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Abstract
Perhaps the whole of human history could be summed up with one word:
economy. The law of the home and the home of all law. Without fail, this situation results
in a structured devotion that must decide what to do with desire. And the economic
decision often follows a violent trajectory, most commonly described as sacrifice. Today,
states will make efforts to conceal this underlying logic, but the insidious configurations
of ‘real politik’ usually surface with a frightening intensity.
My project considers these problematic vestiges through Emmanuel Levinas’s
reconfiguration of subjectivity. To address these bio-historical realities, my work
highlights the role of the martyr in Levinas’s philosophy. As with other philosophical and
religious concepts, I argue that Levinas inverts the dynamic of martyrdom by deposing
the fundamentally agential subject. From this redefinition of the martyr as primary
subjectivity emerges a politics of recurrence—in stark contrast to the politics of
sovereignty dominant in the framework of a liberal nation-state. I place Levinas’s
conception of the subject alongside Girard’s analysis of mimetic desire, out of which
develops a different desire, which I here name “expropriative desire.” In the move from
appropriation to expropriation, a space is opened for the aforementioned politics of
recurrence, with an infinite demand serving as the catalyst for emancipatory struggle.
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Chapter 1: A History of Violence
A. The Problem
This project addresses the problems of both interpersonal and state-sanctioned
violence through Emmanuel Levinas’s reconfiguration of subjectivity. To address these
bio-historical realities, my work highlights the role of the martyr in Levinas’s philosophy.
However, as with other philosophical and religious concepts, I argue that Levinas inverts
the dynamic of martyrdom by deposing the fundamentally agential subject.1 Specifically,
this deposition implies a martyr, or witness-bearer, that is not a distinct category of
practice separate from the structure of subjectivity itself. In other words, the martyr for
Levinas, would be another name for the pre-reflective constitution of the subject instead
of a certain volitional effort related to a particular belief or set of beliefs. From this
redefinition of the martyr as primary subjectivity emerges a politics of recurrence—in
stark contrast to the politics of sovereignty dominant in the framework of a liberal nationstate.2

1
By agential, I intend specifically a rational, self-legislating being. Levinas questions this
assumption throughout his work.
2

I understand the politics of any nation-state to be focused on a mythologized continuity, a
narrative of expansion and development. This is not necessarily geographical, but it can take on that
meaning. Sovereignty, like providence, functions as a kind of legitimation of the expansion. By recurrence,
I understand a constant interrogation of political structure, a fracturing of tentative foundations that feign
stability.

1

Historically, martyrdom has signaled a political approach predicated on
spectacularity.3 The more brutal the punishments and the bolder the sacrifice, the greater
success of martyrdom on the whole. The late historian, Lacey Baldwin Smith, even went
so far as to suggest that martyrdom offered a “new life form that emerged from the shock
of cultural conflict and political crisis.”4 No matter the specifics, the performance of
persecution on the part of martyrs has engineered both sympathy and conviction, both of
which in turn have created conditions for the growth of specific movements. In these
instances, the tools of martyrs map nicely onto the cultural background of both Ancient
Rome and contemporary U.S. society. Meeting the force of the state with a dramatic
refusal assumes not just the possibility of war but its inevitability. Cloaked in ideological
language and amplified by religious devotion, the martyr becomes a political tool for
minority communities.5 Thus, the martyr does not historically disavow violence as much
as employ it for religio-political ends.
As it concerns the nearly omnipresent threat of violence in both ancient and
contemporary settings, no theorist has contributed more to account for this than René
Girard.6 His mimetic theory of desire combined with its extension, the victimage

3

See Elizabeth Castelli, Martyrdom and Memory: Early Christian Culture Making (New York:
Columbia University Press, 2004), Robin Darling Young, In Procession before the World: Martyrdom as
Public Liturgy in Early Christianity (Milwaulkee, WI: Marquette University Press, 2001), and Candida
Moss, Ancient Christian Martyrdom: Diverse Practices, Theologies, Traditions (New Haven, CT: Yale
University Press, 2012).
4

Fools, Martyrs, Traitors (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1997): 362.

5

See Daniel Boyarin on James C. Scott’s work, in Dying for God: Martyrdom and the Making of
Christianity and Judaism (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999): 40-50.
6

Violence and the Sacred (London: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing
Plc, 2017); Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1987).

2

mechanism, offer a non-agential evolutionary account of religio-cultural transmission
through the lens of sacrifice. Here is where Girard himself serves as a first interruption of
the politics of sovereignty. By announcing the mechanism and working to increase its
visibility, the efficacy of sacrificial violence is reduced. This serves as a major
intervention in pausing and inverting the dynamic of martyrdom, if not the entirety of
historical governance, since both employ spectacle as a rhetorical gesture aimed at
conversion.7
Within this context, I argue that Levinas expands the Girardian interruption and
inversion. For Girard, the Gospel accounts of Jesus are testimonies to an intervention
supernatural in nature whose goal is to overturn the entire sacrificial system. While
commendable in its creative challenge to both Christian orthodoxy and scientists’
increasing aversion to all things religious, Girard’s account subtly truncates the universal
significance of mimetic theory.8 Here Levinas serves as a curative insofar as he does not
locate the address to violence in a voluntaristic god but rather focuses his investigation on
the fundamental relationality of human beings. Like Girard, Levinas fully embraces the
prophetic insights of Judeo-Christian tradition. Often, he describes his scholarly practice
as a translation of the Bible into Greek, which means for him the language of

7

My use of the word, “pause,” stems from the work of my advisor, Dr. Sarah Pessin, whose
descriptions of Levinasian subjectivity and the politics that might derive from it, foreground the role of
pause—temporal and ontological. See her discussion with Benjamin Noyes on The New Polis: Critical
Conversations (3)-The Politics of Pause, Struggling Over Speed for Better Futures.
(https://thenewpolis.com/2020/11/16/the-politics-of-pause-struggling-over-speed-for-better-futures-criticalconversations-3/). The working title for her forthcoming work is Pardon, Pause, and Politics: Rereading
Levinas from Existence to the Existent.
8

I concede that he does not wish to do so, and in fact argues the contrary throughout his work.
However, it is at least a matter of debate as to whether he succeeds in his arguments for universal
application.

3

philosophy.9 However, Levinas emphasizes the recurrence of an infinite demand not
limited to a particular space-time, or people.10 Of course, he begins, as we all do, within a
world that has nurtured him and provided him with a language to serve and articulate.11
But the demand of the Other, which is borne by the martyr, is recurrent. It does not
reference a special event, but instead the most mundane of events that happen so
frequently as to be unseen. It has always already occurred anywhere human communities
develop.
The disposition of a martyr, then, is not adjusted to the spectacular but rather what
is on the margins of attention—what I will later reference as the unexplored horizons of
phenomenology. Levinas’s martyr is another name for the subject and does not seek
attention so as to secure favor in the eyes of a deity or community. Instead, Levinas’s
subject only emerges out of the responsibility to another that can never be finally named.
Unplaceable and inextricable, this constitutive relationality is the inverted announcement
that is never complete but forever recurrent. The violence of the sacred (sacrifice) in both
its interpersonal and political forms, remains a threat to human community, even if it
founds civil society.12 Herein lies part of the difficulty and necessity of martyrdom in
Levinas’s philosophy. How to bear witness without succumbing to the temptation to

9

With Gary D. Mole, Beyond the Verse: Talmudic Readings and Lectures (London: Continuum,

2007).
10
Drew M. Dalton, “Phenomenology and the Infinite: Levinas, Husserl, and the Fragility of the
Finite,” Levinas Studies 9 (2014): pp. 23-51, https://doi.org/10.5840/levinas201494.
11

Adriaan Peperzak, “Levinas’ Method,” Research in Phenomenology 28, no. 1 (1998): pp. 110125, https://doi.org/10.1163/156916498x00074.
12

See Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence,” On Violence, June 2007, pp. 268-285,
https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv120qr2d.23.
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sovereignly assert and thereby void the life of another human? How to resist sacrificial
violence in such a way that refuses thaumaturgical coalitions subject to mimetic desire?
These and related questions have shaped my research into the significance of martyrdom
for our time, even though it is indeed a different time and martyr that I theorize here
following Levinas.
However, before expounding on Levinas’s contribution to this discussion, I want
to briefly outline mimetic theory. According to Girard, homo sapiens are fundamentally
mimetic. While he concedes that imitative development occurs elsewhere in the natural
world, nowhere is it as significant as for anatomically modern humans (AMH). This
intensified imitative behavior produces desire, which consequently leads to conflict when
the desires converge on a single object. In other words, inquisitive mimesis is the
morphological precursor to appropriative mimesis.13 For Girard, desire is a triangulated
phenomenon. The subject (S) desires an object (O) because the model (M) for S desires
O. (A model here implies another person with particular influence over S.) In other
words, S only desires O because M desires O. The desire of S is not particular to S but is
actually the internalization of M’s desire by S. This mediated desire strongly suggests
that a subject’s model will become the rival (another S) that stands in the way of the
satisfaction of a particular desire, namely the possession of an object. In addition to this
fundamental process of mediation, a further question is introduced by mimetic theory. Is
the desire mediated by an external model, or does the model belong to the same sociopolitical space and/or bio-historical community—is the model supernatural and quite

13

René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, pp. 7-9.

5

possibly fictional or one more earthly, as in another human? In both instances, desire
leads to a potential conflict, but in the case of external mediation (supernatural, or
fictional), the rival has no blood to shed; since the rival is either a god or a fictional
character, all sacrifice here would be merely symbolic. Therefore, externally mediated
desire does not necessarily lead to violent conflict the way that internally mediated desire
can and often does.14 From these premises, one might conclude that human communities
would have eventually constructed a response to the violence of total destruction (‘a war
of all against all’), which indeed seems to have occurred.
Mimetic theory is an account of human origins that stresses both the disposition to
violence of human communities as well as the effective means for displacing a
destructive violence with a lesser violence i.e. bad violence dispelled by good violence.
Or to put it a different way, violence is good if it dispels other violence that is potentially
more destructive. To illustrate this point, Girard references the modern judiciary. The
State, through the vehicle of its judicial body, dispenses what is deemed an acceptable
violence to prevent potentially worse violence from tearing at the fabric of a precariously
situated community of human beings all pursuing various ends. At present, countless
theorists have effectively analyzed modern institutions as inherently violent in their
origin and practice, none more so than Michel Foucault.15 However, only Girard has

14

Emanuele Antonelli, “Modern Pathologies and the Displacement of the Sacred,” in The
Palgrave Handbook of Mimetic Theory and Religion, eds. James Alison and Wolfgang Palaver (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2017): pp. 319-320.
15

See especially Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed., trans. Alan Sheridan
(New York: Vintage Books, 1995) and Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France,
trans. Graham Burcell, eds. Michel Senellart and Francois Ewald (New York: Picador Press, 2009).

6

accounted for this development from a non-agential evolutionary perspective.16 In other
words, the development of institutions tasked with managing the deployment of violence
is an evolutionary adaptation. And if mimesis is the hallmark of human behavior—apart
from the instinctual drive to feed oneself and find shelter—then the current iteration of
public institutions should not be all that surprising, even if undesirable.
Extending my analysis of Girardian theory a bit more, the mimetic crisis
provoked by mimetic desire can go in at least two different directions. Either the
community plunged into distress by conflictual mimesis achieves no resolution of the
crisis and thereby enters a spiral of violence that will ultimately lead to cultural
extinction, or a mechanism for displacement emerges that affords the community an
opportunity to restore a certain stability, albeit one unstable due to the structure of
hominid desire. For Girard, sacrificial religion is the name given to the mechanism in its
myriad guises. In religious practice—prehistoric religious practice to be precise—the
violent gazes of all converge on a victim, thereby creating a burden-bearer.17 This
burden-bearer will become a witness for Jewish and Christian communities later on,
testifying, for Girard, to the evolutionary significance of the intertwined traditions.18 As a
witness, the victim offers testimony that threatens to undo the efficacy of the practice.

16

Paul Dumouchel, “Genes and Mimesis: Structural Patterns in Darwinism and Mimetic Theory,”
in How We Became Human: Mimetic Theory and the Science of Evolutionary Origins (East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University Press, 2015): pp. 31-32.
17

The burden borne in this situation is the sin of the community.

18

In Ancient Israelite and later Jewish practice, an animal bears the burden of sin for the
community. Thus, human sacrifice is displaced by the substitution of a non-human being. Girard sees this
as an important modification that will itself become finally removed by the ultimate substitutionary
atonement in Jesus, whom Christians recognize as the Messiah. In other words, reform becomes abolition.

7

However, in most communities this testimony is refused in favor of the narrativized
explanation that accounts for both the frightening instability and euphoric return of order
to the community. Specifically, the victim suffers the threatening violence of
“undifferentiation,” and after death, the victim is viewed affectionately by members of
the restored community.19 They misrecognize (méconnaisance) the victim as the source
of both the disorder and restoration, leading to eventual deification. Though in reality the
victim is not responsible for the undifferentiation, the community attributes the disorder
to some transgression by the victim, which justifies the sacrifice. When the community
experiences the return of order, they assume that some ‘awe-some’ power is behind both
the confusion and restoration. Consequently, in Girard’s analysis of religious history,
gods and goddesses were at one time human victims that entered transcendence. As
transcendent, the divine beings provided an opportunity for external mediation and
subsequent transmission of cultural forms. These forms of external mediation provided a
vehicle (sacrifice) for the displacement of ‘extinctive’ violence by a lesser violence.
To be sure, much of Girard’s theory has been contested. Whether in the form of
protests against scientific reductionism or religious eisegesis, mimetic theory has its share
of disciplinary detractors. However, over the past two or three decades a large body of
scholarship has developed around its basic tenets, leading to the formation of a robust
colloquium and academic journal devoted to scholarly refinement of Girard’s insights.
From this industrious body of research has emerged an increasing amount evidence in

19

By undifferentiation, Girard intends something like the confusion of order and place. To
threaten cultural boundaries is to bring about a violent undoing of community. Thus, the victim of
sacrificial violence ends up carrying the burden of this ‘undifferentiation,’ or confusion of boundaries.
Girard maintains that only through sacrifice does the community have order restored.

8

support of mimetic theory in some form or other. Two collections in particular, How We
Became Human: Mimetic Theory and the Science of Evolutionary Origins and Can We
Survive Our Origins? Readings in René Girard’s Theory of Violence and the Sacred,
explore the evidence in detail and respond to various critiques—scientific and
otherwise.20 Palgrave Macmillan has also released a rather lengthy tome discussing the
intersection of mimetic theory with several academic disciplines and broader
contemporary issues (Footnote 4). All of this is to say that mimetic theory is here to stay.
It’s hard to imagine any such ‘grand’ theory of human origins that would achieve
consensus outside of a strictly quantitative approach, one supposedly free from the
ideological baggage of our religious past. Of course, that is precisely the point of Girard’s
analysis and its importance. We are not free of this past, which constitutes us as biohistorical creatures. It stubbornly remains at the root of our personal and geo-political
quandaries.
Girard is certainly not the first theorist to have taken a serious interest in the
disproportionately violent tendencies of hominids not observed in other animal
communities. And my own interest in Girard should not be taken to lend support to the
growing sentiment that humans are simply a pariah, wherein each human birth is an
imposition on the planet.21 With Girard, I would say that suggestions like these are
burdened by a certain idolatrous relation to rational agency, a view that I will critique

20

For How We Became Human, see footnote 6. The second title is edited by Pierpaolo Antonello
and Paul Gifford (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, 2015).
21

Rebecca Tuhus-Dubrow,”I Wish I’d Never Been Born: The Rise of the Anti-Natalists,”
accessed on January 16, 2020, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/14/anti-natalists-childfreepopulation-climate-change.

9

throughout this text. Philosophically, meditations on human avarice and violent behavior
are found throughout the ‘sacred texts,’ from Ecclesiastes to Leviathan, and so Girard
stands on shoulders previously engaged in the work of troubling discernment. It is, after
all, a difficult thing to acknowledge one’s full desire to obtain an object or way of life by
any means necessary. I would wager that many of us have been conditioned to sublimate
this desire for more conventional ends i.e. domestic life within the confines of a nationstate predicated on religious sensibilities.22 In other words, it has often been said that one
should remain silent if unable to offer ‘polite’ words—polite itself etymologically tied to
the law of politics: the ban.23 Polite words, the only kind that ‘should’ be offered, are
those that would reinforce the exclusionary law of the political—which as Girard
suggests, is originally, and ‘originarily,’ the law of all religio-cultural formations.24
Where culture thrives, violent displacement (through sacrifice or exile) has occurred.
Consequently, the backlash to Girard’s theory of the victimage mechanism is
expected because of the very law, or misrecognition, for which he provides an
evolutionary account. I do not intend to crowd this over-saturated critical space, but
instead wish to provide a supplement to Girard’s account. As much as Girard might serve
as a corrective to certain modern assumptions, my work asks if this inversion of both
sacrifice and martyrdom is as expansive as it could be. In providing a non-agential

22
It is impossible to enumerate the seemingly endless list of philosophical productions on this
topic. For general reference, I would suggest https://politicaltheology.com and https://jcrt.org.
23

See Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and the Production of Bare Life, trans.
Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998): p. 49.
24

I use the term ‘originary’ at times to indicate not a chronologically prior event but a recurrent
source. Original often references the past, but originary highlights the ‘immemorial’ past in the present.

10

evolutionary account of culture, has he not also reduced subjectivity to a function. Is
there an otherwise, without resorting to a god that directly intervenes? If it is the case that
the only agency belongs to a god, that is not only a problem philosophically but also
theologically.25 To be fair, it was Michel Serres that first identified Girard’s account as a
non-agential evolutionary perspective, but Girard’s theory nevertheless has issues with
which it must deal. Specifically, how could humans be otherwise either before or after the
Christ-event, which Girard understands to be the complete overturning of the sacrificial
system?
I cannot help but wonder if Girard’s conditioning by two of the ‘masters of
suspicion,’ namely Freud and Nietzsche, secured a particular assignment for the human.26
Disoriented and repressed, the human is unpredictably violent and tremendously virile for
both thinkers, and I suspect Girard assumes as much. The issue for him is how and why
humans are this way and moreover, what structures must be in place for this creature to
not entirely sabotage the species? In other words, Girard begins his inquiry with an
assumption that humans are historically entangled in both potential and actual rivalries,
conflicts that have continued to result in great violence worldwide. From this assumption,
Girard’s questions take form: What causes these rivalries? What prevents them from
being worse than they might otherwise be?27

25
Presumably, according to the text Girard claims for his own, humans are created in the image of
God. This would imply a level of responsibility that serves as a condition for the qualitatively enhanced
experience culture is thought to provide.
26

On many occasions, Girard had remarked that Nietzsche was the greatest theologian, and
Freud’s insight is writ large in Violence and the Sacred,, his criticism of psychoanalysis notwithstanding.
27

My suggestion here does not overlook the fact that Girard’s testimony relates the story of a
literary theorist converted to cultural anthropology and ultimately, to Christianity. However, as with

11

B. Deposing the Subject
As with all questions, cultural context is undeniable. Therefore, asking a different
question is speaking from a different space, resituating the conversation and challenging
the undergirding assumptions. To paraphrase Walter Mignolo, the present of modernity is
the present of Europe, and the critique of its ‘fictions’ is the enunciation from a different
space and time.28 My suggestion—which I hope will be evident throughout this work—is
that the deposition of the modern subject is part of the work required for the emergence
of a ‘pluriverse,’ complete with ‘pluritopic’ hermeneutics and alternately framed
subjectivities creating worlds in which ‘other’ worlds can exist.29 And to reference
Mignolo once more, the work of some European theorists, along with other scholars the
world over, co-constitutes a decolonial pluriverse.30 Of this international collection, the
work of Emmanuel Levinas is primary for my research. Before saying more about how
the following chapters will approach this situation, I want to briefly share why
phenomenology strikes me as particularly well-suited to aid in the dismantling of certain
‘totalitarian’ presuppositions, namely the subject as rational master and autonomous
legislator.

everyone, I assume Girard carried culturally conditioned assumptions into his scholarship and thereby saw
ample evidence that testified to the persistence of the almost ‘demonic’ disposition of human beings, a
recurrence that could only be adequately addressed by supernatural intervention.
28

With Catherine Walsh, On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis (Durham, NC: Duke
University Press, 2018), pp. 110-111.
29

By deposition, I mean simply the evacuation of a particular notion of the human as “virile,” or
“able,” as master of his destiny. By presenting a subject as primarily affected, phenomenology lessens the
‘power’ of the subject and frees it for responsibility, especially in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. The
earliest sections of the text attempt a brief account of some ways in which phenomenology attempts this,
albeit insufficiently in certain respects.
30

Ibid., 105-133.
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Personally, I can attribute a certain therapeutic effect to the school of inquiry
founded by Edmund Husserl. To begin anew means unraveling the prejudicial assortment
bequeathed to me, and for Husserl, this took the form of ‘bracketing.’ Convinced of the
possibility of a complete extrication from metaphysical bias, Husserl presented his new
method as “eidetic analysis.” His was a study of consciousness freed from discordant
elements that prevented intuitive clarity in the sciences. In other words, Husserl sought to
achieve a ground, an effort about which I will say more in the following chapter. As
naïve as it now seems, the largesse of the project indicated both the urgency and
difficulty of the situation: how to reach a level of generalization that would stabilize the
increasing volatility of intellectual and geo-political discourse. Despite Husserl’s repeated
failures, or perhaps through them, a movement of thinkers formed in response to and
guided by his work, the first of which was Martin Heidegger. As with Husserl, more will
be mentioned of Heidegger in the following chapter, but suffice it to say, his efforts
contributed the most to the work of Emmanuel Levinas, whose insights frame the lion’s
share of my investigation. In no uncertain terms, Levinas haunts, guides, and chastens my
efforts here. Levinas has steered me in a particular direction for a number of reasons, not
least of which because he responded to underlying anxieties about the assurances of
Western thought as it had been transmitted to me, both philosophically and theologically.
Like Girard, Levinas deeply challenges stubbornly held assumptions about the nature of
human subjectivity, specifically its ‘masterful’ ability to free itself from materiality. And
just as importantly, he introduces an alternate temporality to expound on the possibility of
justice.

13

As I made clear earlier in this chapter, for Girard, history is violence—complete
with gruesome ‘slaughter-bench’ (G.F.W. Hegel) and its philosophical justification:
progress. The ‘purposive’ movement first analyzed by Kant continues to lend itself to all
forms of psychological gerrymandering, notwithstanding the overwhelming scientific
evidence.31 If people are convinced that violence—however horrific—is necessary, they
are willing to accept it and even perpetuate it. Here, Levinas and Girard are in complete
agreement. In his theory of the ‘victimage mechanism,’ Girard proposes that religion—in
its varied guises—seeks to reduce the violence endemic to our species by ritually
deploying it. And while this account achieves a certain consistency and elegance as a
non-agential explanation for most cultural forms, I contend that it lacks a sufficient
response to the challenge it poses, namely violence. Herein lies Levinas’s major
contribution to the question of violence. Unlike Girard, whose entire system is predicated
on the ‘fact’ that our species is always and has always been disproportionately violent,
Levinas allows for an “immemorial” command that constitutes the subject as both
infinitely responsible and impossibly burdened by its inability to ever completely respond
to the demand. The martyr is this infinite response, which is not a way of elevating
subjectivity to the level of a god but rather indexing the ceaseless recurrence of the
Other’s demand. To Girard’s credit, he recognizes the challenge of violence but appears
to prefer ‘supernatural’ intervention to address it. Levinas also recognizes the challenge
of violence, but instead of an avowedly supernatural response, finds it addressed in the

31

“Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View” (1784), trans. Lewis White
Beck, in On History (Indianapolis, IN: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1963). I use the term
“gerrymandering” to highlight the ornate geographies of cultures and minds decidedly in favor of
justification concerning human progress. In such systems of thought and practice—mental principalities—
the violence of history is treated as the necessary means to the end of a perfect political constitution.

14

command that is visible in the smallest of acts that often go unnoticed; the offer of bread
from one to another in the midst of a famine is but one example. To quote from George
Eliot, “The growing good of the world is partly dependent on unhistoric acts; and that
things are not so ill with you and me as they might have been, is half owing to the
number who lived faithfully a hidden life.”32 The heroic subject seeks a stage, according
to Girard, thereby investing ritual with a mimetic desire—in this case the desire for
prestige in the manner that Georges Bataille analyzes in The Accursed Share.33 Removed
from the spectacular gaze, Levinas’s martyr, by contrast, is contorted in the most extreme
manner, pushed out, prohibited from return or prestige. As an un-historic figure, the
divided one in Levinas is unknown—at least outside of the chronological adornment of
cultural space.
The command in Levinas issues forth from an ‘elsewhere,’ unmapped because
outside of illuminated spatial coordinates. It is incapable of even being re-cognized
because of its refusal of presence. It does not command attention but rather always slips
away before one becomes conscious of anything having happened. The word ‘god,’ or
‘God,’ might be applied in these instances, but I contend that it need not be. Nothing in
Levinas’s oeuvre necessitates theology, but it does evince an ethics, or perhaps an ethics
of ethics, since it is concerned with a pre-theoretical, embodied process manifested
(‘said’) in the many different ethical systems.34 Just as Girard’s notion of religion
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suggests a unifying ‘phenomenon’ discerned in the different forms, so too does Levinas
argue for a singular imperative an-archically situated before all others. The command
issued by the unplaceable Other is always a version of “Do not kill me.” And yet, as
Levinas reminds us, the Other is simultaneously the one I most want to kill because of the
supreme imposition on my freedom.
The relationship with the Other does not move (as does cognition) into
enjoyment and possession, into freedom; the Other imposes himself as an
exigency that dominates this freedom, and hence as more primordial than
everything that takes place in me. The Other, whose exceptional presence
is inscribed in the ethical impossibility of killing him in which I stand,
marks the end of powers. If I can no longer have power over him it is
because he overflows absolutely every idea I can have of him (TI, 87).
The Other is not a theoretical possibility but an ineradicable and even undesirable
insistence without which I am not. The Other-in-Me, or the One-for-the-Other, which
Levinas will name “substitution,” is the interposition of victimhood, the only means by
which the violence that Girard identifies can be halted. I repeat that the martyr is this
infinite interposition-as-response. Only through the constraint of a victim’s cry and
demand does the “me” that hears it stand a chance of becoming an “I.” And if Girard is
accurate in his assessment of the role of sacrifice in human culture, then only an affective
force from the victim can wrest the conatively disposed self, free of its appropriative
desire. Girard’s work has little to say at this point, other than conflating Christianity and
secularization—a transition celebrated by Gianni Vatimo but not born out by the global
evidence of religious re-imagining.35 All this is not to say that I find the mimetic theory
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developed by Girard and others to be wrong, but rather that I find it insufficient, in need
of a critical supplement. In particular, I contend that mimetic theory too often reduces
subjectivity to processual residue instead of the nagging mystery that it is.36 As
‘immemorial,’ nothing Levinas wrote and certainly nothing I write, will completely
illuminate or capture it. However, the space for the in-comprehensible is a prerequisite
for responsible life, a life that even Girard seems to commend in his desire for its
compatibility with meaning.
A new kind of humanity is in the process of gestation; it will be both very
similar to and very different from the one featured in the dreams of our
Utopian thinkers, now in their very last stages. We are now absolutely
unable to understand and for a long time we shall still understand only
very inadequately….37
In place of signification as structured reference, Levinas’s constitutive demand of human
alterity signifies beyond signification, as expression—the expressiveness of the Face. But
it is not that we currently “see through a glass darkly;” it is not a question of visibility at
all. Yes, the Hebraic God is aniconic, but more importantly, this Other/God speaks. The
Other’s countenance is never entirely circumscribed by my intention, but the suffering
call has the potential to overwhelm my virility more than any other possible obstacle.38 In
other words, I am disarmed and obligated in a way that I can refuse but by which I will

divergences of Vattimo and Girard, see Christianity, Truth, and Weakening Faith: A Dialogue, trans.
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remain haunted. The meaning of the Other-as-Victim is lived in responsibility that is
infinite, a movement to which we are given by the Other-in-the-Same.
By supplementing the mimetic theory of culture with Levinas’s reconfiguration of
subjectivity-as-ethics, my work will provide space for a re-visioned martyrdom. Herein
lies the crux of my argument: the martyr is the interposition of the Victim, or Other,
whose inescapable and unbearable demand is borne in the witness of one-for-the-Other.
Substitution is another name for this ‘interpositional’ movement that lies at the heart of
subjectivity.39 What Girard has rightly recognized as the persistent problem behind
myriad others in human society, Levinas addresses with his exploration of the
heteronomously fluid and thus, an-archic origins of the human subject. By inverting
martyrdom and resituating it within the wider context of conflictual mimesis and
appropriative desire, I contend that a new politics emerges. This politics of recurrence has
within it the mechanism for both overcoming the motivational deficit of liberal
democracies and avoiding the violent catharsis of revolutionary regimes. This is not to
imply a magic key, but rather a stubborn demand from which we cannot escape. As it
concerns the reasoning behind my choice of ‘martyr,’ I would suggest that Levinas
prompted it.
The fact of exposing oneself to the charge imposed by the suffering and
wrongdoing of others posits the oneself of the I. I alone can, without
cruelty, be designated as victim. The I is the one who, before all decision,
is elected to bear all the responsibility for the World. Messianism is that
apogee in Being—a reversal of being “persevering in his being”—which
begins in me.40
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Not free to choose but chosen to bear witness (“all the responsibility for the World”) for
the Other, as the Other, to the ‘Other Others’ is the pre-theoretical, pre-reflective
movement that creates the subject ex nihilo.41 The Other’s humility and poverty results in
a non-presence that avoids the designation of creator. Another word for this asymmetrical
condition is “proximity,” which I will further examine in Chapter Four.
C. Phenomenological Rumblings
Despite the temptation to move directly to Levinas from Girard, I decided to
begin this work with a brief exposition of Levinas’s predecessors, Edmund Husserl and
Martin Heidegger. I am convinced that phenomenology has deflated and deposed the
modern European subject. From within the hallowed register of formal systems and
neurobiological discoveries, Husserl emerged with a robust critique and proposal to the
chagrin of many a colleague. Along with Daniel Zahavi, I contend that intentionality is
the springboard for everything Husserl sought to develop.42 As the philosophical
mathematician reasoned, radical openness to the flux of life would guard against
metaphysical contamination and unscientific prejudice. Husserl’s project was possessed
of an ambition rarely encountered, but the very size of his undertaking would result in a
complete expenditure of time and resources. His mind never stopped correcting perceived
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missteps along the way, since he hoped that in doing so to clear space for a truly
enlightened civilization. Enthused by the heroic ideals of his generation, Husserl’s
science of “pure possibilities” did launch a radically new program resulting in
“actualities” that he could not have foreseen and dared not imagine.43 By establishing a
strong correlation between intentionality and intuition, Husserl believed he was
approaching the completion of the vicious regress into which the sciences had been
thrown by their own operations. Like Kant before him, Husserl is primarily concerned
with how there can be objective truth without the abolition of the subject. And whereas
Kant finds the subject in moral action, Husserl emphasizes the constitutive power of the
subject. This is precisely where Levinas will take issue with Husserl.
Chapter Two then moves into a discussion of one of the primary influences and
rivals of Levinas, his former teacher Martin Heidegger. The deposed subject is more
clearly evinced in Heidegger’s work, since Being undergirds the illuminative power of
the human being. Unlike Husserl, whose transcendental ego constitutes the subject,
object, and life-world, Heidegger stresses the disclosive capacity of the subject. Not so
much creator as devotee, Heidegger’s philosophy stresses the relationship between a
subject and the ground of subjectivity, the Ursprung. Consequently, Heidegger’s
philosophy can be described as a metaphysics of metaphysics, wherein Dasein is both the
site of disclosure and the conjunction of essences.44 It is the sensible capacity of Dasein

43

Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1960): p. 65, as cited in The Essential Husserl: Basic Writings in Transcendental
Phenomenology, ed. Donn Welton (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1999): p. 307.
44

See Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. Richard Taft (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1990) and Brian Hansford Bowles, “Sensibility and Transcendence in Kant and the
Problem of Metaphysics,” Philosophy Today 44 (4): pp. 347-365.

20

that offers the possibility of a world, something not altogether foreign to the Husserlian
phenomenology in which he had been steeped. In fact, much of my effort in Chapter Two
emphasizes the thread that connects Husserl and Heidegger, while acknowledging the
different philosophical tones struck by each. This resonance enables my own project to
demonstrate continuity and clarify the departure signaled in Levinas’s work as it formed
a critical relationship to phenomenology. Thus, I conclude this chapter by indicating
general differences between Levinas’s philosophical movements and those of both
Husserl and Heidegger.45
Having examined an important part of Levinas’s philosophical foundation,
Chapter Three affords me the opportunity to follow certain strained trajectories in
Levinas’s work: Nudity, Passivity, and Solitude. These tentative categories serve as
guideposts for my project on the martyr, rather than ultimate frames, since enclosing
Levinas’s philosophy would violate what I contend are his methodological principles. At
best, they create space in which to immerse thought and glean both moral and political
passages into the task of bearing witness in a contemporary setting.
I divide the section on “Nudity” into sub-sections on Shame and Eros.
Exemplified throughout his work, these terms register a different valence than elsewhere
in the history of philosophy. Shame is not a moral category indicating some inherent
impurity or transgressive nature, but rather a vulnerability. It refers to the fundamental
binding that names the subject as a material reality. Aspirational motives
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notwithstanding, human subjectivity is concretely embodied. All efforts to evacuate this
manner of comportment are futile and can be devastatingly violent. This points to one of
Levinas’s primary arguments against liberalism—specifically its political variant.
The source of the bloody barbarism of National Socialism lies not in some
contingent anomaly within human reasoning, nor in some accidental
ideological misunderstanding….Such a possibility still threatens the
subject correlative with being as gathering together and as dominating
[l’être-à-reassembler et à-dominer], that famous subject of transcendental
idealism that before all else wishes to be free and thinks itself free. We
must ask ourselves if liberalism is all we need to achieve an authentic
human dignity for the human subject.46
Recalcitrant liberalism refuses the body, those elementary feelings stoked by all forms of
fascism with calls of “Blut und Boden!” Along with this refusal is an unintended
judgment leveled against the inevitability of exposure. As concrete, the subject cannot do
otherwise than be, rendering it ‘shamefully unable.’ But presupposed virility—a myth
that conditions the failure of subjective aspiration—engenders an awakening antithetical
to the supposed intentions of liberalism. Thus, as Levinas sees it, liberalism is responsible
for the Fascist awakening of the 20th century, an insight that I would argue today is more
prescient than ever. The more the liberal notion of freedom is signaled, the stronger the
reaction of the Body and its bodies against the frustrated expectation. As a carry-over
from the privilege of the visual, liberal idealism denies the significance of the uncanny
call from the Other-in-the-Same. Instead, it opts for the exclusion of all martyrs except
those that ‘appear’ to serve the ends of liberal democracy; otherwise, the burden-bearer is
a terrorist that must be thwarted by any means necessary.
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As part of my analysis of shame within the context of Levinas’s writings, I
incorporate the work of Steven Larocco, whose notion of “commiserative shame” draws
heavily on Levinas, Primo Levi, and Giorgio Agamben.47 Though I discuss a Levinasianinspired politics only in Chapters Four and Five, with Larocco I begin the important work
of identifying intersections between phenomenological analyses of shame and political
engagement. Consequently, it is important to at least hint at certain positive political
constructions for readers of Levinas. Too often, he has been mislabeled a provincial
political thinker, or perhaps an ethicist in need of more astute political analysis.48
Larocco’s work is part of the correction necessary to forestall any additional caricatures.
Likewise, my project is consciously involved in this process, through the lens of a
distinctly religio-political concept: martyrdom.
If the shame of nudity is vulnerability, or to be more specific the inability to be
otherwise, there is nevertheless a certain pleasure in the exposure. Eros is the name given
to this un-intended journey, one not destined but enjoyed. Yet, this enjoyment relates not
merely to the journey of a caress but also the sating of hunger. The carnal desire for food
is perhaps one of the better descriptions of eros in all of Levinas’s work. Only increased
by temporary address, hunger grows in relation to its satisfaction. From the time food is
provided to the body, the process of decomposition insures desire for similar
nourishment. This asymmetrical function highlights the futility of a discourse that seeks
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closure. Easy and rigid descriptors for the erotic only intensify the shadowy alterity
envisaged in its movement. I argue instead that eros and shame aid in the exposition of
vulnerability as exorbitantly ultramaterial (TI, 256). This is the primordial condition of
the subject for Levinas, who is given—as elected—to the Other in need. Before choosing
to be exposed to the Other, I am chosen as exposed by the Other.49
Connected to my treatment of nudity is the uncomfortable category of “Passivity.”
An affront to the liberal commendation of free-will, Levinas offers a subject that lives up
to its name. As subjected, a person emerges in the world as one constrained by the
demand of another. However, the passivity that Levinas explores is not a passivity that
could be welcomed with choice, but one that has been evacuated of all sovereignty. This
end of mastery is the condition for an event that one can no longer assume. Not merely an
epistemological counterweight, but a tacit refusal of the primacy of explorative
consciousness, the passivity announced here testifies to an expenditure without return.
Response to the demand prevents the longed-for return to security, which in turn opens
the possibility of relationship.
Passivity also argues for a heteronomous beginning, a point of origin outside of
the self that nevertheless manages to take up residence and thus, become localized in
subjectivity. The journey of thought departs from a place not of its choosing. Fatigue is
one way that Levinas tracks this occurrence. When the work of the “here” leaves me too
tired to go on, rest offers shelter from eternity, from the universality of thought and its
essential interlocutors: time and space (EE, 66). The passivity of sleep or exhaustion,
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then, becomes something other than a space, a non-lieu. Not driven by an illusory
freedom that expresses itself through dominion, the passivity on the hither side of
passivity prohibits the usurpation of another’s “place in the sun.”
If subjection is the contractive frame for passivity, then hospitality might be
conceived as the convex. I run the risk of being entirely un-Levinasian in this instance,
since he goes out of his way to explicitly avoid the convex—its verbality aligning as it
does with the self of transcendental idealism. However, I suspect that hospitality is the
heart of his philosophy, even if it must be placed in the same foundry as passivity itself.
Both terms strongly imply a choice, but what I want to argue is that the hospitality
offered by me is inextricable from a conditioning gesture that shapes my intersubjective
comportment. Hospitality reverses the policies of the Same by acknowledging the anarchic founding of the world by an-other not circumscribed by any order. In Jacques
Derrida’s exquisite wor(l)d play on this topic, the host receives the hospitality offered by
the guest, implying that a host is welcomed into a home by the guest the host receives
into the home.50
Exposed to and subjected by the demanding welcome of another, each
intervention runs the risk of “Solitude.” By this term, I intend both a failure to orient and
an aloneness that speaks directly into the abyss of concrete existence. As will be noticed
here, my existence seems to remove me from relation, at least from all that is outside the
epistemological sphere of rational existence. The only hope for this enclosure is a seismic
shift of startling proportions that permits escape. The escape is not one that I accomplish,
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but rather like subjection, happens to me. Recall that the martyr bears witness that is
already given to be borne. Otherwise, “I” forget my subjection and proclaim myself
sovereign, master of all difference that threatens to undo me.
As an existent, “I” am alone in all that I do. In hypostasis, existence witnesses a
countermovement, albeit one that is not fully lived outside of ethical relation to the
Other’s infinite demand. The materiality of the witnessed is central to this response,
described by Levinas as the localization of rest. Sleep is the concavity of existence,
evincing a split at the heart of being itself. Coupled with the infinite demand, the solitude
of departure is chastened, directed towards that which is unplaceable. This aloneness can
be aptly described as haunted, infused with an inescapable insistence that leaves me
unbearably burdened and directed beyond death.
If sovereignty carries a tension that tears apart in subjectivity, disorientation is the
aftermath. Drawing from a collection of essays that explore the intersection of Levinas
with Nietzsche on the death of God, I conclude this chapter with a statement on the effect
of chastened solitude.51 The one abandoned is bereft of structure but not responsibility. In
fact, responsibility is arguably the answer to the loss of structural determinants.52 Without
prescription, the subject is cast onto the plane of a singular response to the immediate
need of another. In this study, I describe this responsible life as a refugee subjectivity, but
rather than geographical expulsion, the subject in Levinas is internally exiled. Unable to
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find refuge in being, or the permutations of being that coalesce into culture, the
disoriented and exposed subject, the martyr, responds without return. No homecoming
awaits, no restitution will ameliorate the burden. For a non-reparative thinker like
Levinas, not even mourning is allowed, since mourning is an attempt to ease the pain.
Unlike the wound that heals through coagulation and the bonding of platelets, the martyr
must bear the gift of election (witness) without repair. This means remaining open,
despite the risks such exposure entails.
If the subject examined thus far is fraught, divided by strained imperatives, then
so also is the subject burdened by this fragile embodiment. And in Chapter Four, I further
divide the burdened one into descriptions of “Unbearable” and “Unbearably Borne.” In
doing so, I aim to highlight how the Levinasian subject—phenomenologically
speaking—is impossible. As impossible, the subject transgresses all that is “proper,”
critiquing notions of ownership and selfhood that are problematically entangled. This is
exactly what Girard himself identifies in his analysis; a subject that is defined by
ownership will inevitably and perhaps immediately encounter another potential owner
that wants the object of desire for both. Of course, Girard is able to provide a mechanism
for this occurrence in his analysis of desire. But as I suggested at the beginning of this
chapter, there is perhaps another mechanism at least, which opens an otherwise than what
is often the case. Stated differently, if Girard accounts for what is often the case,
Levinas’s analysis opens what is possible beneath the material manifestations of desire.
Remember that I put forth Levinasian subjectivity as a countermovement—not
cancellation—to Girard’s hominid. This does not imply a secondary temporality, but it is
experienced as secondary, since it interrupts mimetic desire.
27

The one who bears the unbearable is a witness, and as a witness must offer
testimony—not because of a judicial demand but rather because the Other’s need
overwhelms and reconfigures my desire. In witness, I do not mimetically desire but rather
respond in a singular manner to the specific victim in proximity to me. The primary way I
respond is by offering a gift, though not a gift that could be acknowledged or returned.
Instead, the greatest gift I could give is dispossession of my place in the sun, my “right to
property,” as the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen (1791) maintains.
According to Levinas, this “gifting” has occurred before I could even decide to offer a
gift. The “me” has been already been given to the victim, whose call has laid claim to my
life before I am even aware. This claim leads to a pro-clamation in the form of my life-asgift, and the law of recurrence suggests a never-ending re-clamation of the life that I have
never owned.
If I cannot escape this burden, this is because it remains close enough to affect
me, to produce an irreducible constraint on my action. The proximate situation of the
Other is one of the most important and difficult of Levinas’s concepts. My discussion of
“Proximity” is specifically indebted to Desmond Manderson, whose critical analysis of
the juridico-political apparatus proves invaluable to a fuller understanding of the potential
contained in this term. As Manderson makes clear, proximity is often reduced to spatiotemporal coordinates, thereby muddling the matter to the point of incoherence. In what
has proven to be an impossible deliberation, proximity is often cast aside because of its
imprecision. But, as with other Levinasian theses, the imprecision indexes the pretheoretical nature of the movement. Proximity precedes the awareness of a particular
distance and even provides the condition wherein someone could be near enough to me to
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affect me. Phenomenologically speaking, the modality of proximity is shock. As with
escape from the solitude of material existence, the addicted self must be startled out of its
interest in being.53 Discovering the Other-as-inescapable leads to the necessity of politics:
How to establish an order that insures justice for all Others?
The Other responsible for my rupture will sometimes be described as
transcendent. But this word too often conjures ethereal entities conferring favor from a
place far removed from the tumult of human community. For that reason, I follow Kris
Sealey, who stresses Levinas’s early use of excendence.54 This term introduces a material
transcendence, in contrast to the “otherworldly” varieties foregrounded by numerous
religious traditions and their secular counterparts. And its function is simply the push to
‘get out,’ not to elevate or transform. It is as though matter itself were driven to take
leave of itself but finds itself riveted to Being. As Levinas insists, the push to get out
comes from elsewhere, but not another place. Instead, excendence here names the
demand of another person to take leave of being, to become dis-interested—to not
participate in being—so as to become responsible for the Other. Thus, my ability to
respond is the gift of alterity, even if only in secret.
This leads to the final chapter, “Martyrdom, or Infinite Desire.” If mimetic desire
leads to mimetic conflict and ensuing violence, then Levinas’s martyr must testify to a
different desire. Imitation is undeniably a foundational element in hominization, and
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without mediation of some kind, the conflicts that arise would most certainly destroy
individuals and their communities. However, as a pre-theoretical, pre-reflective demand
at the heart of subjectivity, the Other’s proximity redirects my desire away from
appropriation towards donation, from appetite to generosity.55 The recurrence of what
Critchley has described as the ‘original traumatism’ functions to reverse the direction of
intentionality, pushing me out of egoic addictions spiraling around possession and instead
towards the protection of the most exposed.56 My openness to the nudity of another
produces an intensified attention that thwarts my conative aspirations.
Having worked to develop a version of subjectivity located at a distance from
many accounts, this chapter is the conclusion of my research into Levinas’s defense of
the subject-as-responsibility. As responsible, the subject I theorize interposes for the
victim of group violence, rendering ‘martyr’ as the discovered name of the subject. This
substitution does not occur at the level of subjectivity, which would imply the ability to
interchange myself with another person. And since interchange is effectively exchange,
substitution would then only be another name for the economic circle. The collapse of
difference would signal the destruction of the Other, not a response to the Other’s need.
Thus, the interposition is precisely that, the assumption of the Other’s position-as-victim,
the awareness of solidarity-in-vulnerability. The position of the Other in me, the victim in
the assailant, short-circuits the mechanism of expulsion that Girard has rightfully argued
is central to so much cultural transmission. But what of this different subjectivity, which I
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have argued is a refugee subjectivity, exiled first and foremost from oneself, never to
return home?
To reiterate, the name I have given to this subjectivity is martyr, and its place in
the history of ‘religion’ remains contested and often classified in relation to spectacle and
textual hyperbole.57 As historical and philological analyses, several studies of ancient
martyrs—in particular Christian martyrdom—are remarkable in their detail and
illuminating interpretation of various cultural formations. I have benefited from many of
them, but what I find missing in most, if not all, is a serious consideration of martyrdom
as a viable option today.58 Consigned to the superstitious past or canonized present, a
martyr is always something other than what “I” am, or perhaps something altogether
different than what is actively shaping my subjectivity. This is in large part because of
certain metaphysical assumptions bequeathed to all by the project of modernity. Since my
work is informed by various philosophical assaults on these assumptions, my perspective
on the function of martyrdom is decidedly different. Again, I want to preface my own
theorization with an acknowledgement of the value of prior and contemporary martyrdom
scholarship. It is not that I wish to discredit other examinations, but rather that I find
something of immense philosophical value in the category of a witness, whose struggle to
bear and be borne is extraordinarily timely.
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As a re-valuation of the subject, the expression of martyrdom constitutes a
response to the projected closures of distinctly human existence. And if transhuman or
posthuman futures are integral to relevant philosophical discourse, so too is a fuller
appreciation of what I consider distinctly human, namely the interposition of the Same
for the victimized Other.59 This thesis does not elide the posthuman discussion, but
instead offers a version of the human not often considered. In one sense, it offers the
possibility of a subjectivity neither reducible to bio-chemical processes nor elevated to a
status “little lower than that of angels.” Too often, techno-utopian ideals have shaped the
public’s perception of the future, one that Girard and Kant earlier have cast as
uncertain.60 If a disproportionate tendency to violence exists in hominids, then a hopedfor evolution might just as well be a devolution from the perspective of those whose lives
have been excluded from the “count.”61 In this sense, some versions of posthuman or
transhuman futures look more like overly optimistic Hegelianism than a critical scientific
account of probability or even desirability.
Ultimately, martyrdom is desire, but as such, the martyrdom in question is
inverted. The desire of a martyr is not of an object first desired by her model. This desire
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is not imitative or even productive as in capitalist imagination. Additionally, the martyr’s
desire does not correlate with a politics of spectacularity. Instead, martyrdom-as-desire
characterizes the constraint imposed on me by the suffering of the Other as well as the
gratuity of my response. To say the desire of the martyr, then, would be slightly
misleading, since the martyr is constituted both by an excendent desire to ‘get out’ of
conative trajectories and by the desire of the victim to have a witness, someone who
‘sees’ the injustice and lives in such a way as to forestall this violence. The witness borne
of the aforementioned desires refuses the invisibility of the victim, thereby undoing the
violent entanglement of culture. For Levinas, the one who responds as witness chooses
the position of the victim rather than the victimizer, the lynched as opposed to the lynch
mob.
Far from a historical residue, martyrdom names the possibility of an otherwise
borne subjectivity, one that lives into the position of victim in response to the Other’s
demand. Though various accounts portray martyrdom from the perspective of distinct
groups vying for legitimacy in a marketplace of religious options, I want to insist on
martyr as the name of the human as futur anterieur (future perfect).62 Before ‘other
others’ hear the call of the one sacrificed as victim and see the myriad sacrificial systems
for what they are, the martyr will have heard. The martyr will have interposed him/herself
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for the victim. More revolutionary than any vanguard, the martyr is the requisite desire
for all emancipatory struggles. And unlike most revolutionary advances, the martyr also
names the chastened solitude of a struggling subject—one that is burdened by the
impossible witness. A child of desire, the martyr remains haunted by the demands of all
those who affect him/her in their call.
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Chapter Two: Exposure
A. A Deposed Subject
For thinkers as diverse as Augustine and Descartes, agency is derived from
epistemic conclusions. The cogito implies not merely that I am, but additionally, that I
am able.1 To be more precise my doubting—understood as a power—reveals to me that I
am. And to be, is to be able to effect change, predict outcomes, and most importantly,
guard against the insufferable event.2 Thus, rational agency has become the cornerstone
of both philosophical anthropology and political theology. Discussions of the subject
have remained centered on cognitive ability, although what is loosely described as
“continental philosophy” has endeavored to highlight what I will describe as a politics of
the subject, specifically the sovereignty believed to be part and parcel of modern
governance. This philosophical tendency derives much of its grist from Kant and his
successors, two of whom—Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger—were responsible for
the emergence of phenomenology as a discipline that attempted to reposition the subject.3
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Specifically, I contend that phenomenology launched a program whose tenets
involved a deposition of the subject. In Husserl, this re-situating of the subject hinges on
his description of intentionality, a condition that mandates a permanent openness to the
flux of life. Though the subject is engaged in the constitution of the life-world, the
subject is likewise a product of the fulfillment of intention. This requires a certain faith in
the evidence of sensible intuition, which implies that the world is given to the subject’s
intention, or capacity for fulfillment. Heidegger picks up where Husserl “leaves off,” in
announcing the illuminating capacity of Dasein—Heidegger’s preferred word for the
human in his early work. By courageously receiving the revelation of Being, the subject
is primarily a beneficiary. The end of human subjectivity is the adequate reception of the
revelation of Being. In both Husserl and Heidegger, the subject is constituted as
receptive, a departure from the concepts of “mastery” and “dominion” that had assumed
preeminence in the philosophies of selfhood prior to the 20th century.4 However, for both
philosophers, the receptivity proper to the subject prepares the way for its own kind of
mastery and stratification, since it revolves either around me or an impersonal state of
affairs (Being). Thus, I will argue that only in Levinas does the subject become
fundamentally deposed and thus, transformed into what I will later describe as a martyr.
The remainder of this chapter seeks to carefully describe certain contours and tendencies
in Husserl and Heidegger’s philosophy in order to better analyze the significance of
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Levinas concerning human subjectivity. This is but the first step of preparation for a way
to reconceive martyrdom, as discussed briefly in the introduction to this study. It will
serve as a guidepost for the remainder of the work, and I will refer to it when describing
Levinas’s emphasis on the sensible and subjection, or sacrifice. For Husserl especially, it
is necessary to show the views that he was opposing and thereby, construct a narrative of
a way forward that, in his mind, would finally place objective truth on stable ground.
Transcendental Constitution
A. Counterpoint
In an effort to ground the insights of basic mathematical axioms, which entailed
inquiries into the nature of logical concepts and ideas, Husserl developed a method by
which the “subjective and intersubjective life of consciousness” could be studied more
closely.5 He called this discipline phenomenology, since the investigation takes its cue
from what appears, as it appears. Husserl’s creation of a grand system was designed to
offer humans the security of a stable world that revolved around an “intentional,” or
open-ended subject.6 Herein lies the importance of his work as a departure for Levinas’s
own inquiry into the constitution of human subjectivity.
For Husserl, the subject is essentially active insofar as consciousness is always
directed towards an object. This constitutive opening frames the journey of science, and
thus, the goal of human rationality: a comprehensive approach to understanding the

5
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ground of objectivity. To better understand Husserl’s significance, I now briefly present
the theories against which Husserl often situated phenomenology.
The first was ‘psychologism,’ a child of 19th century optimism and more focused
neurological investigations. This amounted to a reduction of reasoning to unconscious
synaptic transmissions, wherein logic and accompanying disciplines were subordinate to
psychology. If a person wanted to understand them, one needed only to look into the field
of psychology for a sufficient explanation. But as Immanuel Kant made clear a century
before these claims, “in logic we do not want to know how understanding is and thinks
and how it hitherto has proceeded in thinking, but how it ought to proceed in thinking.”7
The issue is not the evolutionary development of the human brain but rather the form of
reasoning that corresponds to validity. And yet, in Husserl’s time (perhaps our own as
well), psychologistic arguments persisted. As Theodor Lipps confidently asserted, laws
of logic are “identical with the natural laws of thinking itself. Logic is a physics of
thinking or it is nothing at all.”8 As part of his Prolegomena, Husserl refutes two of the
consequences of this line of thinking. The first part of the refutation builds on the
“universally accepted” fact of psychology’s empirical nature. As an empirical science, its
laws are at best generalizations about “regularities of coexistence and succession.”9 And
were one to deny the inexactness of these laws, nevertheless, natural laws are not a
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priori. Natural laws are induced, which does not establish the law but merely secures a
greater or lesser probability of the “law” holding. In contrast, the laws of “pure logic” are
established not by induction, but rather by “apodeictic inner evidence.”10
Additionally, psychologism conflates an act with an object. In other words, it
reduces the object perceived—the intentional object in Husserl’s language—to a
psychological state. Both psychologism and naturalism suffer from a reductionistic
tendency, whereas Husserl simply aims for a structure of relation between act and
object.11 More precisely, Husserl seeks a correlational framework that enables the
relation. Not unlike Kantian metaphysics, Husserlian phenomenology is after the
conditions that make possible the connection between mind and world. Against the
claims of psychologism, this is a necessary connection.
Like his critique of psychologism, Husserl also sees his work as a response to the
errors of historicism, specifically the philosophy of Wilhelm Dilthey. As Husserl sees it,
the factual character of historicism binds it inseparably to “psychologistic naturalism.”12
And while historical science is an important corrective to deontological modes of inquiry
into cultural formation, it operates on principles that are objectively valid without
providing a foundation for its procedures. It assumes what it must prove. Husserl himself
acknowledges the significance of the “life-world” for the constitution of the subject, but
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he does not thereby reduce the achievement of objective knowledge to a relative position.
To do so would be an abandonment of the primary goal of science, namely the
development of a comprehensive system of objective truth subject to absolute laws. In
conclusion,
if there is something there whose objective validity philosophical criticism
can refute, then there is also an area within which something can be
grounded as objectively valid…If criticism proves that philosophy in its
historical growth has operated with confused concepts, has been guilty of
mixed concepts and specious conclusions, then if one does not wish to fall
into nonsense, that very fact makes it undeniable that, ideally speaking, the
concepts are capable of being pointed, clarified, distinguished, that in the
given area correct conclusions can be drawn.13
A rigid historicism falls into nonsense, is a self-stultifying claim whose ability to stand is
predicated solely on seductive prose rather than sound reasoning. And in accord with
Emmanuel Levinas’ own contentions at a later date, historicism makes knowledge a
product of the powerful used to deny the Other.
In both cases—psychologism and historicism—objective validity is at stake. If
one wishes to follow Husserl, absolute truth must be affirmed and clarified. To proceed
otherwise would amount to a reversal of civilization, a scenario that Husserl rejected and
yet was forced to live through during the rise of National Socialism in Germany. As will
be shown later in this work, Levinas, like Husserl, affirms truth, but he does not thereby
adopt what he sees as the hyper-rationalism of Husserl as a defense against the violence
of “fiction.” Instead, he adopts a different strategy, quite literally abandoning the ground
of contestation for what he considers a primary space of invocation.
B. Genetic Phenomenology
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Phenomenological analysis requires an absolute constituting subject. Often, this is
referenced by Husserl as the transcendental ego. Not unlike Kant’s transcendental unity
of apperception—albeit much more precise—the transcendental ego is a necessary
presupposition for a cosmos. The order implied by meaning is an achievement of this
process of constitution, and furthermore, this ego is self-constituting. “The ego grasps
himself not only as a flowing life but also as I, who lives this and that subjective process,
who lives through this and that cogito, as the same I.” 14 In other words, the ego is
present to itself and emerges from the intentional act. The concretized ego is a product of
the “multiformity of his intentional life,” but the transcendental ego is the form of
perception itself. Perception demands a percipient. The pure form of perception, stripped
from the particularities of actual existence, nevertheless remains a horizon in which
individual perceptions can occur. Similarly, the singular ego of the eidos perception is not
the particular ego of a person but rather the eidos ego. These forms are pure possibility,
the “source” of my de facto ego. According to Husserl, this eidetic phenomenology is the
fundamental ground of any philosophical science. In other words, “the science of pure
possibilities precedes the science of actualities and alone makes it possible, as a
science.”15
The ego constitutes itself according to universal laws of genesis, which Husserl
prefers to regard as formal regularity. This “self-creation” occurs each moment, not
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unlike the creative God of Descartes, whose activity insures the continuity required for a
meaningful world—a cosmos.16 In the creation of the particular ego (I) is simultaneously
the creation of possibilities for me, namely a Nature, a cultural world, social forms, and
the like. Therefore, the self-constitution of the ego occurs simultaneous to the production
of an ontological horizon.
Here, it is crucially important I make clear that this transcendental ego and the
empirical ego are not two different subjects, but rather two different apprehensions. One
(transcendental) is constitutive, while the other (empirical) is constituted. We might also
label these apprehensions as primary and secondary. Furthermore, for Husserl, the
phenomena he is analyzing are not “mere appearances,” but rather the manifestation of
the thing itself.17 Husserl is not out to disprove the existence of a physical world but
rather to unearth the conditions by which there is a relationship between the
manifestation of objects and constituting consciousness. Genetic phenomenology is
simply a rigorous examination of these conditions.
Consequently, the act of constitution is not causal but conditional. Husserl will
often go to great lengths to insure that causality is not the term used to discuss the
relationship between act and object, which would too easily confuse his discipline with
naturalism.18 Nevertheless, Husserl introduces the distinction between passive and active
genesis, implying a fundamental difference. Activity presupposes passivity for Husserl,
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which for him points to the immanence of the given. This dependence will be later
emphasized by Levinas and others as part of a reconfigured subject in contrast to the
‘masterful’ self of philosophical modernity. Words like “flux,” and “flow” are often
employed by Husserl to vaguely reference this presupposed and necessary immanence.
The forms analyzed in eidetic phenomenology are thus, wholly dependent on absolute
time, the ultimate horizon for all phenomena.19 The world, therefore, is simply the totality
of horizons.
C. Constitution
A discussion of worlds and social forms conjures the need for a more complex
analysis of constitution, which itself requires an investigative return to perception in
Husserl. According to Zahavi, perception has a triadic structure: act, meaning, object.
The act concerns the immanent content of the psychical process of perception. And the
content amounts to the moments or phases that together make up the concrete act qua
psychical process. It is important to note that, contrary to the intentional content of the
act—which by definition transcends the act—immanent content is intramental.20 Based
on this delineation, then, intentional content is the meaning of the act—what is intended.
And while Husserl introduces a further division here—that between the intentional
quality and the intentional matter—for our purposes, it suffices to say that together these
components provide meaning. When we are directed towards an object, we intend an
object for which we hope, that we desire, or perhaps even fear. However, this object is
19
The three kinds of temporality for Husserl are the objective time of appearing objects, the
subjective time of acts and experiences, and the absolute streaming of inner-time consciousness. The first
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still only an intentional object, not an actually existing object. Recall that Husserl wants
to avoid metaphysical speculation in his bracketing of the “natural attitude,” namely that
the material world outside of our minds actually exists. These three constituents of
perception map nicely onto the structure of constitution.
Though most Husserl scholars do not argue for a correlation, I think it is helpful
for our purposes to make a modest suggestion, namely that the act-meaning-object
structure of perception is analogous to the constitutive framework of subjectivityintersubjectivity-world.21 As with all analogies, this fails at a certain level, but I believe it
sheds light on Husserl’s attempt to develop a comprehensive system of worldconstitution that does justice to both subjective and objective poles of analysis.
Additionally, it will serve as a point of contrast with Levinas’s philosophical analysis,
which always pushes against these onto-epistemological horizons.
Husserl arrived at his constitutive framework by acknowledging the constituting
subject’s inextricable relationship to others (intersubjectivity) and the common space
(world) necessary to both. Though earlier writings rigidly maintain the independence of
the transcendental subject, later work suggests that he realized that “the subject does not
remain untouched by its constitutive performance, but is, on the contrary, drawn into it,”
and that constitution is an intersubjective process. Furthermore, this intersubjectivity only
“exists and develops in the mutual interrelationship between subjects that are related to
the world.”22
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The dynamic relationship between these three nodes of constitution would exert a
tremendous influence on Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Because of the influence
on Levinas, Husserl’s contribution to Heidegger’s philosophy will be emphasized in this
study. But before turning to Heidegger, I would conclude in the following way as it
concerns Husserl’s “discovery” of the intentional subject in phenomenology. The subject
alone is not enough, though it is central to the phenomenological project, from Husserl
through the present day. For Husserl and Heidegger, this subject is active, but unlike
earlier theorists, the phenomenological subject is affected deeply by other subjects as
well as the world to which both self and other belong. To what extent this affect is
operative in the constitution of the subject remains a matter of debate, but it is clear that
sovereignty is deposed from the privileged position bequeathed to it by modernity. As
will be demonstrated in the remainder of this chapter, differences regarding this
deposition are what ultimately distinguish Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas. Perhaps the
critical feature for our study is that Hussserl’s subject, while affected, is ultimately selfresponsible. For Husserl, an ethical life is one in which the “human being exercises in
unremitting self-reflection and radical accountability a critique—an ultimately evaluating
critique—of his life-aims and then naturally, and mediated through them, his life-paths
and his current means.”23 The subject’s investment does not extend to substitution, but
rather operates through pure rationality, whose function is to maintain security and
stability.
Disclosure
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A. Dasein
As with Husserl, this study will select only those features of Heidegger’s work
that are crucial to expositing Levinas’s own development, as it relates to the question of
witness. Of inestimable value is Heidegger’s analysis of Dasein, the being through whom
and to whom the world is disclosed. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger
uses Kant’s First Critique to examine the conditions for the possibility of ontological
knowledge. His major project, fundamental ontology, is essentially the metaphysics of
metaphysics—that is, the metaphysics of Dasein.24 Understood as dispersion itself,
Dasein is a site of disclosure and the conjunction of essences.25 In other words, the
sensibility that is Dasein is the condition of this conjunction. Of course, this sounds very
similar to Husserl, who had already written that the objective world relied on
transcendental constitution. While acknowledging that Heidegger contributed much to
philosophy that is particular to him, it is also undeniable that his “translation” of Husserl
into a language more suitable to Heidegger’s context often effaced the impact Husserl
had made on the philosopher who had once been his student.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that Heidegger did place more emphasis on the
world-influence than did Husserl, which also further destabilizes the subject that Husserl
had worked so hard to anchor. Put differently, we might contrast Heidegger’s filigree
edifice with Husserl’s stone sculpture.26 Obviously this is slightly unfair to both, but it
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sheds light on a difference of intensity with regards to place in the world. And it bears on
Levinas’s own development, since Heidegger’s fluid subject attains a more robust agency
than Husserl’s transcendental ego, whose will is arguably less resolute than Heidegger’s.
For Husserl, there would be no seizure of history, nor would there be a resting in the open
in which Being would reveal itself. Instead, there remains a necessary uncertainty crucial
to rigorous scientific investigation. Ironically, it could be said that Husserl’s lessercharged subject participated in a more dynamic universe, while Heidegger’s courageous
Dasein could effect epochal shifts with a Kierkegaardian leap into the nothing of death.
However, not wanting to venture too far in order to draw contrast, I am content to
focus on two related concepts in Heidegger’s thought: disclosure and truth. Both terms
refer to the nexus of witness that would have bearing on Levinas, either as a constructive
component or a point of departure. The first requires a closer examination of Dasein. I
have already noted that Dasein is to be understood as a kind of dispersion, an original site
of self-differing indicative of Hegel’s influence. But there is more to Dasein, and thus,
more to disclosure.
In the opening section of Being and Time, Heidegger asks, “In which being is the
meaning of being to be found; from which being is the disclosure of being to get its
start?”27 In other words, which (or whom) among all beings is the best place to begin an
analysis of Being itself? As Heidegger makes clear, it is none other than Da-sein, his
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preferred term for the human being.28 Apart from practical considerations, Heidegger’s
reason for his investigative method centers on his definition of Da-sein as the being
whose existence is inseparably bound to an understanding of being itself.29 Da-sein is
determined by her concern for her existence. Herein lies the beginning of existential
analysis and fundamental ontology—which at the same time might be construed as
fundamental anthropology. Heidegger makes clear that he is not engaged in “vapid
subjectivizing,” but the emphasis of his work here could lead in the direction of a
totalitarian subject, an interpretation about which much has been written in recent
decades.30
Like Husserl, Heidegger prioritizes time as the horizon of understanding for Dasein and speaks of what appears as also what is “produced,” or constituted.31 But in order
to gain full access to Being, Da-sein needs language, since language for Heidegger, is the
“house of being.”32 The relationship between thought and language is what enables the
human—as one who speaks—to accomplish the thought of Being itself. In language as
thought, Being engages itself for itself.33 Therefore, the disclosure of Being requires
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language, leading to the Heideggerean hero, whose language is claimed by Being for the
purpose of Being’s self-disclosure.34 Oddly, the subject is merely a function of this
mysterious Being, which as history would reveal, can exact a terrible price from the one
seized by it.
Heidegger’s subject is heroic, but only insofar as the subject surrenders itself to
the “awe-ful” power of Being, which seems to utilize the “one who speaks” as a vehicle
for “self-awareness.” The slaughter bench of history in Hegel might very well be
translated into the disclosure of Being, albeit with more pessimism and tragedy in
Heidegger. And yet, the subject is given the opportunity to choose, to let Being give itself
to thought in language. This choice implies a path towards sanctification in Heidegger,
one not far removed from his Catholic past (not to mention the idealism of much German
thought from the 19th century). And with a sanctified lot of persons who have opted for
the disclosure of Being, there also arises a group of persons who are described as “fallen”
in some places, and at other times simply as the “They.”35 Such ontological divisions do
imply responsibility, but unlike Husserl’s responsibility to self and the community of
selves of which one is a member, Heideggerean responsibility only appears in relation to
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the mysterious, and perhaps violent, Being.36 The political implications will be parsed
later, but for now, it serves as an important distinction between Heidegger and both
Husserl and Levinas. The witness is clearly present in all three, but the content of this
witness and the consequent testimony vary considerably.
Related to Heidegger’s concept of disclosure is his redefinition of truth. In
contrast to most contemporary theories that focus on the proposition, Heidegger stresses
the relationship between statement and that which is “presented” in the statement. In “On
the Essence of Truth,” he references the historical preoccupation with correspondence to
demonstrate the inevitability of theological explanation as it concerns the congruence of
statement and matter.37 But as Heidegger suggests, this admixture of theology is
unacceptable to a philosophical method that operates a-theistically. After a careful—
albeit guided—tour through the genealogy of the concept of truth, Heidegger risks a
definition: truth is freedom. Having ventured this concise equivalence, he proceeds to
expound on his rather cryptic connection. Seemingly, freedom is a letting beings be, and
in doing so, it can be understood as disclosive. This disclosure requires a kind of
comportment for which Heidegger introduces one of his many neologisms: attunement.
“Every mode of comportment on the part of historical human beings—whether
accentuated or not, whether understood or not—is attuned, and by this attunement is
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drawn up into beings as a whole.”38 Where things are familiar, this attunement is lacking;
hence, the importance of the uncanny in the work of Heidegger. In order to let beings be,
these beings must be disclosed through attunement. Without a certain experience of
strangeness, “not-at-homeness,” the “openendness of beings get flattened out into the
apparent nothingness of what is no longer even a matter of indifference, but rather simply
forgotten.”39 Disclosure, therefore, requires a heroic act of overcoming intimately tied to
Nietzsche’s imperative. Only the courageous can resist the temptation of the familiar, the
chatter of the “They,” and thus, receive the truth of being, or the being of truth.
The resonance here is important because for Husserl, Heidegger, and Levinas, the
subject proposed by each is profoundly affected by historic-cultural events, even though
the extent to which biography is emphasized varies between the three philosophers.
Without a certain Germany, or Europe, in mind, Heidegger’s philosophy makes less
sense, especially his critiques of industrial civilization. Thus, a certain Romanticism is
evidenced in his thought, nowhere more than in his analysis of the human subject. Thus
far, I have stressed the importance of disclosure as it refers to the subject’s ability to letbeings-be. If we are essentially those creatures that illuminate the world through
language, then the subject that emerges from this practice will be inseparable from a
certain aesthetic sensibility—despite Heidegger’s refusal of this description. For this
reason, I want to conclude this section on Heidegger with a close examination of his
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famous essay, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” as it relates specifically to the “new
subject” of the 20th century.40
B. Disclosive Appropriation
Though by no means direct, this essay nevertheless focuses on the ambiguity of
Being, and consequently, the human being. Heidegger suggests that art manages to
illuminate the inherent strife between earth and world in such a way as to provoke the
interrogative disposition required for transformation of the individual and the “lifeworld” of that person.41 In doing so, art functions as a site of disclosure, namely the
happening of truth. In this happening, the tumultuous is existentially opportune because it
indicates the shift of perception, what Husserl might describe as the transition from the
“natural attitude” towards one of phenomenological investigation. However, unlike
Husserl, Heidegger does not see the end as a ground but rather as a fundamental
comportment to life—what I have highlighted above as “attunement.” I will say more
about this manner of relating, but first I want to emphasize the strife to which art directs
the observer and by which art is born.
Obviously, the work of art is comprised of materials taken from the earth, from
the canvas or base to the pigments or medium used by the artist. In this sense, the earth
stands out in a way that it would normally not. For example, rarely do persons notice
stone while driving by mountains or boulders—apart from strange formations that
command attention—but in the sculptures of Michelangelo observers would be drawn to
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the matter itself. In other words, the earth would be set forth in a way that any viewer
would notice. Art highlights the earth by opening space for the earth to show forth as
what it is. Similarly, the world of the artist is opened up through the choice of
composition, reflecting on a situation or event that presses upon the artist in her context.
The work of art invites the viewer into a world to which she might not belong. Thus, both
earth and world are available to the one who “sees” the work, albeit in a particular kind of
way.
The opposition of world and earth is a striving. But we would surely all
too easily falsify its nature if we were to confound striving with discord
and dispute, and thus see it only as disorder and destruction. In essential
striving, rather, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of
their natures.42
Neither earth nor world cancels the other out, but they remain situated in struggle for
truth to happen in the work of art.
But what has this to do with the question of Being, and more precisely for my
argument, the status of the human being? I have mentioned already that Being requires
language for disclosure, and since humans are the animals possessed by speech, the
human being is essential for the disclosure of Being. So, if the truth of Being and the
happening of truth are inextricably related, then art has much to say about the human.
Here I want to stress that the world into which the work of art invites the viewer is always
elsewhere. The subject is transported for the purpose of receiving the revelation, only to
return and appropriate the revelation. I share the following quotes because they capture
much of what I am attempting to communicate in a rather concise manner.
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Because the human being is understood by Heidegger as the site of the
disclosure of entities, it is, like the work of art, an appropriation of the
primal conflict between the clearing and concealing that engenders all
truth…To be fully human is to exact of oneself the courage to endure the
realization that what one shall be one is already.43
The truth happening in art is the truth happening in the human being, which is the truth of
Being—the striving between earth and world. This strife is developed into other
metaphorical frameworks by Heidegger, who stresses the harmony in the striving. I agree
with the above conclusions—developed out of the consensus of scholarship on
Heidegger—as definitive statements concerning the main themes of Heidegger’s work.
Courageous appropriation appears to be the only way to create a world worthy of the
name and thereby seize one’s destiny as a significant function of Being’s self-disclosure.
And it is here that Levinas will depart most clearly from Heidegger, but before I conclude
this chapter with a brief examination of these distinctions, let me first make clear the
resonance between Husserl and Heidegger as it concerns the “new subject” engendered
by transcendental phenomenology (Husserl) or fundamental ontology (Heidegger). What
follows is admittedly approximate, but it does help to show a certain convergence—one
disavowed—that will motivate Levinas in a different philosophical direction.
Agreements
A. Activity
For Husserl, the primary activity is constitution. Understood phenomenologically,
the transcendental subject is the constitutive function of existence and I would suggest
could be mapped onto the structure of time as Husserl conceived it. Pure possibility is the
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necessary requirement for all actuality. Reminiscent of Plato, albeit with much more
precision and technicality, Husserl has the form precede the matter in the realm of truth.
Like Kant, a certain fit is required, but in phenomenology there is room for a genesis
made possible by the coincidence of intention and intuition. Varying degrees of intention
and intuition exist in the Husserlian framework, but the point I am making is simply that
the form of truth is primary to the secondary occurrence of truth in the world.
While the subject of Husserlian phenomenology is not exactly frenzied, she does
ceaselessly engage the world through intentionality. Consciousness is always
consciousness of something, be it an intentional object that does actually exist or one that
is imaginary. For Husserl, there is never an empty consciousness, never a cognitive—and
thus subjective—vacuum. This implies an active subject, even though the variety of
activity in this framework is unconscious. Of course, Husserl has been picked up by
analytic philosophy and psychology because of his description of consciousness and the
necessary presuppositions for a subject in the world.44
By way of contrast, I contend that Heidegger would prefer the mind to be silenced
in its restlessness so as to make way for the revelation of Being. The adoption of
conventional notions often mistake the world for our filtered reception of it, and thus, the
activity of mind, for Heidegger, would be the appropriation of the primal struggle
between earth and world. Of course, Husserl also stressed the importance of bracketing in
order to avoid the prejudices of “common sense.” However, whereas Husserl emphasizes
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the constitutive role of the subject in responding to the “natural attitude,” Heidegger
encourages a courageous appropriation of the truth of Being in order to rise above the
fray, that interminable chatter of the “They.”45
B. Responsibility
Both Husserl and Heidegger also mention the significance of responsibility,
though the two thinkers stress the subject’s response to different realities. While Husserl
maintains a dogmatic self-responsibility that he believes is the preferred path for all
persons, Heidegger instead calls for an authentic response to Being. And though
Heidegger does acknowledge the existence of a truth outside of the realm of immanent
facticity, it appears to serve the subject in its appropriated virility. Consequently, neither
thinker thinks a responsibility without return to the subject.
With Husserl, this homecoming is expected, since the consummation of
intentionality is objective knowledge. Considering that objectivity is constituted by the
transcendental subject, the cyclical nature of responsibility is evident. Even Kant would
agree that such responsibility is too enclosed. Though transcendence for Husserl is a
necessary feature of his phenomenology, it is ultimately a transcendence swallowed by
immanence. Therefore, the ability to respond is primarily about the necessity of selfcorrection and precision. Husserl certainly believed this methodological ethic to be the
essence of an enlightened human population, but as the 20th century made plain, humans
are not transformed into compassionate beings by logic.
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For Heidegger, the homecoming—in spite of unheimlichkeit—has everything to
do with the courage required for a nihilistic age. Taking a cue from Nietzsche, the
projected, or intentional, being sees her death and must return to the present to live
courageously with this knowledge. Never pretending to be immortal, the authentic human
takes responsibility for that which is most properly her own—her death. This
responsibility is supposed to lead to a fuller existence, but if this be true, it is a fuller
existence at the expense of those others for whom I am not responsible. In fact, this
robust responsibility for my situation as a mortal appears to exempt me of any real
responsibilities beyond those of a cryptic history to be seized. Problems abound with
Heideggerean responsibility, and I hope it is clear already how destructive this approach
would be and has been for countless millions of people around the globe.
C. Theoria
In Levinas’s early study of Husserl, he makes it abundantly clear that theoretical
construction is the dominant feature of Husserl’s philosophy. While practical and
aesthetic categories are important, they are not operative in the same manner as the
theoretical modality.
In Husserl’s philosophy…, knowledge and representation are not on the
same level as other modes of life, and they are not secondary modes.
Theory and representation play a dominant role in life, serving as a basis
for the whole of conscious life; they are the forms intentionality that give a
foundation to all others.46
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Levinas maintained for the whole of his life that Husserl’s philosophy was overwhelmed
by his preoccupation with a theoretical ground, and many others would still agree.
Despite the “New Husserl” presented by scholars like Daniel Zahavi and Dermot Moran,
the original phenomenologist was often bound by his training in mathematics and logic
and thus, prioritized the form over the content. As noted above, possibility precedes
actuality for Husserl.
In the case of Heidegger, while undoubtedly opposed to the metaphysical tradition
because of its amnesia with relation to Being, he nevertheless situates vision as primary
in the right comportment of the human being. Specifically, this vision requires
attunement, a mode of seeing akin to the observer of art discussed above. As theory is
etymologically related to vision, Heidegger is searching for a new way of seeing the
world, and thus, a new theory. It is Heidegger’s belief that theory is inextricable from the
instrumental conception of the world he examines in “The Question Concerning
Technology.”47 Specifically, theory offers a frame that becomes an idol, something that
obscures the world and ultimately leads to the amnesia concerning Being. Thus, is not so
much theory that is Heidegger’s target—despite his assertions to the contrary—but rather
a specific kind of theory that makes the world into simply a use-function.
Technology is a way of revealing…The revealing that rules in modern
technology is a challenging…which puts to nature the unreasonable
demand that it supply energy that can be extracted and stored as such…It
sets upon it in the sense of challenging it.48
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Heidegger remains committed to a different way of relating, a different way of “unconcealing” that is voluntarily passive.49 The human is the one capable of “letting lie
forth,” but which often challenges, demands, and extracts. Consequently, Heidegger’s
theory of the human includes a fundamental division between those who can “see” the
revelation of Being and those (the They) who violently and indifferently use earth. This
same group of amnesiacs are also those who lack the courage to take responsibility for
their mortality and instead, seek escapes in frivolous activities.
For both Husserl and Heidegger, a theory re-grounds the human and is much
needed with the onslaught of relativism (Husserl) and nihilism (Heidegger). In this
respect, both scholars are forever indebted to the theoretical maneuvers of philosophy,
and precisely to the analytic divisions forged by this practice. Without a new beginning, a
new ground, the unbearable emergence of an-archy threatens to undo the
accomplishments of history.
B. Levinas’s Exposed One
Like Husserl and Heidegger, Levinas is both concerned about and suspicious of a
new subject. How would this “new” subject diverge from the conceptions of modernity
and before, and what would this divergence translate into? But unlike the early Husserl
and all of Heidegger, Levinas grew up painfully aware of the violence often attached to
“new” things, be they subjects or political campaigns. Levinas’s family was forced to
relocate from his childhood home in Lithuania because of persecution, and he would
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eventually suffer the horrors of Nazism through the loss of many family members and his
time in a work camp as a prisoner of war.50 Neither Husserl nor Heidegger were forced to
endure anything of the sort, and it is no coincidence that Levinas’s work was in large part
a response to the philosophical and existential missteps of both. This is not to say that
Levinas is any kind of protest philosopher. In fact, he always admitted a great deal of
gratitude to the work of both men, and in the case of Heidegger, he made clear that there
was no getting around his work. Their genius was certain in his eyes, and their work had
to be taken seriously and incorporated into anything that would come afterward. But
incorporation and divergence are not mutually exclusive, and while Levinas is clearly
trained as a phenomenologist, his interests would often lie in the unexplored horizons of
phenomenology.51
Against Virility
The primary target of much of Levinas’s work was the heroic conception of an
“authentic” subject announced by Heidegger. While Heidegger valorizes a Stoic attitude
to the fate of others, Levinas, by contrast, sees in the Other’s life the key to my own.
Though he never argues that I can keep the Other from dying forever, defending the other
person and refusing to deny the integrity of her subjectivity naturally leads one to
sacrifice. But this is no kind of heroic sacrifice, like that of Achilles seeking immortality,
but instead a quiet subjection unto death. In fact, the sacrifice that Levinas theorizes is far
removed from the attention of a public, or even my own. Rather, sacrificial, or
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substitutional subjectivity is an event that has already occurred, pre-theoretically, as it
were. The response of one to another is motivated by this pre-cognitive, anti-heroic
binding that traces its origin to the immemorial. In other words, we cannot observe this
event from a privileged frame but instead must seek the traces of its recurrence in the
responses of those who have reached out in welcome.
To briefly differentiate Levinas’s own conclusions from those of his predecessors,
I have chosen to present his treatment of the following topics: constitution, disclosure,
solitude, and horizons. A more thorough analysis of solitude in particular will be
provided in the following chapter.
A. Constitution
In contrast to Heidegger specifically, Levinas does not recognize the first freedom
to be one of will or disclosure. Instead, he simply proposes a new beginning that is not
prompted by my decision or anything else related to human agency. Levinas suggests that
a new beginning always comes from elsewhere, from another that facilitates the
emergence of “me” through an imperative, namely the imperative to not kill. In other
words, subjectivity is subjection.52 More passive than voluntary passivity, the subject for
Levinas is not primarily one who is able.
To further emphasize the distinction here, I will highlight a passage from Time
and the Other. Specifically, the section refers to Heidegger’s analysis of death, which
Levinas describes as an event of freedom.
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Being toward death, in Heidegger’s authentic existence, is a supreme
lucidity and hence a supreme virility. It is Dasein’s assumption of the
uttermost possibility of existence, which precisely makes possible all other
possibilities, and consequently makes possible the very feat of grasping a
possibility—that is, it makes the very feat of grasping a possibility—that
is, it makes possible activity and freedom.53
For Heidegger, the appropriation of one’s death in projective lucidity makes possible
authentic life. Indeed, it is this first deed that amplifies the latent virility of human life. In
contrast, Levinas sees death as the end of my ability, the reduction to tears of even the
most powerful among us. And even this end of my mastery, or dominion, cannot be
assumed, which would imply the ability to defend against it. It would still be projective,
and for Levinas, death is the loss of all projects. The French phrase, nous ne pouvons plus
pouvoir, is the most accurate description of this event for Levinas: to longer be able to be
able. It might be helpful to think of this “inability” as election rather than impotence.
Levinas never recommended passivity in the face of injustice. To the contrary, his work
is dedicated to the necessity of action, although this movement is not prompted by “my”
choice but by the obsessive plodding of an-other.
So then, what of the world—the source of our formations and the activity into
which we are thrown? For Husserl, the problem seems to disappear with the advent of
ideality, the realm of truth bracketed out from the preconceived notions constitutive of
the natural attitude. While he acknowledges the contributions of the life-world to the
intellectual formation of the individual, it is nevertheless secondary to the transcendental
ground of all knowledge. The intentional subject constitutes the world as such, and thus,
puts the stamp of meaning on it through fulfillment of her intention.
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As for Heidegger, the world is certainly at the forefront of his thinking, despite his
major socio-political divisions. History and world come together in a way far too
complex for discussion here, but it is undoubtedly the case that world-revelation and
“unconcealment” are central to his conception of constitution. Of course, the theoretical
stamp is not as obvious as with Husserl, and Heidegger insists on letting that which is,
“lie before” one. But as with most thinkers up to Levinas, the self is determined by the
decision to properly accord oneself with reality. Voluntarism triumphs in Heidegger’s
analysis of the subject, since it is only a person that has courageously accepted her death
in resoluteness, who is capable of living authentically, or truly. Alignment, or in
Heidegger’s terminology, attunement, is necessary for the accomplishment of
subjectivity.
Departing from both Husserl’s theoretical intentionality and Heidegger’s heroic
appropriation, Levinas argues for the constitution of the self by another. The “me” is the
preferred term here since the accusative precedes the nominative in the thought of
Levinas. The Other has exhorted “me” by name, which constitutes me in my ability to
respond to the call. My constitution is the necessary condition for any that follows. And
what follows is a world, full of the language that both Heidegger and Husserl reference,
along with the inevitable compromises entailed by this medium (OTB, 6). For Levinas,
constitution does not first come from the intentional subject but is rather the demand that
precedes and motivates intention. As I will discuss throughout this work, the demand
here is infinite and grows in relation to the responsibility assumed by the one called.
B. Disclosure
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Disclosure does not happen visually for Levinas, as the Other is never met, but
only approached. The yonder towards which we journey is always beyond the perceptual
horizon. But we still we move in that direction, from an “at home” toward an alien
outside-of-oneself (TI, 33). If there were to be disclosure, the distance of relation would
collapse (TI, 34). Instead of a relation with the Other, there would only be the reduction
of the Other to the Same, the I. The violence of this action is repeatedly pointed out by
Levinas, who sees in the illumination of Being only a totalizing erasure of difference.
And yet, perhaps there is a kind of disclosure in Levinas’s work. But only in the
sense of interrogation. The Other, or Stranger, questions the intentionality of the knowing
being, thereby frustrating the inevitable removal of alterity. Rather than subsumption into
a Whole, the questioning Other expresses the other in Being itself. Against the
overcoming of idealist philosophy, Levinas poses the immediacy of difference at the
heart of what is. Thus, metaphysics—as Levinas describes it—precedes ontology (TI,
39). And since metaphysics is the desire for the invisible, disclosure—if it happens in
Levinas—is always and only disclosure of impossibility of disclosure. Not unlike
Levinas’s starting point for phenomenological work, the absence of an illuminated
disclosure is primarily the admission that, “One is no longer able to be able.” In the case
of disclosure, I cannot see and thus cannot comprehend that which is revealed to me.
The void that breaks the totality can be maintained against an inevitably
totalizing and synoptic thought only if thought finds itself faced with an
other refractory to categories…We propose to call “religion” the bond that
is established between the same and the other without constituting a
totality (TI, 40).
And though Levinas’s designation of his covenantal disclosure as religion might produce
a bit of head-shaking from those already frustrated by his deployment of religious terms,
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I would caution against such a hasty judgment. Throughout his work, Levinas’s religion
looks much less like the triumphant theism of Judeo-Christian orthodoxy than it does a
more sober and hard-fought relationship to the human condition. Nevertheless, here we
have a window into Levinas’s refusal of disclosure, which is inextricable from his refusal
of totality.
C. Solitude
In direct contrast to the thesis that time is the production of the transcendental
subject (Kant and Husserl), Levinas maintains that it is the relationship of the subject to
the Other which most properly expresses time.54 More precisely, time is the relationship
with the Other, albeit not a synchronous time but rather a diachronic intervention.
Consequently, solitude is not simply an opposition to collectivity, both of which
presuppose the time of minutes. It is, indeed, the fundamental condition of existence. To
be is to exist in solitude, necessarily and without exception. And to exist outside of
relation is to exist outside of time.
For some, participation in a larger reality, a collective, suggests a way out of the
dialectic—as though one could leave it and exist simultaneously. But as Levinas points
out, this movement points to fusion and monism; solitude would then be a meaningless
term.55 So if solitude is more than an oppositional term, and it is inextricable from
existence, or being, then what are we to say of Levinas’s approach? Does it reject
solitude? Does it prefer something different?
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Perhaps Levinas and Nietzsche unexpectedly signal here, not so much in the
material of their discourse as the pain of the beginning that both announce. For Levinas
and Nietzsche, the pain borne is not reparative mourning, nor is it the temporary absence
of a stable context from which one might derive significance. The “broken subjectivity”
at the heart of the ethical (Levinas) is the incessant refusal of connection to the past. It
sees through the salves provided, as well as the home offered by the totalizing
contentment of the theorizing and cultural practice of the West.56 Without the
accompaniment of a system, tradition, or even god, the subject is completely disoriented.
This solitude, as a specter that has haunted the idealist philosophies of Western thought,
precedes the contented variety that has fallen in love with what will ultimately kill it.
Therefore, as a beginning, it emerges in the burn of erasure, not its ruins.57 With the
evacuation of the common, the solitude that is always but a trace constitutes the necessity
of an-other beginning.
For Heidegger, the gathering of the gods is crucial to the future of humanity. For
Levinas, it is the absence of such things that require it. Solitude is the hidden
announcement at the core of the Western project. And despite the degeneration that is
totality, infinity breaks out from this project to again say, “Here is me.”58 Ethical
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subjectivity emerges from the solitude of evacuation, the refusal of a totalizing
connection promised by the Said. Only in this “saying” does the subject begin, and for
that matter, the intersubjective sociality of a world. Responding to the Other person never
occurs algorithmically but only in the singularity of a call from elsewhere (not in the
place designated by a conceptual framework).
D. Horizons
As John Drabinski makes clear in his work on Husserl and Levinas, the latter only
exceeds the Husserlian program “by way of the horizons Husserl’s labors open up.”59
Much like the interrogative imperative of deconstruction, the phenomenological method
calls forth its own excess. Otherwise, it would be stagnant, a counter to the beginning it
claims to inaugurate. Recognizing this, Levinas begins his philosophy in the areas
unexplored by phenomenology proper.
The crux of Levinas’s argument is a more expansive view of intentionality.
Whereas Husserl understands intentionality to be a specific function of an attendant
mind, Levinas insists that intentionality is the fundamental exposure of the subject. As I
have already discussed in this chapter, the intentionality of Husserl is accompanied by a
very robust sense of intellectual agency, whereas for Levinas it points to the ever-present
opening to call constitutive of a responsible subjectivity. That is something of an
oversimplification, but it gets at the tension between the two thinkers. As an example,
there is uncertainty around what qualifies as experience. Does this depend on a
“positional and action conception of the ego,” or are all modalities, passive and active,
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included in the stream of lived experience.60 A charitable read of Husserl renders him
more open in this area, but Levinas does not accept simply being open to a possibility but
instead emphasizes the pervasive permeability at the heart of subjectivity.
Another way of understanding Levinas’s divergence from Husserl and Heidegger
as it concerns horizons, focuses on the question, “Where?” Where does the event or work
occur? For both Husserl and Heidegger, the operation of a subject occurs only within the
delimited and illuminated space. Levinas has the event and working relation tied to what
is beyond the light, so to speak; hence, the distinction between the totality (Husserl and
Heidegger) and infinity (Levinas). To be fair, Levinas acknowledges the importance of
work done in an illuminated sphere i.e. politics, education, science, etc. The difference
lies in the origin of these spheres. Do they emerge from a bond with what is wholly other
or wholly within? Transcendence or immanence? As with disclosure for Levinas, a
horizon does not reveal content as much as it suggests the motivating origin of everything
that lies “beyond” visibility. In Heidegger, it is Death that opens and motivates the
actions of people. For Levinas, the beyond is the Other, and it is not “something” from
which one returns to the Same. The disrupted and contorted self is certainly not virile but
is instead devoid of the scaffolding provided by the long history of tradition or ‘Being.’
Instead, only the trace of a still, small voice persists, and it is often mistaken for a
distraction from the task at hand. Another way to frame this difference centers on the
distinction between what is public and what is metaphysical i.e. otherwise. The public,
opened by the horizon, is dependent on the metaphysical, opened as Desire.
Conclusion
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In the preceding sections, I have attempted to argue for the importance of a new
subject that emerges in the 20th century, one that is not altogether different from previous
demonstrations, but which nevertheless departs from the strictures of philosophical
convention with thoughts, movements, and most especially in the subject’s mysterious
relationship to the world. For Husserl and Heidegger, this subject is actively engaged in
the construction of the world, either through transcendental constitution or disclosive
appropriation. Both thinkers envision a departure from the sovereign rationality of
Western discourse, albeit one infused with the critical lens of Western philosophical
history. Whereas pre-phenomenological philosophy moves against the “undesirable”
openings of the irrational, Husserl and Heidegger allow for beginnings, new horizons
engineered by a dynamic interaction between mind and world. And though sovereignty
does manage to find its way back to the subject, through the operations prioritized by
each thinker, there remains an important caveat: such sovereignty is never final.
Phenomenology refuses the foreclosure of most systems of thought, and this insistence is
what enables Levinas to glean value and possibility in the work of both Husserl and
Heidegger. To be fair, the rigors of the phenomenological method meant that Husserl was
arguably at odds with himself for most of his career. And while Heidegger believed his
fundamental ontology to be a necessary break with Husserlian phenomenology, even it
remained indebted to Husserlian insights for the entirety of his life. And so it is with
Levinas, whose own critical departure simultaneously acknowledges a debt owed. The
major difference is that Levinas will prioritize not the agency of a subject—intentional
and disclosive—but rather the passivity. And even this will not do, since Levinas
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recognizes the tendency to think of passivity from the perspective of choice. If passivity
is the best word here, then it must be thought as a passivity more passive than passivity
(OTB, 15).
I have mentioned only a small number of frames for this brief comparison, largely
because I maintain that they conjure the clearest distinctions. Even the most elementary
examination reveals problems, or tensions, and it is from this appearance that I hope to
more closely explore Levinas’s treatment of the subject. I have argued for the continued
assumption of agency in this chapter, as it pertains to the work of Husserl and Heidegger.
Even though both thinkers introduce us to an exposed subject, the exposure is always in
service to comprehension, or appropriation. By contrast, Levinas’s subject is
fundamentally deposed and exposed without regard, sacrificed without reserve.
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Chapter 3: Otherwise Exposed
A Fraught Subject
As implied in the previous chapter, Levinas’s subject is at odds with itself,
divided between an infinite demand and an infinite response.1 This dividual is not
fundamentally able, contrasting with both Husserlian constitution and Heideggerean
appropriation. On the contrary, the subject is unable to even be able.2 In what follows I
will clarify the contours of this emerging subject through the concepts of nudity,
passivity, and solitude. For Levinas, each of these descriptions marks a perspective on the
“discovered” subject that is nevertheless not revealed. The ‘clandestinity’ of alterity,
described in terms of profanation, modifies every attempt to bring clarity to an otherwise
shadowy necessity. Thus, the language adopted by Levinas is strained. For this reason, I
will spend considerable time attending to the subtleties of his many redeployed terms.
Nudity
The one who is fully exposed exemplifies a tension between the modalities of
shame and eros. Not wholly at home with this exposed “me,” the subject nevertheless
also experiences a certain pleasure in the search. Stripped of posture and pretense, the
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nude one cannot hide from the eyes of others, with their shameful glares, nor can the
subject deny the pleasure of unburdening the skin of obstruction. In the following
paragraphs, I will explore this conflict in several of Levinas’s works so as to demonstrate
both change and recurrence.
A. Shame
For Levinas, being, as pure existence, can be described as a fundamental
enchainment. In contrast to the many obstacles overcome by the heroes of all histories,
the one thing a being cannot overcome is itself, or at least the existence that designates it
as a being.3 In existence, there is clearly no lack, no ‘thing’ that would grant a certain
wholeness as it concerns being. Rather, the impossible desire of a being is to get out of
being itself. At first, one might hastily conclude that a being might choose not to be, but
not-being is itself swallowed by being in the infinite progress of mundane existence.
Levinas is especially concerned here with the plight of the human subject, who is
burdened by a being that the subject cannot escape. For the modern self, existence is a
weight—hence his choice of the term enchainment—that leads to a desire prompted by
world-weariness. This desire is escape, the title of one of his early essays.4 And it is
primarily a quest for the marvelous, or whatever breaks up the “somnolence of bourgeois
existence.”5 Deeper still, the burden of creation—the pressure to do or make that never
seems to let up—is impossible to sustain, and yet, how else can one avoid destruction?
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From the perspective of a being desperate to escape the mundanity and insomnia
of existence, several paths seem promising. However, Levinas is quick to point out the
failure of each, none more so than the route of pleasure. In few areas of life does the
promise of consummation and release appear richer, which makes the inevitable
disappointment of this path all the more painful. If the burden of being is being itself, the
anti-climax of pleasure reminds the subject that the erotic ascent is fleeting and illusory.
And furthermore, the subject is embarrassed by the former belief. “Pleasure conforms to
the demands of need but is incapable of equaling them. And, at the moment of its
disappointment, which should have been that of its triumph, the meaning of its failure is
underscored by shame.”6 The failure of pleasure makes shame all the more available as a
constituent of the human subject. However, it is not accurate to suggest that Levinas has a
moralistic notion of shame. To the contrary, it refers to our exposure. Our futilities, our
absurd labors, are the shame that we cannot escape, and as Critchley suggests, laughing at
our condition is a therapeutic measure dating at least back to Freud.7
At this point, it is necessary to ask: If shame is inevitable, does it have the
potential to be emancipatory? In other words, is shame an opening onto the necessary but
seemingly impossible escape? In On Escape, Levinas is uncertain. By the time he writes
the two ‘great’ works, Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being, it is clear that
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shame contains the seeds of liberation. To further explore the potential of this affect, I
will draw on the work of Steve Larocco.8
Before delving into his extension of Levinas’s phenomenology of shame, Larocco
presents a brief analysis of justice as socio-political phenomenon. First, social orders
operate according to a legislatively warranted distribution of goods and services. These
orders work to create a population of believers, who derive meaning from conventional
participation in these practices.9 As might be gleaned from this cursory examination,
justice here would appear to favor those who benefit from the accepted orders of
distribution. As Larocco emphasizes, this sense of justice “euphemizes the fact that
hierarchy typically hurts, and thereby sanitizes the ordinary violence of structural
inequality; and second, it tends to institute…a baseline of what need not be attended to as
a moral issue at all,” which leaves the public with a banalized regularity that often is hell
for many.10 In this system, the movement of compassion is a naive refusal of what is, to
which the “powers that be” might respond, “Grow up!”
If ethics is framed within this context, it is simply the regulation of social norms,
inherently utilitarian and self-driven. As should be evident at this point, Levinas is
opposed to thinking of ethics in this way. Policing is politics, not ethics. Instead,
exemplary movements of care and sacrifice are the starting point, and both operate in the
face-to-face encounter with another human, whose primary exhortation is, “Do not
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kill.”11 The face forbids this violence, not because of some phenotypical register but
rather, its induction of shame. And this shame arises “where freedom discovers itself
murderous in its very exercise” (TI, 84). In other words, the violence that reduces the
other-in-need to a problem of distribution is the essence of freedom. No longer theorized
as a perversion of inalienable rights, Levinas instead highlights the egocentric nature of
freedom and thus, its futility to escape the monotony of existence. Whenever “I” am
composed in and by “my” conative disposition, the usurpation of another’s space is
guaranteed. Because of the inherent violence of this “standing-forth,” that sees in the
other person only a rival for goods and services, freedom, thus conceived, is part and
parcel of sacrificial economies.
However, when freedom “feels itself be to arbitrary and violent,” morality begins.
When the subject becomes aware of a violent indifference to another, through the
mechanism of shame, there is once again the possibility of a relation.12 To be clear, this
relation precedes the awareness and is a condition for it, but the relation is often refused
or overwhelmed by the persistence of the self in being. The shame that accompanies the
discovery of violence is the disabling of freedom—and thus, the I. Here is a step towards
the “otherwise exposed” subject in Levinas, a “discovery” that will guide my later
analysis of testimony as it concerns the martyr.
Elsewhere in his work, Larocco asks whether the production of shame is
inherently moral. And, in keeping with his primary interlocutor, the answer is ambiguous.
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First, shame is not just one thing. Levinas himself appears to have two distinct ways of
viewing the phenomenon, and both are important to understanding his project. As
discussed above, Levinas early on gives an account of shame that concerns nudity. Here
it would be the inability to cover oneself up despite countless attempts to do just that.
This fundamental impotence relates to the subject’s being “riveted” to a body. The
subject exists in and as a protuberance that cannot be covered, or forgotten, at least not
permanently. Shame functions here as a discomfort with one’s very being, the
aforementioned need to escape. Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, interprets this
sense of shame as the experience of having “no other content than [the subject’s] own
desubjectivation,” when a subject “becomes witness to its own disorder, its own oblivion
as a subject.”13 And while this could suggest a transcendence at the heart of
subjectivity—insofar as my immanent self is empty—it does not compel the subject into
a relationship with the other. I maintain that this hint becomes a loud declarative by the
time of TI and OTB, but here it only suggests a possibility.
A fuller account of shame is required to arrive at anything like what Levinas
intends with his use of the word “ethics,” and Larocco defines this second sense as
commiserative—unlike the moral framing of a juridico-political analysis:
a shame that emerges in and through the other’s shame. It is a shame that
is not ego, not a response to a social disciplinary gaze or appraisal, but
rather a shame that occurs through a kind of transmissibility, a movement
of shame from the other to the subject as a form of affiliation and thereby
responsibility.14
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In commiserative shame, my connection to another person engenders the shame at this
person’s condition, a condition for which I am in some sense responsible. Socially, I may
be innocent, but I am still shamed by the destitution that confronts me.15 I am exposed to
the need and hunger of the other person in this relation. And in this ethical bond, which
precedes the social, I am unable to escape the dysfunction and horror of another’s
“flawed deficiency.”16 Ethics, then, exceeds the world, “tears me up from the world and
determines me as an irrecusable response to the appeal of its hunger.”17 The subject is
pressed out in this tearing, a process described by Levinas as “denucleation” (TI, 64).
Having been cored out, subjectivity can only come from the demand of the Other, one
infinite and thus, technically “impossible.”
But if this constitutive appeal donates subjectivity, how can infinity be met with
the inherent limitations of a singular response. In short, it cannot—at least not
conclusively. The politics here is not one that finds resolution.18 The relationship between
the subject and the Other never reaches consummation, and a politics that stems from this
pre-reflective, “immemorial” encounter is both impossible and necessary. Much like the
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discipline of phenomenology itself, the politics literally “inspired” by Levinasian ethics
refuses foreclosure. It is a restless and recurrent practice (see Ch.5 for my analysis of
‘interstitial hyperpolitics’), leading Critchley to describe it as the “original traumatism.”19
Larocco acknowledges that Levinas does not carry out a political analysis in
relation to his ethics. Much like Kant’s revision of metaphysics in the First Critique,
Levinas’s aim is to excavate the “an-archic ground” of subjectivity, not offer a specific
politics. However, while heeding Levinas’s caution, Larocco advances the suggestion
that commiserative shame is the best path to a politics that honors the condition of
subjectivity itself. And in the second half of his essay, his writing draws in the reflections
of Primo Levi to better illustrate the importance of this function. In particular, he cites
Levi’s distinction between forgiveness and responsibility to register the unease with
which society typically deals with the historical persecution of a people.
For Levi there is no forgiveness, only responsibility. Forgiveness remits
the past; responsibility (through commiserative shame) instead takes it up
by taking it in. For Levi, the transmissibility of the shame of those
drowned in the Lager compels a responsibility to bear witness, even if that
witnessing can never be adequate or reparative. It cannot fix the past.20
Calls for unity abound after horrific acts, wherein a group of people has a reasonable
complaint against the perpetrators of a crime but are urged to not take action in the
interest of a common vision. One example is the behavior of certain powers in the
aftermath of the Colfax Massacre (U.S.) in 1873. Jonathan Wilson-Hartgrove has written
at length of this moment in time, in which the Ku Klux Klan murdered well over 100
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black people at a courthouse in Louisiana but were never held accountable. Instead,
leaders all over the nation called for unity to avoid more bloodshed.21 Similarly, Bruce
Janz has written about the current situation in South Africa, following a long struggle
against apartheid. For Janz, inequities persist and the cultural divides of South Africa
correlate with power and opportunity. However, white South Africans consistently decry
the efforts at repatriation and diversification of the management workforce. Like
Larocco, Janz sees in the primordial exposure of Levinas’s subject an evocation of shame
that has political potential. But he is quick to note—as is Larocco—the possibility that
shame can manifest as “hyper-nationalism, hyper-individualism, and other self-justifying
social stances.”22 Larocco describes this process as by-passing commiserative shame,
something uncontrollable and thus, impossible from the management perspective of
contemporary political frames.23 This is precisely why Levinas is rarely included in the
work of policy analysts. The politics that shame produces is impossible to predict, not
unlike the event that haunts every contemporary political proposal.
As a concluding remark, Larocco emphasizes the normalcy of bypass. In fact, he
recalls that a distributive system accepts inequity as an inevitable consequence of human
activity. In this context, justice is a lesser evil rather than an “undeconstructible” reality.
Larocco even suggests that the “problem with justice…may be precisely the socially
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legitimized normalcy with which commiserative shame can be bypassed.”24 So, to put
this insight into Levinasian terminology, “The mass remains permanent and interest
remains. Transcendence is factitious and peace unstable” (OTB, 5). All is simply
calculation.
Thus far, I have discussed Levinas’s concept of nudity, or exposure, in relation to
the production of shame. The two modes of shame can be described as metaphysical and
existential, and they are held together by the demand of the Other. What I cannot rid
myself of, finally, is the accusation that grants me subjectivity. This accusation requires
action, though it can just as easily produce strategies of bypass as justice. But nudity also
concerns the erotic and the metaphysical implications gleaned from this affect. In the
following section, I will highlight the role of the erotic in TI in order to provide the
necessary counterpart to shame in Levinas’s work.25
B. Eros
As with shame, Levinas’s analysis of eros hinges on a distinction between the
existential and metaphysical movements to which eros is often linked. In fact, there are at
least three perspectives on eros that Levinas adopts in his work, ranging from
metaphysical desire in On Escape to carnal hunger in TI.26 In the section above on shame,
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I have touched on his analysis of erotic pleasure, namely as an attempt to escape being.
And while I do not think he abandons his position in later writings, it is clear that a more
nuanced position on eros emerges in the interim. In all fairness, eros itself was not fully
examined in On Escape, but only the use of pleasure to get out of existence. In TI,
Levinas spends an entire section plumbing the depths and complexity of eros, concluding
that the erotic is the “simultaneity of the clandestine and the exposed,” which “precisely
defines profanation.”27 This implies that eros is not a thing, nor is it a virility akin to the
revelatory actions of Husserl’s intentional subject or Heidegger’s illuminating Dasein.28
Instead, the erotic is a search, not to disclose but to express.
More precisely, the erotic can be understood as a hunger, a desire that is only
amplified by temporary satiation. For those familiar with the work of Levinas, this
description will seem eerily similar to his analysis of responsibility, which only grows in
proportion to its enactment. (OTB, 114-115). Contrary to a balanced ratio, both eros and
responsibility resonate through their asymmetrical function. Some commentators have
stressed Levinas’s refusal of eros in favor of responsibility, but I contend this move is too
hasty and unnecessary.29 Levinas does not dismiss eros, along with its “feminine”
descriptor, like some would suggest. Rather, I interpret him as challenging the very
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axiomatics that characterize the feminine. It is important to recall that Levinas sees in the
‘masculine’ identification with the light a core problem in Western philosophy. Thus, the
shadows of alterity, envisaged mysteriously by the erotic, serve to unearth the violence of
logocentric discourse. For example, when he describes “erotic nudity” as a “signification
that signifies falsely,” I contend that he is pointing out the idolatry of truth that has been
commonplace since the Greeks (TI, 263). In other words, signifying falsely ‘says’ the
profanation of eros, which as I mentioned above, resonates deeply with the work of
responsibility. Both emerge to consciousness as contradictions, since it is this ‘falsely
signifying’ force that ‘founds’ truth.30 Thus, it would be unfair to see in eros a modality
so much less significant than responsibility, even if he himself appears to abandon it at
times.
If hunger is one word for the erotic, passion is certainly another. The carnal
passion of a Lover “in search” is beyond the seizure of an object that could possibly
satisfy the hunger. The Lover’s love only desires the love that the Beloved bears me and
consequently, embraces that which is always “not yet,” even though it is founded by an
invitation that is “immemorial.” All of this points to the impossibility of capture, which
again creates a strong connection between the Beloved and the Other, neither of whom
can be finally named. The passion in particular suggests that the movements of Lover in
search of a love borne are never completed. This compression into “sensibility, into a
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sensuousness wrapped up in the non-signifyingness of carnal passion,” is the work of
eros.31 The ego is not obliterated but is ensouled, just as the face is given life.
For Levinas, the paradigmatic example of erotic activity is the caress. As with the
hunger of carnal passion, the caress feels beyond the felt, “seizing upon nothing, in
soliciting what ceaselessly escapes its form toward a future never future enough….” (TI,
257). In a play of absences, the caress does not aim at what can be seen, or any object
whatsoever. It does not disclose the previously hidden, but instead discovers what is “not
yet,” without thereby illuminating it. The caress welcomes the body of the beloved, not
seeking to grasp or contain, but simply to touch. Yet, much like the saying that occurs
before vocalization, the caress moves prior to contact, achieving compressed sensibilities.
The ego is “lost,” not collapsed. It forgets itself in the movement for and towards the
other. For this reason, Levinas sees in the erotic a precursor and mechanism for nonindifference, if not the unsaying of the said.
Both shame and eros serve to help the reader envisage the power of nudity in its
“exorbitant ultramateriality.”32 We seek to cover up and reach out simultaneously, just as
the trace of the Other commands the subject. In shame, the affinity with the Other and
with the Other’s exposure disarms my conative assumptions, whereas the erotic indicates
the hunger for relationship with the Other who is never fully known. The two modalities
exhibit the primordial condition of a subject, who in a sense is given to the Other without
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deciding to be offered. This travail is a fundamental description of exposure in Levinas,
which is supplemented by the concepts of passivity and solitude.
Passivity
According to Benda Hofmeyr, the central problem of radical passivity is the
problem of freedom.33 In other words, it is a matter of debate whether “freedom [is] a
necessary condition for the possibility of ethically significant behavior or…an expression
of self-concern, a hindrance to ethical action.”34 And to be clear, Levinas is anything but
“clear” in his assessment of freedom’s role. There appears a tension here, not unlike the
categories of shame and eros with regards to the concept of nudity. For passivity, I have
chosen subjection and hospitality to capture this duality at the heart of Levinasian
passivity. It would be a mistake to claim, as some have, that Levinas operates under a
strict quietism, and yet, Levinas is deeply troubled by the virile movements of human
will, that would account for the bloodiest century on record. In the following analyses, I
will expound on this dynamic, which is crucial to an understanding of Levinas’s
investigations of subjectivity.
A. Subjection
Levinas focuses on a concept of subjectivity found in the very word itself. Both
linguistically and historically, a subject is that which is subjected to the actions of
another. This subject lacks the robust freedom entailed by naive projections, an insight
shared by Hegel. In a Philosophy of Right, Hegel describes a “contextual” freedom,
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which depends for its actualization on the political association and interactions of other
humans.35 Similarly for Levinas, the “I” fully emerges from a constraint imposed by the
demand of the Other. The consequences of this deposition are hinted at but not fully
analyzed by Levinas’s predecessors, one of which is the loss of rigid epistemological
boundaries as it concerns my relation to the world.
At the outset, it is crucial to note that Levinas’s passivity is actually a passivity
with regards to itself. Before a decision is made to be passive, or receptive, the subject in
Levinas is already paralyzed in its volitional movement. In this, the sovereignty of
consciousness is evacuated in sacrificial service to the other: “The end of mastery
indicates that we have assumed existing in such a way that an event can happen to us that
we no longer assume….” (TO, 74). In Husserl, the intention seeks fulfillment, thereby
moving from explorative consciousness to knowledgeable self. In contrast, Levinasian
subjectivity testifies to a countermovement that provides a condition for
phenomenological investigation.36 Before I seek, I am commanded.
The imperative of alterity strikes against the conative frame of general
equivalence. The horizon of being exhibits calculations that presuppose a state of war.
Immanence only knows origin stories that promote commerce. Whether in Hobbes or
Smith, the organizing mechanisms of a society without transcendence revolve around
war. If “I” precedes “you,” then our relation will inevitably default to competition; a high
stakes game that is anything but. For this reason, Levinas emphasizes the need for
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disarmament as it concerns any notion of freedom. Otherwise, we confuse anxiety with
control.
To accomplish his stated task, Levinas spends nearly the entirety of his life
providing an argument for the priority of the non-intentional. Despite various
commentators’ focus on the “great works,” gleanings from the whole of Levinas’s oeuvre
testify to the Other’s insistence. The enchainment that aptly describes the human
condition centers on the subject’s inability to take leave, to get out of the pervasive
existing that swallows up every attempt to escape. And while this early claim by Levinas
is located in a rather uncertain analysis, developments in his thought would assure him
that an escape was possible, not through my efforts but rather through the infinite demand
placed on me by the Other. By this means only am I able to avoid returning to myself. It
is only in this encounter that I have the chance to become Abraham rather than
Odysseus.37
Levinas assumes that this “disinterested” gesture happens quite regularly, traces
of which linger in the French adieu (both ‘farewell’ and ‘to God’) and après vous (‘after
you’). By thinking of another to the point of forgetting oneself, the self exists non-lieu, in
no place. This “one” who thinks of another refuses to usurp the place of that person,
which could deprive this Other of life. However, Levinas admits that it is always possible
to mistake the call for a chance disturbance in the existing order. And a disturbance
merely “disturbs order without troubling it seriously. It enters in so subtle a way that
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unless we retain it, it has already withdrawn.”38 The simultaneity of call and retreat, or a
retreat-in-advance, characterizes the demand of the Other, both a resistance and
vulnerability. And it transcendentally precedes the emergence of the subject, rendering it
always already accused. Standing without recusal, Levinas’s anarchically founded subject
is (to borrow a preferred phrase of Levinas) “held hostage.” In other words, responsibility
precedes identity. The un-thematized strikes against consciousness of the same and
unsettles it. Outside of discursive life, the ana-thematized Other beseeches me in
destitution.
Put even more severely, the demand is lodged in me; “I cannot deny without
denying myself.”39 Contra Heidegger, my destiny is not my projection but instead, the
obsession of the Other. This unsolicited experience “imposes a necessity in the
arbitrariness of my freedom and thereby invests my freedom or unburdens me of my
freedom that cannot but lead me astray.”40 Only in this subjection to the Other do “I”
become singularly responsible and thus, uniquely created. The problem of freedom, then,
would amount to a decision about the arbitrariness of life itself. Straddling the tightrope
of Zarathustra, Levinas’s subject can only persevere because necessity comes from
without. Whereas in Kant the subject escapes the arbitrariness of “machinic” life through
the freedom of autonomous moral legislation, Levinas’s subject leaves the climate of
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philosophical immanence—arbitrariness—by way of another person’s impossible
demand.
Another way Levinas makes the same point is through language of the event. In
one brief analysis of the Cartesian cogito, Levinas emphasizes that rationality is not the
discovery but rather localization.41 Here, in the world, some ‘thing’ posits; thought has a
point of origin. Rather than being absorbed into knowledge, this “protuberance” is the
condition for knowing. In other words, thought is not sovereign but is rather dependent
for its part on a non-thought. The wavelike immanence of being is escaped, not through
effort, but rather fatigue. When the work of the “here” produces exhaustion, sleep offers
shelter from eternity and universality (EE, 66). And this sleep is not simply the
affirmation of any place, but specifically the place that I lie down, or my lying down as
place; sabbath as localization. Against the abstract extension of presence in an ethereal
realm and the geographic specifications of a material environment, Levinas proposes that
this formation of a recess in the plenum of being is the “subjectivation of the subject.”
Here, Levinas is careful to not fall into the substance metaphysics of Descartes and his
successors, nor does it require a resignation to idealism. Instead, it leads to his reappropriation of the Neo-Platonic hypostasis.
The event of localization indicates a position, the event of the instant as present.
The present is not one of many, but is rather indifferent to any other time; it “is an
ignorance of history.”42 As an event, the present of position refracts the future. It
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sacrifices continuity for creation. But in this kenosis, the event produces an “exceptional
situation where we can give an instant a name, and conceive it as a substantive” (EE, 71).
At this stage in Levinas’s writing, the mechanism by which the subject emerges is only
suggested. Subjectivation is emphasized as the condition for thought, but the condition of
this subjectivation is left shrouded in darkness. Instead of another pressing in on me,
paralyzing me—putting to rest my conative disposition—the subject in Levinas’s early
work is a posited interruption, a break with being. This rapturous constitution is at odds
with Levinas’s predecessors, who emphasize the subject’s self-constitution in a nearly
harmonious processual manner. In no way enthused by my “utmost ownmost,” Levinas’s
subject is immobilized, parted from the continuity of time. As I have indicated already,
this passivity at the heart of subjectivity is not a choice, but a paralysis, and it is produced
by the demand laid on me by the Other.
B. Hospitality
For most persons, the thought of hospitality conjures open hands and a welcoming
smile, perhaps accompanied by a warm fire and some much-needed sustenance.
Congeniality and gratitude are just a couple of the characteristics typically associated
with this image and disposition. And while Levinas would find none of these traits
objectionable, they remain insufficient—secondary at best. Dinner tables are meaningful
spaces, and lively conversation part of life’s joy, but Levinas’s work focuses on a
hospitality that metaphysically precedes these practices and is a condition for their
occurrence in the world.
Further, in most minds, hospitality is a choice, but for Levinas it is an immemorial
“event” that occurs in a different time than that of Being, or essence. However, there is a
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tension here, since hospitality does imply a certain responsiveness that is inseparable
from call. But this responsiveness, as Peperzak notes, is forever mired in addictions
without the interruptive and infinite demand of the Other.43 And with addiction, there is
precisely the absence of choice (the word itself rooted in the Latin addictus), defined as
one who has been bound in slavery to another. In other words, prior to the call—albeit
not temporally—I am a slave to an economy of pleasure and pain. But what then of this
“responsiveness,” this susceptibility to call? In the slavish economy, does there
nevertheless dwell an ability to respond to interruption with something other than brute
force?
Because of the inherent ambiguity of the term, hospitality finds its way into
Levinas’s philosophy by way of an-other. Left to its “own” world—what is indeed proper
to it—the addicted “self” totalizes. The initial transcendence of any alterity would be
sublated into a latent possibility of the addict. An absolute transcendence is needed for
the separation of relationship and hospitality, a time of the not-yet that refuses latency. In
this situation, the cause of the self would be “still to come,” since it “is thought or known
by its effect as though it were posterior to its effect” (TI, 54). Put differently, before I
have chosen to host the Other, the Other’s proximity has constituted me in an inextricable
and asymmetrical sociality. Hospitality, then, is what enables the world to be, not the
anonymous movement of essence, or Spirit, or Being.
And if hospitality is a movement of welcome before my decision, then the Same
that dominates reason is incapable of comprehending the difference by which I (je) am
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me (moi).44 The economics of the Same seeks advantage; the politics of the Same seeks
power. By contrast, hospitality is a reverse of these policies, confronting me with a
situation and separation that I can neither master nor traverse. In subjection to the face of
the other person, the endless concern for myself is put to an end.45
But if my movement is not primarily, or at least not spontaneously volitional, it is
nevertheless an approach and gathering that deepens my relationship with the other while
not erasing the distance. This proximity amounts to an alternation of passivity and
activity that Levinas names sensibility. In Levinas’s thought, this runs counter to the
dominant traditions of Western philosophy, in which “sensibility is already dominated by
act, by an intuition of an essence.”46 But in order to achieve the thought of offering,
Levinas must find a way to describe the gesture by which a guest is welcomed, who has
already greeted the one who welcomes. Only once this dynamic is further explored can
the role of the hostage also be understood as host.47
To invoke this dynamic so troubling to reason, Levinas initiates a discourse of the
feminine.48 At the outset, it is imperative to highlight Levinas’s distinction between the
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destination operative in the phenomenal register and its function in his inquiry. Though
the language is admittedly problematic, the “non-signifyingness” and “exorbitant
ultramateriality” of the Beloved (femininity) is not to be confused with stereotypical
descriptions of sexualized and gendered women.49 Instead, Levinas is desperate to find
language precisely for that which avoids the violent circumscription of patriarchal and
racist thinking. While stumbling in his efforts, the goal of Levinas’s strained discourse is
the charting of a way that is neither a place nor signification.
Anticipation grasps possibles; what the caress seeks is not situated in a
perspective and in the light of the graspable. The carnal, the tender par
excellence correlative of the caress, the beloved, is to be identified neither
with the body-thing of the physiologist, nor with the lived body [corps
propre] of the “I can,” nor with the body-expression, attendance at its own
manifestation, or face. In the caress, a relation yet, in one aspect, sensible,
the body already denudes itself of its very form, offering itself as erotic
nudity (TI, 258).
Denuding is the essence of opening, taking leave of certain inhibiting protections that
secure one from the Other, certain addictions that keep a swollen self from attending to
the outside. Of course, as I have indicated already, in hospitality the outside is revealed as
the possibility of an inside, a pre-predicative expression of an infinite demand.
As a designation, feminine cannot completely remove itself from binary
discourse. Even with Luce Irigaray’s desire for it to invoke a play of genders, their

stereotypical disregard and proto-feminism for most scholars. Two works that concern this tension are
Feminist Interpretations of Emmanuel Levinas, ed. Tina Chanter (University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania
State University Press, 2001) and Claire Elise Katz, Levinas, Judaism, and the Feminine: The Silent
Footsteps of Rebecca (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003).
49

Specifically, Claire Katz discusses the connection between Levinas’s characterization of the
Other as feminine and central figures of Hebrew Scriptures.

92

distance and difference, the precedent connections demand attention.50 As Catherine
Malabou writes, “In the end, we have to admit that “feminine” does owe something to
women!”51 Which makes Levinas’s position all the more complex, since he also—like
Irigaray—would like for the term to evince distance and proximity rather than a reified
social role. Malabou herself, echoing Derrida, acknowledges that femininity is not a
mode of hospitality but rather hospitality itself.52 For Malabou, Levinas and Irigaray both
at times lean too heavily in a direction that would restrict femininity to openness and
plurality, thereby denying the singularity of a person gendered as woman. Oddly, in this
reading, Levinas is too feminist to see the “im-possibilities” of femininity. Not unlike the
tension in Levinas’s work between the universal structure of heinini (Here is me!) and the
unique situation of one accused, femininity and hospitality must account for facticity.
Unlike Malabou, I want to suggest that Levinas does address this with a non-prescriptive
politics in order to account for the variegated recurrence of the Other’s demand. Later, I
will address the political possibilities gleaned from Levinas’s work as it concerns the
function of witness in contemporary global settings (Chapter Five). For now, it is enough
to have indicated the significance of hospitality, or welcome, in tension with the
subjection of the Same to better highlight the dynamics at play in Levinas’s thinking on
subjectivity.
Solitude
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As with the previous concepts, solitude is used in at least two different ways by
Levinas. At times, Levinas writes of solitude as a symptom of existence, a condition
rather than a choice: “to be is to be isolated by existing….”53 Elsewhere, he modifies this
claim by describing the existence characterized by solitude as an epistemological
position, a Cartesian existence secured through the act of knowing.54 This situation
contrasts with the diachronic existence of the ethical relation, a lived reality that insists
on the Other’s demand in what Derrida playfully defines as a “hauntology.”55 In the
following analysis, I will present solitude through the two lenses of sovereignty and
disorientation, in order to capture the ambiguity present in Levinas’s adoption of the
term.
A. Sovereignty
Levinas is fond of quoting from Blaise Pascal’s Pensees, in particular the
conclusion that demanding a “place in the sun” launched the usurpation of the whole
world (OTB, viii). Like Pascal, Levinas is convinced that the conative disposition of the
self-same subject violently displaces the other person and thereby commits murder, in as
much as the sun—which has been stolen—is needed for life to continue. However,
having reached this conclusion, Levinas does not then think that irrationality is the key to
salvation. On the contrary, the knowledge central to the project of modernity has to be
factored in as inevitable at least. Instead, Levinas argues that knowledge and solitude are
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mutually implicative, for in knowing I am cut off from what is outside that
epistemological sphere. In order to escape the inevitable and necessary enclosure of
knowledge, I must be awakened (startled!) to the ethical relation constitutive of the
knowing subject I become.56 This, of course, implies that Levinas sees escape as the
overwhelming desire of the restless subject. In the above section, “Nudity,” I discussed
the ontological nature of both Shame and Eros, which opened possibilities for escape
(while remaining subordinate to the ethical relation). As a dimension of solitude,
sovereignty is positioned differently: while not the ultimate, an-archic ground of
subjectivity, it is a crucial part of the politics inextricable from ethics. Though a betrayal,
it is necessary.
The connection between sovereignty and solitude is described by Levinas as the
“bourgeois spirit,” defined as a cult of initiative and discovery to secure the unknown.57
Neither satisfied with the objects possessed nor content with available pleasures, the
bourgeois needs to escape and remains dissatisfied by her failed attempts to do so.
Additionally, the subject is riveted to herself precisely by that through which agency is
expressed: the body. The vertigo of existence centers on this entanglement, producing
nausea. An accompanying interrogation evinces the truth of the subject as exposure.
Nevertheless, the struggle persists in spite of the failures, leaving one not only nauseous
but also fatigued. Existentially, this gives way to despair. It would seem that mastery
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leads to destruction and war, rather than peace. In place of responsibility is egoistic
calculation (OTB, 4-5).
In the vein of sovereignty, solitude is a condition of degradation, a broken
covenant, a forgotten allegiance. When Levinas writes of solitude in this way, it is always
an indictment of the “traditions” of Western thought, the ontologies of force that carry
out sacrifices to insure harmony. And while he tends to collapse plurality in his reading
of Western philosophical history, his point is not to provide the closest of readings but
instead provide a reason for caution amidst the dissimulations of Europe and its prodigy,
the United States.
Nevertheless, the agential determinations of subjectivity have a place in Levinas’s
thought, especially in his political investigations. Never afraid of dirty hands, Levinas
acknowledges the necessary failures of the human endeavor to live together. However,
rather than pretending violence is not at hand in my actions, Levinas’s work insists on
giving account. This is part and parcel of his project, which works to overcome the
limitations of self-responsibility. Instead of simply attending to the parameters of my
actions, in Levinas the subject is primarily responsible for the Other. In other words,
ethics and politics are immemorially and antagonistically bound. Each sharpens the other,
which means that the solitude of sovereignty has a place, albeit one deposed from
previous descriptions of the subject.
In the general economy of Being, there is (il y a), and nothing more. As an
existent, I am alone. My existence is my solitude. The hypostatic emergence of a subject
is a countermovement, but one only fully achieved in ethical relation to the Other’s
infinite demand. The only force strong enough to free me from the existential condition
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of solitude does not inhabit the same plane. The demand is asymmetrical and thereby
“outside” of the sphere of Being; hence, the title, Otherwise than Being. The phrase I
have developed to approximate the role of “aloneness” in Levinas’s philosophy is
chastened solitude. Neither a product of self-isolation nor an inescapable situation,
chastened solitude is a solitude that bears the mark, or trace, of the Other. To return to
Derrida, this modified solitude is haunted.
B. Disorientation
Having broken from and with Being, the subject born of infinite responsibility is
bereft of structure. Though emancipation is preferable to bondage, the cost is nearly
unbearable. “Without the tradition, there is the complete disorientation of subjectivity.”58
The solitude that stems from this irruption is central to Levinas’s project of promise,
since for there to be anything like a “beginning,” this evacuation is necessary. But what
of the situation with this refugee subjectivity?59 How can one begin from nothing?
The creatio ex nihilo has a long history of doctrinal debate which I will not
explore here, as I intend usage of the term to be strictly metaphorical. It is an
approximation of the situation for Levinas’s stranded subjectivity, and for that matter,
Nietzsche’s madman. Heidegger’s response to the situation—which he also recognized,
albeit insufficiently—gave way to mourning. But mourning works to repair a broken
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subjectivity, and in Levinas there is no final reparation available.60 The more responsible
one is, the greater the burden. Contrary to the calculus of exchange in sacrificial
economies, no atonement is final.
In my discussion of sovereignty, I described solitude in Levinas as fixed to
existence itself. As an existent, I am alone. But here, I want to suggest that the tradition
of Western thought under scrutiny by Levinas deprives me of the personal existence so
valued by the same tradition. Indicative of a civil war, the logocentric West both isolates
me as inescapably myself and reduces me to nothing. As Drabinski makes clear, “The
West is a theorizing and cultural practice of a voracious, eliminationist subjectivity.”61
Yet, even this impossible set of practices feels like home to many, who are consequently
unable to escape; herein lies the dilemma facing Levinas and his philosophical
successors. How can one begin, when the infinite demand has taken leave of everything
that had defined life up to that point? Herein lies the difficulty of the ‘creation from
nothing.’
For one exposed to the intensity of asymmetrical intersubjectivity, the witness
borne becomes the impossible burden and source of all meaning i.e. social and political
practices. But bearing this witness means having no bearing. The practice of witnessbearing for Levinasian subjectivity is without guidance, since the constitutive
responsibility abandons resolve and reciprocity. No book, no religion, no politics, can
anchor the burdened subjectivity. And no measurement can deliver the phenomenal
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texture of the one who is to be my neighbor. Yet, there is a kind of messy hope, an agony
of sorts, that stubbornly refuses to let go—much like Jacob wrestling with the divine
messenger, God, or himself. This recalcitrant insistence in offering oneself to the needs of
another prompts the impossible establishment of a political community that works to
deliver justice. Of course, the deliverance borne by chastened solitude renders closure
both unrealistic and undesirable. And without assurance, such activity is always a risk,
much like the irruptive subjectivity of Levinasian phenomenology.
Orientation is the preferred situation of a Euro-American subjectivity. Being
placed in relation to the points of a compass provides security, purpose, and authority.
Security from the wilderness “in need of domestication,” purpose amid the chaos of
human encounters with the non-human world, and authority to effect change when the
circumstances are undesirable or incomprehensible. A disoriented subjectivity is not
afforded a compass, which renders the person ill-equipped to unsolder the bond with the
Other. Being unmoored from solid ground, the end is nowhere to be found, the horizon
always beyond my sight. Illumination is the essence of being, monstration its heart beat.
Husserl gravitates to this event of illumination as the bedrock of a rigorous science, but
Levinas bears the unspoken violence of foreclosure and scientific certainty. Having lost
many family members in the Holocaust, arguably the culmination of a “spiritualized,” or
idealized state, Levinas becomes a witness to the unintended and unexplored horizons of
human life.62
Conclusions
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To be fraught is to be permeated with an inescapable anxiety, a suspicion that
one’s enclosure is less secure than imagined. In Levinas’s work, the subject that emerges
is wholly divided between an impossible demand and an infinite response. The tension
between these fundamental (anti)structures constitutes a responsible subjectivity capable
of engaging in agonizing political struggle in the name of a justice that is always “to
come.” I chose the concept pairs in this chapter because they reveal the tense dynamic at
work in the forever divided subjectivity Levinas announces throughout his writings.
Nudity is a term laden with excess, not all of which would be misplaced in a
discussion of Levinas’s work. So often it remains couched in critical and popular
investigations of the erotic, also a position from which Levinas is not entirely estranged.
To best explore the subject-possibilities of this category, I decided on the terms, “shame”
and “eros.” In this way, I was able to dissuade moralistic references, and thus open up a
sense of nudity as exposure and vulnerability instead of an overture to transgression. To
be sure, even transgression is an important concept for Levinas, but instead of the virile
self, transgressing the imposed boundaries, the direction is reversed in Levinas. The
prideful and authorized self-same subject is transgressed, transformed into a concavity. In
my discussion of shame, I highlighted that the most shameful experience for this self is
the inability to escape its situation as an existent, or to even hide itself. Therein lies the
shame as exposure, a protuberance that cannot be covered. Beyond this initial gleaning,
there are political implications to shame, especially commiserative shame, which forms
an unpredictable and non-prescriptive solidarity. Eros is suggestive of more than Levinas
writes. As indicated in the above analysis, the caress of the tender hand bound to the
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erotic is always pointing beyond itself, not to a specific destination but rather to an
amplification of desire. In contrast to another theorist of desire, Jacques Lacan,
Levinasian desire is not linked to lack but rather to surplus.63 My cup always runs over
towards the Other.
Maybe the most difficult category for Levinas scholars is passivity. It remains a
difficult—at times impossible—task of thinking ethics without some kind of agency. And
it seems that agency implies a “freedom from” coercion of any kind. But Levinas pushes
against this notion of freedom, which presents a false spontaneity controlled by the
conative disposition of “beings.” Rather than freedom, the situation is one of “allergic
egoisms” (OTB, 4-5). A calculated peace reigns within a modern concept of freedom
derived not from responsibility but rather from a struggle to exist in spite of the claims
placed on me by others. Benda Hofmeyr and others have written of the need for some
exploration of agency that avoids the pitfalls that Levinas identifies without succumbing
to paralysis. I am not convinced that Levinas’s philosophy suffers from this as much as
Hofmeyr contends, but I consider her challenge a valid one which I aim to take up in this
work. To that end, the next chapter will explore the function of bearing in relation to the
“becoming subject” of a witness. And it is here that I think Levinas’s philosophy opens
onto possibilities for the contemporary situation of humans living in impossible times
with a burden not of their making, but for which they must assume all responsibility. In
our time and place, what does it mean to carry a burden imposed on us both by our
ancestry and the planet that we have degraded with our activities of conquest?
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Finally, the solitude of a witness is undeniably the most painful aspect of a
subjectivity in process. To not bear knowledge, but a demand, is to carry a burden that
can never be released. And the work of bearing is never finished, like the labor of
birthing a life never entirely present. In fact, Levinas describes the subjectivity in
formation as a maternity, “a body suffering for another…a pure undergoing” (OTB, 79).
The voice and vision of the witness expresses “the fission of the inward secrecy that
makes signs to another, signs of this very giving of signs” (OTB, 147). Responding as a
dividual, formed by the division engendered by the command, the subject is detached
from the orientation of a directional plane. Consequently, the subject is alone, singularly
named by the call of the Other. Without hope of a return, the disoriented and “non-final”
subject approaches the Infinite (OTB, 155).
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Chapter 4: Bearing Witness
A Burdened Subject
As indicated in the previous chapter, the vision of the Other--which has nothing to
do with the distribution of light through optical mechanisms—is the most difficult burden
to carry. It can neither be unseen nor transferred to another person. Because I did not
choose this “vision,” I have no control over its revelation; its “appearing” is
unconditioned, violating the principles of intentional analysis.1 And yet, I am commanded
to bear this transgression in spite of my ability, accused without recourse to arbitration.
As a non-adjudicated condition, I not only bear this witness but am borne by it into an
always unanticipated future. In this chapter, I will explore the traumatic constitution of
the subject in Levinas through the lenses of gift, proximity, and transcendence.
Additionally, I will contend that, as a fragile subjectivity, I am borne through the trials of
impossibility, necessity, and infinity, birthed into the agonies and ecstasies of responsible
life.
Unbearable
Though it is the case with all terms, “to bear” in particular has a wide semantic
range. Among other possibilities, it means “to carry a burden of life” or “to produce
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life.”2 By framing this section with the term “unbearable,” I have chosen to explore this
ambiguity as it relates to impossibility. Thus, unbearable would imply a burden too great
to bear or a life that cannot be fully birthed. In place of the masterful, virile, subject
would be one unable to carry out a task, ill-equipped to actualize itself. In the words of
Levinas, this subject would be unable to even be able (nous ne pouvons plus pouvoir). As
the end of mastery, testifying to the unbearable is the emergence of responsible
subjectivity.
A. Gift
Gift is a term that Levinas does not often use. In fact, it is usually mentioned only
in relation to the actions of one who “gives” bread to another (from one’s own mouth).
As significant as this ethically grounded practice is, I want to complicate this situation by
referencing the constitutive demand of the Other as the “original” gift, without origins.
Adina Bozga describes this as the “exasperating gift of singularity.”3 Exasperating and
unbearable, the gift nevertheless forges the subject and is the very possibility of meaning.
Levinas himself describes something akin to gift from both the perspective of the Same
(“donation”) and the Other (“demand”). Other scholars have examined the gift from the
perspective of maternity—though Levinas uses the masculine in relation to fecundity and
the feminine concerning the welcome of a habitation. I will briefly explore these
possibilities to inflect the wide range of meanings related to a gift, and in doing so, offer
contours for my later description of the testimony of a martyr.
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In Totality and Infinity, Levinas uses language as the supreme example of a gift.
When reaching out to another, the speaker extracts a “word” from a private context and
offers it to the other. This offering invites the other into the world of the speaker.
The relationship with the Other, transcendence, consists in speaking the
world to the Other. But language accomplishes the primordial putting in
common—which refers to possession and presupposes economy. (italics
mine, TI, 173).
The task of putting in common implies that “something” was not in common before the
offering. Something private, internal to the speaker, is now shared with another, thereby
constructing a home—economy being the law of this home. To be clear, the language
referenced here does not require sounds, systems of enunciation, or inscribed symbols.
Language is fundamentally the reaching out by any means, and oftentimes, the language
of transcendence is failed by logos; hence, Plato’s deference to mythos in Timaeus.
Levinas rejects the option of myth, but perhaps steers close through his invocation of
religious language throughout much of his philosophical work. What matters is that the
language of transcendence expresses beyond signification, which means that it cannot be
enclosed in a totality. It cannot become a system, a nomos, but must instead recur as a
breach in structure.
Of course, the offer of what is “mine” is a form of dispossession. The bestowing
of a gift and being dispossessed are the same movement by which a shared world is
created. But the relationship with the Other, transcendence as ethics, involves an
unbearable action, namely my self-impoverishment. As a conative being, mired in the
addictive pursuit of Being, I am loathe to pause, or allow anything to partake of the being
which I have been so desperate to attain. Ironically, this conative disposition is precisely
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what imprisons me, thereby robbing me of meaning, the enthused world. Contrary to
robust notions of freedom as self-actualization, Levinas’s account of world-creation
requires the subjection of the self, the self as subject(-ed). But if I am unable to bear the
subjection, and therefore, refuse it of my own will, the dispossession must then come
from without. My offering in language is not spontaneously prompted by an inherent
goodwill but is instead forced upon me by another. Consequently, the gift I offer—
unbeknownst to me—is conditioned by the demand of the Other as gift.
As the original gift without origins, the Other’s demand of me is exasperating,
like an infuriating possession. In fact, like Kant’s moral law, this gift provokes a certain
pain because it contrasts so strongly with my egoic pursuits. The halt of addiction is
never pleasurable, though it is necessary for a world to exist.4 The other’s possession of
me (not I, but one who stands accused) is the necessary condition for the dispossessive
act of creation. And it is an unbearable gift, which is why I cannot even be aware of it.
Otherwise, I would refuse it. Herein lies a major contribution of Levinas’s work to the
problematic of human community. My subjectivity is grounded not in my activity, but
rather the relationship with another initiated from outside of what I think I am, beyond
the perceptual horizons of my identity.
Early in Levinas’s work, his attention was given to the singularity of the existent,
aware as he was of the violent turn to the collective. Being Jewish in France or Germany
meant living permanently on the outside of cultural assumptions. His priority of
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singularity stems from what he considered the importance of resistance in the face of an
anonymous force. Known ontologically as the il y a, and politically as totalitarianism,
Levinas forcefully argues that the “wave upon wave” of immanence threatened the very
humanity of the human.5 And nothing is more immanent to modern thought than
chronology. According to Kant, chronological time is one of the two ideal conditions for
knowledge.6 The intervention of the other, diachrony, is not the source of chronology but
a radical break with it. Oppositional rather than complementary—which would suggest a
unifying third—the diachronic demand announces the human as a rupture.
If we assume, with Kant and his successors, that chronological time is a condition
for knowledge, then the break with that time is also a break with the known. And
breaking with the known entails an evacuation of all that I consider myself to be, a
disorientation that feels less like a gift than a curse. As aforementioned sections have
noted, the abandoned subject of modernity is replaced by a subjectivity that bears without
bearing.7 But how to do this? How to bear without direction, without a place from which
I arise and to where I must go?
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Herein lies the importance of the gift of the Other. Unplaceable and always
uncertain, the command of the Other nevertheless calls the subject into action.8 And
through this action emerges a responsible subjectivity, or to be more precise, a
subjectivity not only able but forced to respond, coerced as though possessed. Haunted by
the demand to “not murder,” the fragile subjectivity is opened and consequently, opens
hands and home. Not called to some place but to someone, the ethically constituted
subjectivity repeatedly bears the gift of this demand, not continuously but in an infinite
recurrence—what Simon Critchley has described as the “original traumatism.”9 The
impossible burden that must be borne, the cursed gift that must be received.
In a somewhat different register, one not identical to but resonant with Levinas’s
own work—or at least in a spirit not foreign to Levinas—Lisa Guenther has noted a
similar ambiguity present in the gift of birth. “If birth is a gift, then who gives what to
whom?”10 Do I give myself my own birth? That would be both the height of hubris and
absurdity. And yet, the mother that “gives birth” does not give what she has. Recall that,
for Levinas, language is the original gift without origin, since it is a “putting into
common” what is private. Thus, it is the donation of a world, a world that is not the
possession of the giver. How does one offer a world that is not one’s own, or at least not
exclusively one’s own. This approaches the aporia of giving itself, since what is given is
always a gift beforehand. Levinas’s phrase, “anteriorly posterior,” attempts to
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approximate this paradox (TI, 170). Returning to Guenther, there are two births that help
us to further explore the ambiguity of gift. One is the “birth into a world,” which speaks
to the enjoyments of a self. In enjoyment, I am for myself, from the original grasping and
possession of a child to the labor of an adult. The second is the “birth unto an Other,”
which is a birth into responsibility. In this birth, I am called out of the immanent prison of
egoic pursuits into a life of commitment. Guenther concisely distinguishes between these
two births and the antagonistic relationship between them.
I do not myself float for an eternity in the womb of the element, nor do I
extricate myself from the element on my own; rather I am welcomed out
of the element and into a home by a feminine Other who antecedes me,
and who makes my dwelling possible.11
Is the Other that welcomes the same as the Other that commands? Is a command
necessary to welcome? Can a welcome ever be commanded or a command welcomed?
For Levinas, answers will vary, but I contend it is a matter of consensus among Levinas
scholars that the possessed subjectivity must welcome the One that accuses. This is
ethics, the welcome of the Other that commands from on high and beseeches from below.
I do wonder whether an argument can be made that they are but two sides of alterity. The
welcoming Other is the aspiration of the subject, the exemplary practice of hospitality.
The commanding Other is the one whose accusations elicit a response that participates in
my birth. Both are gifting the Same with an alterity necessary for a responsible practice
of life, and thus, for a world.
B. Proximity
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In contrast to common designations of proximity as the spatio-temporal distance
between two objects, Levinas offers that proximity is the irreducible restlessness of a
subject vulnerable to the suffering of another. “Proximity is the subject that approaches
and consequently constitutes a relationship in which I participate as a term, but where I
am more, or less, than a term… I am a term irreducible to the relation, and yet in a
recurrence which empties me of all consistency” (OTB, 82). Both a term in asymmetrical
relation and irreducible to a term, the subject exposed to the suffering of another is
emptied of virility, power, the conative disposition of addictive being. This nearness, that
is also an unbridgeable chasm, is the origin of the infinite responsibility to which Levinas
continually makes reference.
Unlike with the gift, Levinas writes extensively of proximity, reconsidering it,
substituting other terms so as to deliver the urgency it names. Part of this effort stems
from the fact that proximity is invisible; it is not the measurable but the anarchic origin of
what becomes measured (OTB, 81). And as invisible, it must be gleaned from the
engendered dislocations and contortions it produces in the wounded subject. Perhaps the
clearest method for distinguishing proximity from its “productions” is legal analysis.
Additionally, the distinction between proximity and policy is instructive insofar as it
provides an opportunity to resist resignation to dysfunctional structures. As Desmond
Manderson makes clear,
Legal education suffers … from a fatal flaw: it is vigorously critical of
legal forms and analyses, but it frequently lacks any theoretical framework
that would help our students work towards a better system or a better way
of explaining it.12
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Just as many lawyers find themselves ill-equipped to drive change, so too must all
persons feel despair under the totalizing influence of techno-scientific rationality. If the
conceptual tools on which I depend prefigure my response, then my actions serve as little
more than status confirmations.
In the work of Levinas, proximity is the antidote to determinism. In fact, to use
phenomenological language, shock is the intuitive modality of the unforeseeable event.13
As with the gift, proximity indexes both the impossibility and possibility of
phenomenology. Though structurally forbidden, the proximity of the Other nevertheless
torments me from within. Perhaps a better word for proximity, then, is soul. Instead of
being resigned to substantialist notions of a ghostlike occupant, soul is the name for an
“asymptotic approach,” the “infinitesimal gulf” that both separates and binds humans
together in a primordial sociality.14 To be soulful is to be proximately connected before I
am even self-conscious.
Too often, persons vested with power to effect change in a given situation operate
under an assumption that over-determines proximity as spatio-temporal location. After
tirelessly working through what counts as “proximate,” the legislative powers simply find
the term ineffective because imprecise. But that is precisely the significance of
proximity! Precision is only a matter for consideration because proximity calls a body to
give account of its actions. I am liable because vulnerable to another’s suffering.
Vulnerability is what determines my responsibility. To frame this in jurisprudential
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terms, the area of tort law deals with issues of negligence, a category problematic since
its inception. Specifically, the problem arises in legal discussions that either reduce
proximity to geographical coordinates or conflate policy with proximity. I have already
highlighted Levinas’s own contrast of proximity with cartographic determinations, and so
here I will only examine the confusion of proximity with policy.
Levinas describes this problem as the tension between ethics and politics, but
Manderson substitutes proximity for ethics and modifies politics to policy. He suggests
that proximity be thought of as what orients responsibility in relation to “you.” It is not an
I-Thou or an I-We but rather a You-Me relationship that drives the responsible subject in
Levinas. As for policy, responsibility is oriented in relation to “us.” The human plurality
is an object of consideration here, an impossible but necessary practice that Levinas
names justice. In this unbearably difficult situation, “I pass from the relation in which I
am obligated to the other, responsible for the other, to one in which I ask myself which is
first.”15 I am bound to the Other in the “face-to-face” but also the other of this Other, who
places demands on me as well. Inescapable and impossible, this situation arises from the
immemorial relation of responsibility.
Policy seeks to redress this difficult situation through the category of negligence.
This area of law is “precisely about the unexpected, the careless, or the thoughtless. It is a
judgment passed on our responses when ‘respons-ability’ suddenly approaches to us…”16
When given the opportunity to respond, the legal matter of negligence sees to it that
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persons are held accountable for their lack of response. Implicit within the expectations
established by negligence is an invisible bond between humans that demands attention.
Failure to respond within the horizon of vulnerability—conjured by the suffering of the
defendant—amounts to a violation of law. But this becomes quite complicated when
jurists attempt to design parameters of proximity (the horizon of vulnerability) in which
defendants could be found guilty of negligence. As Manderson has made clear—citing a
number of cases—the jurists in this situation fail to see that the boundaries are invisible.17
The accusation of the plaintiff cannot be placed under the microscope of jurisprudence as
it is currently structured; hence, the need for a theory by which the entire framework
could be adjusted to handle the priority of the ethical.
Moving on from legality, I want to close out this discussion of proximity by
examining how Levinas uses the term in “Peace and Proximity.” In Chapter 2, I wrote at
length of the function of solitude in Levinas’s work. Specifically, I chose Sovereignty
and Disorientation as the means of analysis, which I did because of their relation to the
project (or myth) of modernity.18 With sovereignty, knowledge and solitude are mutually
implicative, and armed with a knowing “I,” they seek to master the world. Consequently,
they violate the invisible “law” of proximity and refuse to give account of this
displacement. Such usurpation further denies the “immediate immorality of a culture and
a history,” which is evidenced by the “risk run by each for himself in a world without
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security….”19 Concatenated though allergic, every “each” runs as an interested and
indifferent entrepreneur. The aim of Levinas’s work is to question this race, this
competition that undercuts the very wellspring of activity, namely the pre-reflective
proximity to another. This wellspring, or Ur-sprung, to borrow from Heidegger, literally
overflows the finite intentions of a totalizing discourse. In Levinas’s words, this amounts
to an “excess of of sociality and love” over solitude.20 The disarmament of this enclosed
sovereignty occurs only through the impingement of an infinite demand that will not
allow for a return, a relaxation in the face of immediate need. I highlight “excess” in this
reference to point ahead to an investigation of transcendence, as it relates to the
unbearable. Together with gift and proximity, transcendence constitutes the knot by
which the impossible is expressed, the unbearable borne.
C. Transcendence
At the outset, it is imperative to unequivocally reject considerations of
transcendence that invoke another world, a “heavenly” realm, purified of material
complexity. Levinas characterizes this other-worldly gesture as “false and cruel,” hinting
at both the explicit and implicit violence of the sacred in these systems of thought and
practice.21 However, he also recognizes the danger of immanence, which reduces the
human to an object of thought in a totality. Hegel’s “slaughter-bench” maintains a
frightening resonance for Levinas and others who have paid the price of such thought,
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which is nothing less than mass-murder and enslavement.22 Situated between two
unacceptable explanations, Levinas’s work begins in the solicitation of alternate
meanings for transcendence that neither disparage the body nor chain the subject to
biology. And in the unresolved unity of human subjectivity lies the harbored secret of
transcendence: responsibility.
But before arriving at responsibility in later works, Levinas suggests a different
model of transcendence, predicated not on departure but instead what he terms “being
held fast [rivé]” (OE, 52). Unlike Husserlian phenomenology, which presents and represents a constituted world—correlative constitution—Levinas’s an-archic sourcing
prioritizes the location of an existent. As Kris Sealey writes, “In being positioned, I am
burdened by an obligation that I neither choose nor give meaning to, since the event of
positionality categorically remains outside of a constituted ‘world.’”23 The transcendence
here described is given a neologism by Levinas: excendence. In excendence, the desire is
not to take refuge somewhere—as it would be in philosophical and theological notions of
transcendence—but simply to get out [sortir] (OE, 54).24 The need is not to surmount or
transform but only to escape. Corporeal existence is driven to get out, but it remains
riveted. However, in the very desire to get out is signaled a certain transcendence, a
resistance to the enveloping ocean of existence. Levinas’s early work “establishes that an
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understanding of transcendence as an excendence from being trumps the efficacy of a
more liberal notion of spontaneity to capture the structure of identity implied in an
experience like suffering.”25 Excendence, then, is the very refusal of what besieges the
existent on all sides. I cannot get out, or away, but still I desire to do just that; not because
I am free but because I am infinitely compressed and riveted to the existence from which
I desire to take leave.
The transcendence as excendence found in On Escape highlights a duality within
identity, namely that of the moi and the soi. The refusal suggests an existent, or an
identity, at odds with itself, not at-home-with-itself in anything like logical identity. In
sharp contrast to the law of contradiction, A is never simply A but rather resisting A,
worried about A, seeking to leave A. To use different language, the ego (moi) struggles
with the self (soi). Burdened not only by the weight of being but the having-to-be-with
oneself, the existent is encumbered on multiple levels. This experience of the body as a
burden is indicative of the aforementioned duality; hence, Critchley’s use of the term
“dividual” to characterize subjectivity in Levinas, albeit one infinitely divided not just
between an ego and a self, but between a self and an Other’s demand (See Chapter 2,
Footnote 1).
While not fully extricated from the anonymous il y a, the existent on the way to
subjectivity has already broken with this undifferentiated field.26 But the fissure opened
here is not accomplished by a willful expenditure of energy. On the contrary, it is the
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decline of such strength that enables a tentative separation. This dynamic between the
effort of an instant and the rupture of fatigue highlights the need for a phenomenology of
aging, a passivity from which one cannot escape. It also demonstrates that even tentative
transcendence of anonymity is not accomplished by ingenuity or astonishing vigor, but
rather by the inability to go on. The indolence of an existent unable to exert (anymore)
argues for the intrinsic division at the heart of existence itself (EE, 64-70). “Existents are
there (to be precisely the sufferers of the burden of an absolutely exterior existence), but
they are there as precisely not-yet subjects.”27 And yet, as indicated by the dynamic of
effort and fatigue, an existence borne is the undoing of a subject never quite undone.28
The strain of bearing, the need to rest (localization), makes the ‘thought’ of refusal
possible, and it is this material conditioning of thought that challenges ecstatic models of
transcendence.
The relationship between an existent and existence can be described by the term
“sensibility.” Unlike formal models that treat sensibility as a ‘power,’ an ability to
receive data from outside certain biological parameters, sensibility in Levinas refers to
the “how” of the relationship. Through ‘corporeal affection,’ existence permeates the
movement of the existent. An outside that inspires and burdens the interior, sensibility
names an unbearable situation. This existential predicament produces pain and suffering,
exacerbating the need to escape. Consequently, transcendence is the “condition for” and
“motivated effect of” sensibility. A “body is open to pain insofar as it is exposed to an
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exteriority (that wounds), and … the essence of suffering lies in our inability to escape
the body (our body) at that moment of exposure.”29 Nevertheless, one does seek to leave,
an undeniably damned pursuit but one crucial to the emergence of subjectivity.
If I am unable, finally, to rend myself from the existence and body I bear, another
must intervene. Herein lies the significance of Levinas’s later work and the trajectory of
Levinas’s early thought concerning human subjectivity. What I glean through fatigue and
enjoyment becomes complete (albeit impermanently) in the inescapable demand placed
on me by the Other. Specifically, the existent is de-positioned in transcendence, an event
that can only occur through the impetus of the Other.30 The conative, addictive self,
mired in the moi of self-absorbed intentionality, is incapable of accomplishing
transcendence, despite its belief to the contrary. No mysticism, no heightened state of
thought can escape riveted existence. This strongly contrasts with classical
transcendence, which characterizes both the god and human thought that transcends its
limitations. The movement is decidedly from inside to outside, as in Husserl’s
intentionality seeking intuition. The genius of Levinas’s insight stems from his
identification of transcendence at the heart of existence, an exteriority conditioning the
interior.
In a contribution to the Encyclopédie Philosophique Universelle, Levinas writes
that, for Plotinus, “thought as the act of knowing or intellection, in the duality of seeing
and seen, emanated from the transcendence of the One, from its unity or repose,
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untroubled by any relation of multiplicity….”31 In the article, he proceeds to identify the
common thread of classical notions of transcendence: nostalgia. Homesickness for the
one—from Plato to Husserl—has motivated the totalizing gestures of Western philosophy
(and theology).
This nostalgia, or this piety or gathering of oneself, going beyond and
above the intelligible that is present to the intelligence—is philosophy,
aspiration to a wisdom, that is not knowledge, that is not representation,
that is love. Love of a wisdom other than the intelligible giving itself to
knowledge.32
Philosophy, then, is (or has been) a kind of erotic fusion with the One; a return to the
One, from the exile of existence. However, as Levinas makes clear in all of his work,
detachment from the body is the tragic dream of liberalism, and it is partly responsible for
the rise of “Hitlerism,” which Levinas describes as an “awakening of more elementary
feelings.”33 In other words, nostalgia unsuccessfully conceals what it denies—the body.
By way of a curated history of philosophy, Levinas arrives at the conclusion that
transcending the conative imperative of Being requires the Other person. Only by the
‘word’ of another person am I summoned to responsibility. Careful to avoid the troubling
generalizations that so often constitute thought, the unique issuance of need from outside
my egoic sphere deposes the feigned sovereignty of the ‘hateful I.’ This subjection to a
demand shapes the possibility for all activities that arise in the life of a subject.
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A thought constrained to the categorical imperative, inspired by an
unknown God, constrained to bear non-transferable responsibilities, but,
thus, consecrating my personal uniqueness, my primogeniture and
election.34
I am, only in obeyance to the summons, which is also described as the Word of God.
However, as with transcendence, Levinas has deformalized divinity to such an extent that
contestations between theistic and atheistic visions are ill-conceived at best. The first
question is not how we know (epistemology) but rather how we live in response.
Unbearably Borne
As with gift, proximity, and transcendence, other indices of Levinas’ thought are
almost always unbearable. Thinking against a tradition requires an effort beyond that of
volition and cunning, which is why Levinas constantly stresses the vulnerability at the
heart of a thought that gives the bread from one’s mouth to another. Having already
written of the radical passivity undergirding the life of responsible subjectivity, it bears
repeating that the “end of mastery indicates that we have assumed existing in such a way
that an event can happen to us that we no longer assume” (TO, 74). Not only are we
incapable of voluntarily assuming the event of responsibility, we are equally ill-equipped,
as existents, to bear the burden of witness as it concerns the diachronic intervention of a
summons from elsewhere; hence, the following investigative terms: impossibility,
necessity, and infinity.
A. Impossibility
Possibility is shaped almost exclusively by the cultural frame that precedes
inquiry. Husserl described this frame as the ‘life-world,’ the intuitive environment that
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exists in common for all within a particular socio-cultural region.35 From the perspective
of this epistemological horizon, a threshold of possibility exists for the appearance of
objects to the intentions of a percipient. Outside of this horizon, appearance is impossible.
And it is this limit that Levinas tests, an excavation that leads him to a reversion of
intentionality in the emergence of the Other. The subsequent rupture of phenomenology,
by way of the demand imposed by unexplored horizons, establishes at least a strand of
phenomenology as a discipline of the margins rather than the illuminated foreground. In
fact, this obsession ‘with and by’ excess reconfigured the second half of 20th century
French philosophy. On the whole, it continues to be an interrogation of certain
philosophical styles that predominated for most of the history of Western thought. If one
were to decide on a concept of particular interest for this loosely assembled family of
thinkers, a strong candidate would be “event.” Recall Michel Foucault, whose
genealogical work highlights the different strategies for ‘evental’ prevention.
This…way of conceiving and programming things implies something very
important in relation to the event of scarcity, in relation to this eventscourge of scarcity-dearness with its possible consequence, revolt. At
bottom, the scourge, scarcity, as it was conceived until then, was both an
individual and collective phenomenon….36
While Foucault is focused on social (bio-political) functions of power, the event he
names and the event Levinas investigates have in common the feature of severe
discretion, or even absence. Both are attempting to index the founding trauma of human
sociality, albeit with different ends in mind. And for Levinas and the assemblage of other
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philosophers indebted to Husserlian phenomenology, that which refuses appearance
exceeds phenomenological possibility; hence, the need for an escape that would
technically be impossible.
If philosophy, as a posture of thought, is an attempt to control this event, then
Levinas must find a way that maintains the rigor that Husserl emphasized while avoiding
the exactitude that covets security and maintenance. In “Substitution,” he points out that
“subjectivity qua consciousness can thus be interpreted as the articulation of an
ontological event, as one of the mysterious ways in which its “act of being” is deployed”
(OTB, 99). This event, though mysterious, is possible. Phenomenology can pursue the
aforementioned articulation with painstaking effort, but according to Levinas, this event
is merely another instance of self-possession, or sovereignty. Despite the deposition
introduced by the phenomenological method, the conclusion suggests that the ingenious
modification is merely a reform of preexistent insight. Of course, Husserl never intended
phenomenology to be more than that, which of course satisfied his and others’ concerns
about being “unscientific.” In contrast, Levinas begins with sensibility interpreted as a
proximity irreducible to spatio-temporal coordinates (OTB, 100). Rather than an object
given to consciousness within a culturally established horizon, proximity highlights the
recurrent covenant with another, not one of my choosing but rather an immemorial
binding that precedes my freedom. In the depths, as it were, of a subjectivity, an
accusation is made by the one that always approaches before I am aware. The projective
for-itself of an ego is thrown back onto itself to the point of pushing the self “outside.”
This movement from the for-itself to the for-another is substitution. An unbearable
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witness to be sure, substitution tears at the solipsistic enclosure of knowledge. It muddies
the clarity of self-righteousness.
Substitution operates in the entrails of the self, rending its inwardness,
putting its identity out of phase and disrupting its recurrence. Yet this
occurs in the impossibility for me to evade substitution, which confers
uniqueness on this ever failing identity of the oneself. Substitution is a
communication from the one to the other and from the other to the one
without the two relations having the same sense (OTB, 196, italics mine).
What Levinas proposes is impossible by the standards of Western thought; specifically
phenomenology.37 And he responds to this conviction of impossibility by issuing his own
declaration: it is impossible for me to evade substitution because I do not choose it.
Whereas philosophy has often attempted to show the means by which a rational agent
freely decides on the right path of action or belief, Levinas’s work argues that this is the
real impossibility. The conatus of beings in Being knows only persistence. It cannot
allow for the existence of another, and thus will never decide for the Other. In short,
Western philosophy cannot explain the offer of bread from a starving person to another in
need. Consequently, freedom can never be the ground for an ethically motivated
response.38
Not only is freedom a central target for Levinas, but so also is the notion of selfconcern as the fundamental logic of human subjectivity. As indicated above, a for-
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itself—however benign and well-meaning—can never accomplish “true” generosity,
which is to say self-sacrifice. Thus, the question to which substitution might be the
answer is, “How is sacrifice possible?”39 How is it possible for an existent mired in
addictive persistence driven out of itself for the sake of another? How can one driven to
survive relinquish this obsession for the care of someone else? To the extent that the
subject is reduced to consciousness, “a radical challenge to the subject is excluded…from
the outset.”40 If the “I” is primary, then it will always usurp the care demanded by
another. As with children playing a game of conquest atop a mound of soil, the I will
fight feverishly for its place in the sun. Even communication with the other, as other, is
denied. In the realm of consciousness, the other is always only a competitor for my
wants. Thus, consciousness must be commanded by that which is somehow other,
something without a place or marker of certainty.
Whereas in Totality and Infinity, Levinas depicts a pre-formed entity destabilized
by an encounter with radical difference, his later efforts expound on the subject as always
already disturbed, pressed upon by an outside that is on the inside. In an effort to clarify
what some had taken for the possibility of a non-ethical existence—one free of alterity—
Levinas moves to insist on the immemorial recurrence of the Other as the founding
trauma of subjectivity.41 And it is this original-without-origins displacement that accounts
for the subject, seen thusly as for-another before she is for-herself. Levinas does not
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remove the possibility of one being for-oneself, but he does articulate the condition by
which one could be otherwise. Herein lies the primary function of substitution in his
work. I contend that the entirety of Levinas’s philosophical efforts could be interpreted as
an exploration of this (im)possibility.42
However, communicating the gist of Levinas’s own recurrent enunciation does
not insure greater clarity as to the “How?” of the founding trauma. In what instances
might one glean the working-out of what Levinas has announced? To the chagrin of
Levinas himself perhaps, I will now borrow from the work of Rudi Visker, whose
juxtaposition of Levinas with Freud I find helpful in achieving a better understanding of
substitution as dispossession.43 But, as Visker is quick to note, this comparative
examination does not reduce Levinasian philosophy to psychoanalysis or vice versa, nor
does it claim to speak for Levinas, who harbored certain fears about being confused with
the “talking cure.”44 Instead, it draws out the important differences amidst the resonance
and thereby contextualizes Levinas’s insights, just as a study of Jewish midrash would
assist in approaching his work.
Words like ‘trauma’ and ‘obsession’ are clearly indebted to the discipline of
psychoanalysis, but they also have a theological heritage from which psychoanalysis
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derives much of its lexicon. While Levinas does not want to be confused with this school
of thought, in some ways his work puts into question the assumptions of psychoanalysis
itself i.e. it psychoanalyzes psychoanalysis. Specifically, it challenges the
characterization of the traumatic constitution of the subject. Though Levinas does not
argue that the effect of egoic displacement is less than traumatic, he does not assume
alienation as a necessary consequence for the subject.
…unlike in Freud, this affect does not suffocate and overpower us, does
not alienate and enslave us. If it oppresses us, then it is an oppression
which liberates. And hence is the place of that affect an other trauma, a
trauma that heals. A good trauma, then, for this is the trauma of a Good
that leaves us ‘no time’ to refuse it or choose for it….45
The trauma that heals is the Other that commands, the trace of the Infinite in the face of
the Other. But how can the Other precede my self-consciousness; how can the approach
precede my volition and thereby leave me with no time to choose? This heteronomous
experience, as indicated above, is impossible from the perspective of a tradition that
maintains rational agency is primary.46 Having the all-coveted prize of decision—and
thus, the possession of choice—torn from one’s grasp is a wounding, a chastening that
results in either evasion or uprightness.47 And this traumatic event is painful only because
of enjoyment:
[This tearing away] is an attack made immediately on the plenitude of the
complacency in oneself (which is also a complacency of complacency), on
the identity in enjoyment (more identical still than any identification of a
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term in the said), on life in which signification, the for-the-other, is
swallowed up, on life giving or enjoying life (OTB, 74).
Betwixt and between, the wounded subject is for-the-other before she is for-herself. And
in this immemorial matrix the very matter of life is materialized; meaning is given to the
otherwise machinic functions of biological efficiency. The Other’s demand enables my
body to relate to the world in an entirely different manner. In many ways, this new way
of relating is central to the Other’s traumatic gift. A “person receives his or her hand from
the Other. The hand stops being an organ for grasping things when it comes upon the
Other….”48 Unlike the enjoyment of possession from which the subject has been “torn,”
the ‘impossible’ covenant allows for a distributive joy whose cares are first for others;
this is what makes human sociality possible.
But how is one to understand this trauma that heals? Assuming it does, what
distinguishes it from the trauma that alienates? Here, Visker sees fit to point out
Levinas’s place of God—which, of course, is non-lieu. In every area of life, we are
indebted because a loan or action was undertaken for our benefit, from the time of
childhood through countless iterations of convalescence and subsidy in later years. With
good reason, one feels indebted in these instances, precisely because one is or becomes
aware of something done for oneself by another. By contrast, in Levinas’s work, the
subject is inspired by “an indebtedness before any loan” (OTB, 111). This, of course,
produces a certain discomfort, since an impossible debt must be paid to whom I know
not. Yet the discomfort ‘felt’ here is not the panic from post-traumatic stress, but instead
more closely resembles shame—not under the lens of some religious moralism but as a
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result of one’s inability to neutralize the exposure to an absent Other. After all, there is
something embarrassing about not being able to cover up.
The recurrence of the Other always takes one by surprise but it doesn’t come from
outside but from within. Again, the exterior as interior is an epistemological
impossibility, but one nevertheless persistent in its compression of the self. In the rupture
of encounter, the discomfort in one’s skin becomes unbearable and thus unbearably borne
by the subject able to respond. To express this paradoxical creation, Visker borrows the
term “ex-timacy” from Jacques Lacan.
This ex-timacy makes the ordinary inside of intimacy vulnerable from
inside out: it acts somewhat like a traitor within the walls, opening the
gates at the most unexpected moment, allowing the seemingly innocent
passersby to slip inside and arm himself with the weapons—the
‘energy’—to begin sowing terror.49
Though stated rather dramatically, Visker makes the point that a disturbance upsets a
presumed order, thereby disorienting the self-same subject. However, as Levinas points
out time and again, this disturbance by the Other in the Same harbors a blessing. The
creation of the subject frees the subject from a slavish relationship to a master. In
commanding me, the Other’s demand sets me free, thereby insuring a uniqueness that
cannot be earned through any merit-worthy activity. To put this in strictly theological
terms, the humility of God enables a connection without attachment. The hiatus between
“otherwise” and “existence” allows the cause to free itself from its effect, granting
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freedom in responsibility. And to carry this further, the God that creates only lets itself be
heard in an affect not directed to it.50
Saying always seeks to unsay that dissimulation, and this is its very
veracity. In the play activating the cultural keyboard of language, sincerity
or witness signifies by the very ambiguity of every said, where, in the
midst of the information communicated to another there signifies also the
sign that is given to him of this giving of signs (OTB, 152).
The trace of the infinite or otherwise—whatever one chooses to call the break-up of an
enclosed system of thought—says the saying and calls us to remember that we too
“were/are” strangers in a strange land.
Thus far, I have tried to impress upon the reader a sense of difficulty concerning
Levinas’s task. Not only must he communicate through the Said what cannot be said—
thereby committing the inevitable sin of dissimulation—but further, he must bear the
responsibility for the many readers that would have left his work unfinished, tired of
wrestling with an angel or devil at Peniel. But Levinas persists, right along with that
which persists in him, stretching out his philosophical skin to the point of permanent
striation; hence, his arguments for what is necessary to which I now turn.
B. Necessity
How odd to even think of necessity when writing of Levinas, one who forced his
way out of the ontological barriers of Western thought, believed to be necessary by his
teachers and colleagues. Yes, Levinas was anything but an idealist, despite the possible
connotations of his work. The declaration of transcendence only makes necessity all the
more imperative, since we are without recourse for our neglect of the Other, and the
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Other’s other—who is always also Wholly Other.51 For many scholars, the crucial
division between the ethical and political is primary, forgetting that an intrigue is but the
arousal of curiosity, not a verdict of inviolability.52 Something more nuanced—a
movement that does not conform to predicate logic—is required for a richer appreciation
of the Saying and the Said in Levinas’s work, his “amphibology of Being and entities”
(OTB, 38-39). Rather than resign myself, along with a “certain” Levinas, to the structures
of Western civilization, I will instead emphasize that it is necessary to “do something,”
since “one must not go to God with empty hands,” and that “doing something” involves
doing more than one imagines can be done; hence, the relationship between impossibility
and necessity.53
According to Levinas, “violence can involve justice,” and despite protests to the
contrary, “one cannot say that there is no legitimate violence.”54 Elsewhere, he writes that
“there is a possible harmony between ethics and the state.”55 This would imply that the
legitimate violence is either harmonious or a transitional stage on the way to harmony. Of
course, extracting two responses to prop up an entire discourse is invalid, and I am
convinced that Levinas is after something more complicated than paradox or dialectic—
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meaning of course in pursuit of and posthumously participating.56 Neither is he simply
repeating the old adage about broken eggs and omelets. As Derrida has wryly noted, there
is something ‘hauntological’ about Levinas’s amphibology, something that persists as
intrigue rather than anticipated consummation. In his article, “Necessity and Legitimacy
of the State,” Pascal Delhom concludes that Levinas’s work indicates a ‘knowledge’ that
disquiets the State because it associates its legitimacy with weakness.57 As for its
necessity, this stems for Levinas not from concern about one’s own death but rather
concerns about the others, which is to say it arises in a situation of singular responsibility;
hence, the necessity of the state is not historical but ethical.58 In both instances, Being
does not have the last word, either through its ‘historical epochs’ or through its conative
persistence in beings. If there is a necessity to the state, it is ethical, not historical, and if
the state is to have any legitimacy, it will emerge from hesitation when using force even
when there is a case to be made for the use of force in the preservation of justice. To
make the point differently, “love must always watch over justice.”59
Thus far, I have demonstrated the extent to which one could go in accommodating
certain structures present in the world today. So long as they are constantly haunted by
the singular responsibility that bears justice, it can be argued that we must work with
these “principalities and powers” in order to ameliorate the suffering of others and strive
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towards a world wherein human fraternity is primary. But as I suggested in the
introductory paragraph, I find it necessary to push Levinas further than he wants to go at
times, which is also to say towards the “infinite” that is more than he can think but which
his thought nevertheless echoes. In previous sections, I have referenced the work of
Simon Critchley, who positions Levinas—albeit cautiously—as a metapolitical anarchist.
This is not to say that he wishes to communicate Levinas’s own political ideas, but rather
that there is something in Levinas’s thought which opens up space for anarchist politics. I
have chosen the term “interstitial” elsewhere to describe this possibility, one both ethical
and political.60 Here, I will also adopt a term going forward that I borrow from Asher
Horowitz’ essay, namely “hyperpolitics.” Taken together, interstitial hyperpolitics
affirms both the necessity of thinking beyond statist logic in Levinas and the hyperbolic
intensification of subjectivity in Levinas that motivates the creation of emancipatory
spaces of responsible praxis. Though I will write briefly here of Horowitz’s analysis,
more work will be done in Chapter 5, where I hope to utilize the distributive network of
Levinasian philosophy to propose a new frame for the subjectivity of a martyr.
As indicated above, Horowitz begins his reflections with a chagrinned assessment
of scholarly commentaries on the political possibilities emerging from Levinas’s work,
wherein a political discourse of minimal violence, which is to say justified violence, is
accepted tout court. As I have shown, certain of Levinas’s writings lend credence to this
stance, but if embraced, nothing has really changed. Instead of a ‘voluntarily’ passive
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resignation to the “powers that be,” Horowitz insists on the necessarily unfinished sense
of his writings because “Levinas’s whole work displaces, without abolishing, what in the
West has been the very logic constituting the terms and relations for the possibility of any
social bond at all.”61 Outside of formal structure and the logic that scaffolds it, is an
otherwise that not only disquiets the form but opens up alternatives. Here Horowitz
proposes that readers adopt a different frame for investigating the ethics-politics
distinction, one that neither emphasizes their disjunction nor their assemblage under a
third term. If ethics is placed over against politics too forcefully, it risks becoming a
heavenly city, another world behind the scenes (OTB, 5-7). And in this case, politics is
simply a Hobbesian fact resulting from our ‘brutish’ natures. To avoid these pitfalls of
interpretation, Horowitz offers the Moebius Strip as a lens through which to better
understand the intriguing relationship between ethics and politics, the saying and the said.
With a Moebius strip, surfaces that are two—experienced as two—are actually one, and
the one surface is two. Neither one nor two accurately captures the force of the device,
since both are defensible accounts. The reduction of the correlation of the Saying and the
Said does not result in a paradox, nor does it seek to replace one ontology with another.
Instead, it reduces the said to the saying beyond the logos, outside of logical forms that
offer comprehensibility. Yet, even here it is inaccurate to suggest that the outside is not
found inside the forms of logic, even if to signal their distance from its operations.62 Not
only can the beyond being not be stated in terms of being, but the relation between the
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beyond being and being cannot be stated in these terms either. Instead, Horowitz points to
the superlative as indicative of different intensities.63 Though Levinas uses a variety of
spatial and affective terms, his discursive telos is catachresis, a breaking open of
language itself through increased strain. In effect, Levinas’s reduction of the betrayal at
the heart of the ethical-political distinction provokes another way, one unforeseen by
Levinas himself perhaps.64 However, Levinas arguably offers plenty in the way of
mediation concerning this tension, especially his emphasis on the Saying in the Said, the
ethical in the political and vice versa. I have already written extensively of this ex-timate
relationship between interior and exterior with the aid of Rudi Visker’s work, so I will
simply point the reader back to the section on ‘Impossibility’ for additional comments on
this unbearable dilemma.
In conclusion, what is always necessary for Levinas is the response to the Other.
In fact, this ability is necessary not as an imperative but rather as the immemorial
condition of subjectivity. I do not choose what I must, but instead must be chosen to act
in a singularly responsible way for the life of the Other and further, for human
community i.e. politics. The eternal recurrence of responsibility is not eternity as
timeless, but rather infinite time. Each ‘moment of madness’ (Kierkegaard) is met by
another. The responsibility only grows to the extent that I respond, unlike the resolution
of debts in the arena of being. Something already has been done before something can be
done, and it always must. We do approach the Other with bread, after all. Politics is just
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as necessary as the ethical intrigue, since it is inseparable from it other than in ‘polite
conversation.’ Recall that Levinas takes Martin Buber to task for not accepting the
necessity of a political analysis:
The I-Thou is an event (Geschehen), a shock, a comprehension, but does
not enable us to account for (except as aberration, a fall, or a sickness) a
life other than friendship: economy, the search for happiness, the
representational relation with things. They remain, in a sort of disdainful
spiritualism, unexplored and unexplained (TI, 68-69).
Having suggested as a tentative conclusion that responsible subjectivity is both
impossible and necessary, I now turn to the Infinite in the hope that it will inspire both
the unbearable burdens of gift, proximity, and transcendence as well as bear the
unbearable subject in necessity and impossibility.
C. Infinity
For any reader even tangentially familiar with Levinas, the term “infinity” will
have some resonance, however mistaken it may be. The title of one of his ‘great’ works
includes it, and several of his essays focus on the relationship of philosophy to infinity.
Thus, I turn now with caution to the ‘infinite,’ aware of the possibility of
overdetermination, but also with the hope that more will break out of the husks of
scholarship, leveraging rupture instead of foreclosure as integral to the investigation.
Levinas is first and foremost a student of philosophy, a critical historian of the
Western tradition. Of course, as I and others have argued, he proposes a radically
different way of conceiving certain terms central to that history. As it concerns infinity,
Levinas proceeds much like he does with “transcendence,” providing a version of history
that attempts to trace development. He does not spend too much time here, since his goal
is to challenge the conjunctions of thought deemed primary in the thread, suggesting
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rather that both transcendence and infinity are a knot. This knot, as with many things,
evokes the practice of adoption from the varied religious systems that comprise what
might be loosely called the ‘great monotheisms.’ With infinity specifically, the knot is
transformed into a gift over which rational animals become masters. As owners of this
“knowledge,” we help infinity to fulfill its teleological function as immanence, or so the
“venerable tradition” would have it.65 But this would imply an economy, a “house we live
in, our home…,” an exactitude worthy of an infinite god—perhaps the inevitable result of
this story: God became man so man could become God.66
However, this patristic imposition does not avoid the difficulty of either
Augustine or Descartes’ musings; “How can the finite thought of man draw from itself
the idea of the infinite?” In short, it cannot, but Levinas is not interested in arguments for
the existence of God; it is simply that Descartes stumbled across the problem of the
relationship between the infinite and the finite in a rather curious manner. Contrary to the
desired order of thought—a historic preoccupation of Western theo-philosophical
adventures—the idea of the infinite constitutes an exception and “implies the awakening
of a psyche that cannot be reduced to the pure correlation and the noetic-noematic
parallelism which the least prejudiced analysis finds in human thought approached in the
context of knowledge.”67 In other words, infinity cannot be made present, and thus cannot
be re-presented (re-presenced) in the order of time. This aporetic juncture arguably serves
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as a departure for much of modern philosophy in the West, and as Levinas ably contends,
much effort is expended to overcome the difference of infinity so as to salvage the order
of the home.
Whether in Medieval Kabbala or the writings of Descartes, infinity names a
“power beyond all power, that no creature, nor any other divinity, limits, and whose ways
no one can know.”68 That which is not limited or conceived by anything else would be
Infinite. And yet, a certain conception is possible, suggests both Anselm and Descartes,
namely that I can conceive of the Infinite as that about which nothing can be known or
said, finally. Herein lies a confusing tension between knowledge and mystery as it
concerns the Infinite, enough to trouble many of the philosophers in the wake of
Descartes. According to Levinas, the Cartesian God is infinitely powerful through the
will that power presupposes: God is neither Good nor Evil, Truth nor Falsehood, because
it is God that institutes these categories. In this sense, so also can the human be infinite.
The equivalence between free will and the infinite without transcendence
inspired the thought of the infinite in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It is
again the will—the will of the will—or the will to power, that, in
Nietzsche, describes the surpassing of man, the overman.69
Freedom, then, would be a god-like quality, the religion of Enlightenment liberalism.
Infinity, in this respect, would amount to the capacity to voluntarily go beyond the
horizon of possibility. Additionally, this going beyond works toward the abolition of
difference, for if a being has no other, it is infinite—without limit. “But to see the infinite
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in the suppression of the Other or in reconciliation with him assumes that the Other is, for
the Same, nothing but limit and menace.”70 Levinas wants to point to another possibility,
a different road by which the Other can be greeted with hospitality, where the I is not
limited to itself, alone in a world of its own making.
If the history of philosophy in the West presents an Infinite that absorbs the finite,
then Levinas must find a different path if he is to provide an alternative. However, he
finds this path not in some exotic land far from his home but within the recesses of
Western thought itself, the unexplored horizons of various thinkers. Specifically, Levinas
sees in Descartes the possibility of a different relation between the Infinite and the finite,
one in which the alterity of the Infinite “neither limits nor absorbs, [but]…elates the soul
that, according to formal logic, it should harm.”71 This elation is the sign of
responsibility, called forth by the growing alterity of an infinite become proximate.
Irreducible in its infinity, the distance between the Other and the Same is never traversed,
but instead contributes to the infinition of Infinity in the recurrence of an ability to
respond. Levinas quotes approvingly of Descartes’ confession in a letter to Mersenne on
January 28, 1641, “I have never treated the infinite except to submit to it.”72 Likewise,
Levinas stresses the involuntary passivity at the heart of responsibility, the accusation
from the Other that demands a response and thus, establishes me as singular in that
election. Here is the Infinity before the Infinity of power and foundation, a vocative
assignation that pushes the I out of itself in order to be in ethical relation to that which is
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never present but instead breaks up every present. The rupture of the finite by the Infinite
is an affectionate wound, a trauma that does not alienate but rather creates all possibility.
As described in the aforementioned section, “Impossibility,” this traumatic recurrence
functions as a creative act because it births responsible subjectivity and does so with
humility—the demand of the non-present Other comes as though from our own lips, in
effect mobilizing me to commit myself in service. In other words, I am a creature made
by the “Other-Creator” but experience myself as autonomous because the Other always
slips away before I can become aware; the humility of the Other is responsible for my
sense of agency.
As evidenced by this reversal of Infinity, Levinas’s main interest is the way in
which Infinity breaks up Totality, the manner in which it disturbs the State and all states.
As “protestation against totality,” the Infinite values the subject (affectionately wounds
her) over against the system that threatens to subsume (TI, 26). Far from the dispassionate
indifference of Infinity in the history of philosophy, or even the specter of disorder that it
has been for many systematic thinkers, in Levinas it will be the “an-archic” source of
responsibility itself. It is to be received beyond my capacity to receive, which implies that
I have not chosen (I could not choose it!). The “I” of rational agency stems from the “me”
of infinite responsibility, ineluctably borne of an unbearable guest that is responsible for
the world.
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Chapter 5: Martyrdom, or Infinite Desire
I. The Center Cannot Hold1
The recurrence of an infinite demand traumatically constitutes the subject-asresponsible, exposed to the Other, and consequently, obligated to bear witness to this
exposure. In bearing witness, the subject is a martyr, albeit one not in search of
spectacular liturgy. The subjectivity resulting from this traumatic constitution suffers a
judgment that requires a defense. In other words, the “I,” or the Same in Levinas’s
preferred idiom, is turned inside out temporally. Unlike the jurisprudence of our time—
and all chronological time—wherein the defense precedes the judgment, the life of a
subject for Levinas is an infinite apology, or account, in response to the judgment of the
Other. Before “I” proceed in any way, I am accused, or assigned by the One that I cannot
appropriate. Herein lies the challenging wisdom of Levinas’s work. In the next several
sections, I will locate the specific ways that Levinas modifies both intentionality and
desire, inverting martyrdom in the process. I will also demonstrate how both the capacity
for response and the space of response are conditions for the subject as martyr. Both the
inversion of martyrdom and the expansion of conditions lead to a politics of recurrence,
emphasizing the exposure of violent ‘governmentalities’ as the outcome of bearing
witness. Finally, I will reiterate my suggestion that subjectivity be viewed through the
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lens of Levinas’s martyr, whose heteronomous constitution chastens potentially
disastrous enthusiasm while not dampening the impact of the infinite demand. This
allows for multiple political figurations that resist totality in favor of infinite
responsibility and pursue an impossible justice against the normalizing tendencies of
socio-political management.
A. Intentionality and Desire
From Plato to Husserl, desire in the West has historically been framed by lack.
One desires that which one needs but does not have. In contrast, Levinas argues for a
desire that stems from surplus, not deprivation. To do so, he first locates the material
being as a site of enjoyment. The human enjoys needs; they are co-constitutive of
satisfaction through appropriative labor (TI, 112-114). Without them, we are unable to
enjoy at all. Additionally, enjoyment is the postponement of lack, which always returns
because of the uncertainty of the element. By element, Levinas means the world of
elements (wind, earth, fire, water) which presents itself to humans in uncertain ways.
Because of the uncertainty integral to the elemental, the human seeks to suspend the
recurrence of lack through labor (TI, 116). Of course, appropriative labor implies a
dwelling into which one might bring the products of labor. Here, in the shelter that is both
connected to and separated from the elemental world, the human can enjoy the fruits of
labor blissfully indifferent to the vicissitudes that await beyond the dwelling. The
representation dear to both Husserl and the whole of Western philosophy depends on the
satisfaction of needs in a dwelling. Only here can a formless element be configured as
separate objects used for particular ends. Unlike the central role of tool application in
Heidegger’s philosophy, for Levinas the utility of objects—and the refined technologies
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directed towards their extraction—is secondary (TI, 153).2 And if tools and the labor they
imply are secondary, the strategic satisfaction of needs—or the thought of their
satisfaction—comes after enjoyment. Before one goes in search of what satisfies my
needs, one must enjoy the “living from….”3 This dependence actually constitutes the
independence of the human in the form of interiority, or the dwelling. A person would
not construct a separate dwelling if s/he were not first satisfied enough to achieve a
certain distance with regards to the satisfaction of need through enjoyment. It is only as a
fully satiated being that one turns to desire. And since desire emerges from/in satiety, not
deprivation, desire always moves beyond. It is not primarily desperation but inspiration
that animates human existence. For this reason, Levinas is fond of saying the Other—as
what is outside of need—quite literally inspires me (OTB, 140-144). Having arrived at
desire by distinguishing it from the satisfactory labor of enjoyment, I want to first say a
bit about intentionality in the work of phenomenology.
In my brief excursus on Husserlian phenomenology, I suggested—along with
Zahavi, Moran, and countless others—that intentionality is the engine of phenomenology
(Ch. 1, Footnote 6), which is to say that the phenomenological operation does not work
without an intentional consciousness. As I noted earlier, the phenomenological subject is
essentially a directed consciousness, whose primary task is constitution of the objective
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of a material being. Enjoyment connects with the element that has no form before it appropriates objects
through labor.
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world. By objective, I do not intend a material world, but rather a meaningful world with
certain indubitable truths discernible through intuition. This is not to imply the denial of
the material world, but instead an unbiased “scientific” account of truth-claims insofar as
they are both intersubjectively accessible and capable of being demonstrated through
reduplicated experimentation. In other words, objectivity here should imply an
unwavering correlation between intention and intuition. Building on both Descartes and
Kant, Husserl seeks a ground from which can be deduced clear and distinct ideas. These
ideas, in turn, would form the generative matrix of all scientific accomplishment.
The movement of intentionality is outward, from a transcendental ego—that is
arguably the structure of time—through successive layers into contact with the presented
(or “given”) world. What is given to consciousness can be comprehended as
representation, implying for Husserl a noema that corresponds to the ideatum, or datum.
The terms here can be a bit tricky and inconsistent—in both Husserl and Levinas—but
the gist of the contention is simply that a correlation exists between intentional act and
the intentional object. Husserl goes to great lengths to avoid mistaking the intentional
object with a material aggregate, since the “real” world is bracketed away through the
epoche—Husserl’s procedure of suspension that supposedly secures access to the “truth”
or “essence” of the real, without the overlay of bio-historical prejudice. I do not want to
dive even further into what has always remained an extremely complicated tapestry of
meaning and distribution. What is germane to my argument is Levinas’s reversal of the
direction of intentionality, or at least his decision to foreground the shock that precedes
constitutive consciousness. Husserl assumes a constituting subject, an “I” that is both
deposed to the extent that one is affected and dependent on what is given, but also
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sublimated through representational mastery of the world. In Levinas, one discovers
subjectivation as a traumatized response. Before anything else, I am invoked, provoked,
and held hostage by the demand of the Other.
To clarify, this shock does not preclude enjoyment but actually requires it. Words
like sacrifice and interposition would have no meaning outside of this enjoyment. But, it
does not work to assume chronological priority in this exposition, as Levinas contends
that time itself is the relation with the Other and is founded on the Other’s disruption.
Unlike in Husserl, the subject does not gradually discover the world through
representation, but is abruptly halted by the un-representable, the in-comprehensible, that
is simultaneously the an-archic origin of the subject in the world. Though one is shocked
in the search, Levinas suggests that the Other both creates (ex nihilo) the subject-asresponsible and is found in the shattering of the subject’s enjoyment. In other words, I am
“given” to enjoyment by the one that halts that very enjoyment. Primary sociality is
another way to describe the reality of the Other in the formation of the subject.
Intentionality is only directed to “things” in the world because of the relationship through
which a world is formed. The relation is prior to any directed movement.
Simply put, this relationship is ethics. What comes after, in the form of rules and
practices, is a matter of circumstantial discretion. In other words, the “how” follows the
recurrent “why.” Justification is required by the relationship before it is demanded by the
law. Another way of putting it is that ethics is the “law of the law.” And if there is a law
of the law, then Levinas will challenge the self-constituting ego and its laws by
contraposing the demand from outside the law. What grounds the law—albeit
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anarchically—is not circumscribed by the law.4 This excendence, or transcendence, is the
place of Desire for Levinas, and it is where I now return.
Above, I suggested that for Levinas, desire emerges in a fully satiated being. Only
one who is enjoying (“living from….”) can desire. And if desire stems from abundance,
then what is beyond the satisfaction of needs must also be outside of enjoyment. Desire
cannot be tied to a hedonic frame, since pleasure is bound to enjoyment. M. Jamie
Ferreira has suggested that motivated responsibility is connected to Levinas’s analysis of
desire, which involves torment and persecution.5 However, since this challenges
conventional notions, I will modify desire by the terms “appropriative” and
“expropriative” to distinguish between the different modalities.6 This is especially true in
the case of the martyr for Levinas.
In the more traditional account, desire wishes to appropriate for the purpose of
satisfaction. Needs must be met, and desire is the means by which I secure whatever
meets my needs. However, this appropriation through labor renders ownership central to

4
I feel it is important to highlight similarities with other recent philosophies in terms of this
dilemma. Just as Levinas recognizes the inadequacy of a system, which he names immanence, to capture
the relationship intended by ethics, so also do his contemporaries and even more recent directions attest to
this impasse. For example, Gilles Deleuze often described his philosophy as a “transcendental empiricism,”
and Alain Badiou theorizes the event as what cannot be captured by the count, which leads to his particular
theory of subjectivation as fidelity. In both of these cases, the problem of the event is central to an
“engaged” philosophy, which refuses consolation. See Deleuze, Kant’s Critical Philosophy, trans. Hugh
Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), and Badiou,
Being and Event, trans. Oliver Feltham (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
5
“The Misfortune of the Happy: Levinas and the Ethical Dimensions of Desire,” Journal of
Religious Ethics 34, no. 3 (2006): pp. 461-483, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9795.2006.00278.x.
6

The term, “expropriate,” means to dispossess a person (an owner) of property. My usage allows
for a counterweight to the appetitive desire that consumes, extracts, and secures in a dwelling. The
encounter with the Other, the Victim, burdens “me” (in the accusative) with a desire for the Other that, as
Levinas is fond of reminding the reader, takes the bread from my mouth to put it in the mouth of another
person. This primary dispossession is what I mean with the term, “expropriative desire.”
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my subjectivity. Of course, this would conform to more-or-less conventional narratives of
the ‘civilized’ human that expresses himself through possession. Levinas, in stark
contrast, argues that ownership is inextricably tied to representation, which as I have
argued throughout this text is not primary. Before and ‘beyond’ representation (essence)
is the Other that I cannot own, cannot appropriate through labor, but which I nevertheless
desire. In fact, desire always leads to the Other, since the movement of desire is
amplification. Recall that desire is not about satiation in Levinas, but instead what lies
‘next’ for an already satiated being.
As I alluded to in my distinction between appropriation and expropriation, desire
does seem tied to both appetite and goodness. However, the goodness that is infinite
desire is beyond the appetitive desire that concerns my happiness. Therefore, movement
is crucial to understanding desire in Levinas.
The movement toward the Other (Autruí), instead of completing me or
contenting me, implicates me in a conjuncture which in a way did not
concern me and should leave me indifferent—why did I get involved in
this business?...The relationship with the Other puts me into
question…The Desire for the Other (Autruí), which we live in the most
ordinary social experience, is the fundamental movement, a pure transport
(italics mine).7
What might emerge from a hedonic gesture does not reside there. The appetite is not
satisfied, which implies that it seeks more than need-satisfaction. Appetite itself, while
working through the appropriative desire of consumption, does not stand still. As with

7

“Meaning and Sense,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, trans. Alphonso
Lingis, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana
University Press, 1996): pp. 51-52.
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expropriation, appetitive desire is also fundamentally movement. Appropriation
transforms into expropriation on the move.
The idea of the infinite consists in the impossibility of…coming to rest
and in the absence of any hiding place, of any interiority where the I could
repose harmoniously upon itself. But this continually forward movement
is precisely the way in which the subject disengages itself from the relative
in responding to the absolute.8
Tireless in its march, desire is actually the vehicle for detaching rather than grasping. It
would seem that the end of desire (assuming we grant desire an end) is actually a
movement outside of being, which consists entirely of enjoyment (in both positive and
negative senses).9 As Ferreira puts it, the movement to exteriority leads us necessarily
forward, outward—to disengage from the relative.10 This disengagement from the relative
to welcome the absolute is also the transformation from appropriative desire to
expropriative desire.
In transitioning from one to another, Levinasian subjectivity also abandons the
primacy of representational thought. I appropriate, own, that which I have configured as
an object capable of being taken from the element—the alterity that is always only
relative. In detaching from ownership, I am, strictly speaking, moving without intent. I
move because of my desire for the infinite, but no intention is capable of opening onto

8

“Transcendence and Height,” in Emmanuel Levinas: Basic Philosophical Writings, trans. Tina
Chanter, Nicholas Walker, and Simon Critchley, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak, Simon Critchley, and Robert
Bernasconi (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1996): pp. 20-21.
9
Levinas will often use the term “enjoyment” for both pleasurable engagement and suffering.
Enjoyment seems to operate generally at the level of consumption, which Levinas both acknowledges as
essential to life itself and inadequate to account for the ethical relation. In other words, if humans are only
self-interested (meaning one starts and ends with oneself), then moral actions are impossible. Not unlike
Kant, but certainly not as beholden to rationality as the hallmark of morality. According to Levinas, it is the
infinite demand that would even create the possibility for something like autonomous legislation.
10

“Misfortune of the Happy,” p. 469.
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the infinite, of ‘intending it.’ Therefore, while motivated by desire, I am in relation to
what is not an object of desire. Herein lies the paradox. My desire is a movement that
navigates the world of ownership, on its way to nowhere (non-lieu) and in doing so,
dispossesses me of what I thought was mine. This reversal of ‘direction,’ is also the
deposition of intentionality understood as the fundamental truth of subjectivity. If I am
not what I own, nor what I intend to own, then what must I be? What is the end of the
human?
As I explained in the opening chapter, René Girard and many of his social science
colleagues present a human obsessed by mimesis and subsequently, with ownership. The
conflicts that ensue have necessitated the development of a mechanism for the release of
this conflictual energy. The victimage mechanism at the heart of religion, and thus,
culture, is the invention required by an evolutionary impasse. As I already noted, I do not
take issue with much of Girard’s work and even consider myself part of the growing
body of scholarship involved in rigorous application and refinement of mimetic theory.
What I have proposed throughout this work, and what I have highlighted in this first
section of the concluding chapter, is a recurrence at work prior to mimesis. If conflict
with another is at the heart of violence itself, then Levinas suggests that we look to the
violence for an apogee, a break from the persistence of conative dispositions that fuel the
sacrificial economy. This is where desire for the Infinite emerges as a response and
modest corrective to the more general reduction of mimetic theory. To be more precise, it
is in the desire for the Infinite that we find both a counterweight to mimetic conflict and
the creative shock required for a relation outside of calculated risk. But this claim
requires more specificity.
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The desire that pushes the conative-appropriative-appetitive subject beyond
satisfaction is also what opens us to the Other. Our fundamental openness and aspiration
for exteriority is what enables our welcome of the Other, and as I have argued, the
welcome of a subjectivity borne in-and-by responsibility; “the Desire for exteriority has
appeared to us to move not in objective cognition but in Discourse, which in turn has
presented itself as justice, in the uprightness of the welcome made to the face” (TI, 82).
Moved towards and by the Other, specifically the face, I am in relation before I imitate.
In fact, I can imitate only after I have been in relation with another. The model (M)
whose practices become my own through mimesis, is selected by the relationship
between a subject (S) and him/her. Only once there is relationship and subsequently,
imitation, does there arise the issue of conflict, which does often result in violence—be it
physical or another sort more insidious and ultimately destructive of even my capacity for
relationship.11
Desire may very well be desire of another, but unlike Girard whose primary
contention is that ‘my’ desire is the desire of another, whose desire belongs to yet
another, ad infinitum presumably, Levinas suggests that my desire is for the Other. Of
course, this infinite desire is given to me by the Other, but it does not lead to
appropriation but rather donation. And this is because of the dispossession that leads to
abundance.
The relationship with the Other (Autruí) puts me into question, empties me
of myself and empties me without end, showing me ever new resources. I
11

I am unsure if much research has been done on trauma and mimesis at present, but since
Levinas (and Critchley) choose some version of this word in order to describe the relationship between the
Same (subject) and Other, I think this could be a fruitful venture going forward.
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did not know I was so rich, but I no longer have the right to keep anything
for myself.12
A movement in reverse, or a movement in a direction other than the direction I thought
myself to be traveling, the relationship with the Other that is announced in Desire
hollows me out and detaches me from the relative value of appropriated objects of desire.
Girard’s theory of desire is compatible with the level of desire defined by appropriation,
but it fails to consider the desire for the Infinite that empties one of ownership—at least
as a fundamental identity.
B. The Subject-as-Responsible
From what I have argued thus far, there is a tentative ‘metaphysical’ structure that
emerges in the dynamic of an ethical relationship.13 Levinas’s entire career was spent
highlighting different aspects of this unkempt mechanism, none of which can be entirely
removed from another. Of course, this does not imply Levinas was a closet structuralist in
the vein of Levi-Strauss or even Sartre. For the sake of a clear intervention, I am simply
proposing the following relation as a window into the larger argument—the martyr as a
response to the ever-present threat of violence: Exposure (nudity) to the infinite demand
of the Other (passivity) through affective relation (proximity) grants an unbearable gift in
the form of singular witness. As I move through this second section, I will review these
‘components’ in my effort to assemble them. If successful, it will be clear that the martyr
found in Levinas’s work is not only a response to Girard’s concerns with ‘sacred

12

“Meaning and Sense,” p. 52.

13

Though I do not always find this term helpful, I will in keeping with Levinas’s preference use it
instead of ontological or transcendental (terms which also have problematic connotations).
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violence’ but also to the growing tide of scholarship that finds ‘human’ to be a category
condemned to the limitations of epochal power structures and the narrow window of
religious totalitarianism.
Bereft of recourse to conceptual clothing, the an-archically exposed subject in
Levinas’s thought is denied protection. Unable to produce sufficient defense mechanisms,
this radical exposure subjects me, renders the subject as me. Before even registering the
details requisite for a strategy, I stand accused (chosen) by the one whose demand is
beyond my ability. “Unable to even be able” in this situation, I respond with all that is
‘mine.’ Earlier, I described this exposure as related to shame and eros. I will revisit these
here through the inflection of the broader proposal above.
For Levinas, shame avoids moral designation, and instead speaks to what I will
here describe as a metaphysical condition. It stems from the inability of being/existence
to do or be anything other. As an existent, I cannot but be. Fundamentally enchained to
my existence (riveted), the existent seeks a way out through pleasure or ataraxia, even
suicide, but always returns to the existence that swallows up such efforts. The continual
work of an existent to do something other than ‘be’ points to a fundamental desire:
escape.
Escape connects to the desire for a beyond, for an exterior to being. At different
points in his work, Levinas will provide accounts of rest and refusal as counterweights to
conative insomnia.14 And yet, none of these would appear sufficient to the task at hand.
No effort is commensurate with the desire; the work falls short of departure.

14

See Existence and Existents and Time and the Other.
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Interestingly, pleasure comes close only to thrust the aroused existent ‘back down’ into
being with such force so as to exacerbate the despair felt by the experience of ‘no exit.’15
Yet, without recourse, the desire persists, if only to continually be thwarted by being
itself. All efforts to secure oneself against the uncertainties of the element (existence)
result in failure, but they are still made. This outward, appropriative, gesture pushes the
existent in an unintended direction—especially since intentions are always failing to
produce security; representations always fall short. Therein lies the transition from
appropriative desire to expropriative desire. In the midst of my enjoyment, my
consumption of the harvest, comes the shock of a demand, the call to give account of my
neglect. As one who fails to move beyond return, which is to say outside of
appropriation, I am commanded from ‘no-place’ to justify my failure. How and why have
I failed to make contact with that which cannot be grasped or objectively configured?
This unintended direction—which, consequently I did not choose—changes
everything. Now, I am not seeking to enjoy but to respond to the needs of another. As one
who is satiated by my blissful dependence on the element, I have not considered the
constitutive usurpation of such dependence. My grasp removes what another might need,
and if desire is only understood through the circular movement of economy, I am left
alienated. In contrast, the movement of desire that I have suggested, following Levinas,
disengages the relative in favor of the absolute—even if and precisely because I cannot
‘know’ and thus, claim the absolute. Though this march can easily be understood as
logical sequence, that would miss the challenge of Levinas’s thought. The desire that is
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On Escape, p. 63.
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always moving towards the infinite would have no reason to move in this unintended way
if one were not first given the ‘idea’ of the infinite. Here, Levinas makes use of
Descartes, who argued for the idea of the infinite as a gift of God that I could no wise
have constructed myself. More than the negation of finitude, the infinite is positively
understood as what pierces the enclosure of conative addiction and literally animates the
subject-as-responsible. Whether this involves the ‘taking of bread from one’s mouth’ or
the words of greeting extended to a stranger, the ‘origin’ (an-archic) of all responsible
activity is the demand of the Other. Thus, infinite desire is wholly expropriative, since it
involves the donation of a world. “The relationship with the Other is not produced
outside of the world, but puts in question the world possessed. The relationship with the
Other, transcendence, consists in speaking the world to the Other” (TI, 173). From my
perspective, the Other here need not imply theism. In fact, I am convinced that this
reading assumes more than it can textually justify. Of course, Levinas is a Jewish thinker,
and for Levinas, biography matters. However, to reduce an insight that would, in theory,
engage a much larger discourse is an offense to the rigor of his thought. Levinas could
have happily written for a strictly Jewish audience, as he had ample support. Instead, he
attempted to listen and speak to a ‘world’ which too often neglected him as a thinker.
Therefore, I propose that the Other be understood as indexing the ethical relation, and
that his employment of Descartes is a pragmatic illustration of the divided subject. Yes,
Descartes invokes a god, but this was used by Levinas to simply point out the
insufficiency of a closed subject. It aids in his analysis of desire, but beyond serving as an
aid, it need not be ‘literally’ transplanted from the 17th to the 20th century. Further,
expropriative desire makes no sense in a strictly theological sense. The “primordial
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dispossession” of language gives nothing to an all-encompassing deity, but it does
provide nurture to a person in need (TI, 173).16
Bared before the Other, who has pushed me out of my skin and clothing into the
exposure of nudity, I am subjected to a demand to which I have no way of adequately
responding. Not flaw but rather inspiration, this dynamic constitutes the responsible
subject as such. If desire for the Other—and from the Other through his/her need—is
what compels movement, then “I” am fundamentally passive. And this passivity is not a
choice, as I indicated above concerning desire. The desire that moves “me” (as accused)
is unintended desire (lacking an object since it precedes representation), which results in
a passivity on the hither side of being voluntarily passive. I did not choose to desire the
Other but in doing so, am exposed to the Other’s demand, which assigned me before I
was aware of being assigned. This assignation occurred, not in some recuperable moment
before, but rather as a constitutive recurrence that keeps “me” from adorning myself and
thus, limiting my exposure. Incapable of being inconspicuous, I am affected by a relation
with an Other that I cannot “see” but which names me as responsible, and ultimately as
martyr.
But what enables this ‘recurring occurrence’? What feature holds me hostage to
the demand that singularizes me? Levinas’s preferred term is proximity. By proximity, he

16
Certain Christian commentators have attempted to connect Levinas—and his student, Jacques
Derrida—with negative theology. A spiritual practice of dispossession (unsaying) enlivens the work of this
tradition, but as Derrida makes clear, too often negative theology seeks a hyper-presence, one in which the
“I” is swallowed up in divine union. This is the opposite of Levinas’s argument for the Other’s primacy in
the heteronomous constitution of the subject. The distance between the Same and Other remains, which is
what enables the relationship. There is no suggestion that this distance should be traversed—or could be
traversed—in the movement of desire. Instead, the distance only becomes more severe as the “I” is
disengaged from the relative.
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intends an encounter not of the same order as experience—since experience presupposes
an intentional consciousness. This encounter opens dialogue and commits one before a
decision has been made to commit. Herein lies the distance that connects and compels,
that holds and directs.
Posited before the unity of self-consciousness, which is equal to itself and
makes itself equal to the world, is thus the encounter in dialogue which
would be a thought thinking beyond the world. There is in this radical
difference between the I and the You, placed in relationship of dialogue
wherein the encounter is formed, not a simple failure of recognition of the
one by the other, or of the synthesis of their coincidence and their
identification. There is, rather, the surplus or the better of a beyond
oneself, the surplus and the better of the proximity of the neighbor;
“better” than the coincidence with self, despite or because of the
difference separating them. “More” or “better,” signified in dialogue, not
by some supernatural voice interfering in the conversation, nor by some
prejudgment. “More” or “better than” would be the gratuitous gift or the
grace of the other’s coming to meet me….17
The word dialogue can be misleading, since it need not consist of verbal cues and
linguistic conventions. In fact, while these are connected to dialogue in the way Levinas
employs it in the above passage, they are not the first or ‘original’ sense. Instead,
dialogue here names a relation, a welcome of and by the Other, which provokes the
additional gestures of conversation. Before there is a unified self (consciousness), there is
relation, hospitality, proximity. As an untraversable distance, proximity maintains
connection without evacuating identity. I am not the Other, and the Other is not simply a
different version of the Same. Instead, the distance of difference is maintained in the

17

“Dialogue: Self-Consciousness and Proximity of the Neighbor,” in Of God Who Comes to Mind,
trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998): pp. 146-147.
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infinite desire that opens onto a shared world. The primordial dispossession, or donation,
that I referenced above is prompted by this distance, which is also relation.
Another way to concretely describe this distance is the range of affect. At the risk
of simplifying, I want to suggest—with Desmond Manderson—that proximity is the
distance across which I can be impacted by the suffering of another.18 The Other’s
suffering affects me, leaving me no choice—since the suffering preceded my choice. For
this reason, Levinas often describes the work of ethics as “seeing the face” (TI, 174).
However, this sometimes misleads readers into the assumption that visual equipment is
required despite Levinas’s claim that the Other/Victim commands “me” from an
unilluminated space, outside the horizons of expectation and mastery. Language might be
a better place to emphasize the “optics” of Levinas’s ethics, since it is the verbal donation
of a world that approaches the Other, a response to the proximate. Not seen but sensed,
Manderson describes the encounter as one of shock, but that shock need not be construed
as negative.19 Surprises can excite with pleasure just as easily as they can frighten and
afflict. In both cases, the demand preempts my intention. For this reason, Steven Larocco
has emphasized the efficacy of commiserative shame as a tool for societal transformation.
In Larocco’s account, I do not choose to feel ashamed but, because of constitutive
exposure, take on the shame of another.20 In other words, my shame at my inability to
clothe myself is also what allows me to be affected by the plight of the Other. Their
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Proximity, Levinas, and the Soul of Law.
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Ibid., p. 126.
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“The Other, Shame, and Politics.”
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shame becomes my own. Sociality occurs because we are fundamentally exposed—to
suffering, to joy, to the call of another person.
Thus far, I have argued for a constitutive exposure to the Other’s demand. I do not
choose to expose myself; I have no say in the matter. Before ‘I am,’ ‘there is’ an
exposure that pushes me out of the localized sensibility that is me. Tucked within the
confines of the restless il y a is an apogee, or rupture, through which a response happens.
Blissfully unaware of that pausal commandment, I am shocked out of my conative state
of enjoyment through the demand of proximity—the affective relation from which and
towards which a martyr is born/e. In this birthing and bearing is the ‘unbearable’ gift of
singularity.21
C. The Space of Response
Specifically, what singularizes ‘me’ is the demand given to me and no other. I am
both located and pushed out of addictive existence through this demand. And yet, there is
also a space created for the response, namely the distance of difference. This gap, which
Levinas names proximity, allows for a relationship that convicts without reducing the
accuser and accused. In a court of law, these positions are founded on a plane (of
immanence), but the asymmetry of Levinas’s ‘otherwise’ maintains the distance, without
which relationship is impossible. Against comprehension and closure, the space of
difference bears me towards you as ‘interposition.’
In using this phrase, I need to emphasize that I am not employing the term
‘theologically,’ but metaphysically. And yet, perhaps these two are more similar than
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Adina Bozga, The Exasperating Gift of Singularity.

157

different—so I will say more. By arguing for an immemorial interposition as the anarchic origin of responsible subjectivity, I am not proposing a historical intervention on
the part of a supernatural being. Christian interposition is traditionally a one-time event
through which the whole of humanity is redeemed. This bears on Levinas’s inversion of
the martyr, whose activity in Christian history has been construed as an approximation of
the ‘pure’ act of bearing witness in Christ. Against this view, I argue for a non-reparative
event of interposition that tirelessly recurs in ‘me’ on the way to responsible subjectivity.
Unlike the Christian theological designation of martyrdom, neither redemption nor
salvation is possible; only the possibility of an interstitial solidarity. Herein lies the
metapolitical import of Levinas’s ‘theory’ of the subject. The impossibility of closure is
precisely what motivates the ‘hyperpolitics’ of witness i.e. the politics of recurrence. The
event of ‘vocative singularization,’ through the demand of the Other, traumatically
constitutes a subject that reaches out unceasingly to share a world. This primordial
dispossession does not save us, but instead elects us to a meaningful struggle. And yet, if
salvation were used to describe the translation of this encounter-in-response, it would be
a salvation without consummation. A martyrdom in need of being born/e.
Somewhat ironically, this refusal of ‘sacred’ violence—the protest against a
sacrificial economy—is the condition for something like a sacrificial economy. As I
mentioned in Chapter 1, Girardian theory argues that the violence of religion (sacrifice)
displaces a worse violence. It is a murderous salve, without which the proliferation of
culture would cease. What Levinas’s analysis of subjectivity provides here is a
motivation for any curative mechanism. It also has the added benefit of including
communities that may have chosen to refuse violence at some point in their development,
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but which are not tied to the Judeo-Christian lineage. Essentially, Levinas’s
phenomenological exploration points to unexamined possibilities for human community
as well as glimpsing the ‘origins’ of all community—sacrificial or not.
However, while his thought works against sacrificial economy to an extent,
Levinas does use the term ‘sacrifice’ to describe what I argue is actually interposition.22
As with other concepts, Levinas has a way of turning them on their head. Instead of
sacrificing another innocent victim to prevent the violent implosion of community, the
accused ‘me’ interposes myself. As I indicated earlier, this interposition is not the
usurpation of another’s subjectivity but instead their position as victim. Rather than allow
the victimization of an innocent human, the accused takes up the position of the victim in
defiance of violent gestures, thereby denying the utility of sacrificial displacement.
Sacrifice works to the extent that it can be agreed upon and remains invisible. If and
when this dynamic is named for what it is—murder!—the efficacy of such behavior is
weakened. The interposed subject (the martyr) calls into question the practice, just as the
conatively disposed self of enjoyment is called into question by the victim (the Other).
The shift from the Other to the victim indexes a different situation, one identified
and analyzed thoroughly by Girard and the entire field of mimetic theory. Levinas is well
aware of victims, and it is arguable that the Other—who approaches in both destitution
and power—is always speaking from the situation of a victim and with the force of a
victim’s cry. In fact, I am suggesting that the Other is best understood from this
perspective. This lends credence to my larger argument that the martyr is tasked with the
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impossible burden of bearing witness to and for the victim and birthing this witness as
the victim. Having encountered the victim through the affective relation of proximity, the
martyr responds through interposition as the victim. In the spirit of Levinas, I do not
suggest a ‘proper’ chronology, since synchrony is predicated on the diachronic
intervention of the victim. Additionally, as with Totality and Infinity, it would betray the
exposition of subjectivity to offer a fully formed self that secondarily responds to the call
of a victim. Though a temptation, I want to caution against this reading. Instead, what I
propose as the space of response is an-archic, without precedent but nevertheless
recurrent. Though I cannot recuperate it through some kind of sophisticated anamnesis,
the cry of the victim won’t let go of me and functions much like psychological trauma.23
Recall that the concern in Levinas’s early writings relates to an unshakeable
desire for escape. The aspiration for exteriority is continually thwarted by the ‘shameful’
excess of existence in an existent. For the most part, it would seem an impossible dream,
largely because this earlier work is focused on the effort of a self to get out (sortir).
However, what Levinas declares clearly in his later work is that the responsible self
(subject) emerges through the effort of the Other, specifically the demand/cry that pushes
the addict out of interiority. Transcendence as interposition is the fullest response to the
initial desire. It accomplishes (however tentatively) the departure from being, but only in
the work of response to an ‘inappropriable’ other. Expropriative desire disengages the
addict from an enclosed interiority in order to place him/her into a relationship with an
absolutely other: the victim.
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D. Interposition
At the risk of being redundant, I want to say just a bit more about interposition. I
have already attempted to distance this phrase from its decidedly Christian theological
connotations. Now, I turn to interposition as the ‘unchosen’ operation at the heart of
martyrdom, which is always the witness that refuses violence. I have suggested that this
refusal stems from infinite desire, or a desire for the infinite. The movement of desire that
I analyzed above—apart from facilitating the shock of encounter—fuels the effort of
responsive interposition. Responsibility disinters the human buried in being.24 It forces a
departure from the violence of being that effort alone fails to accomplish.
For Girard, this departure occurs in the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, whom
Christians are united in naming the Christ. Levinas refuses this sectarian confession,
opting instead for a wisdom that translates into donation—ethics. In contemporary
society, political discourse translates the archaic sacrificial into the executive branch of a
nation-state.25 However, in doing so, these entities on the whole seek to invalidate the
witness I have described in this work. Cloaked in a façade of justice, the modern nationstate defines the martyr as either a delusional ne’er-do-well or a champion of whatever
platform is adopted by that particular regime. Martyr, as configured historically and
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ideologically, serves to strengthen the faith of a collective or distance that same collective
from the terror of the ‘event’ (See Chapter 2, Footnote 2). This historical figure adopts a
politics of spectacularity in pursuit of certain ends, thereby deploying the political means
at his/her disposal. What I am proposing with the term, “interposition,” is an altogether
different metapolitical, or metaphysical, frame for the martyr that naturally leads to a
radically different version of politics. Following Goodhart, I have already described
Levinasian subjectivity as ‘bearing witness’ to, for, and as the victim. This redefines the
martyr, outside of exclusionary logics, since it is best placed as immemorial recurrence,
to use the language of Levinas. Consequently, martyrdom refers to the infinite desire of
responsibility instead of the ideological defense of a belief or political position.
Of course, this changes the conversation around martyrdom. No longer confined
to an irrational, and thus undesirable past, the martyr, or witness, becomes the very
condition for any and all activity—political or otherwise. To be clear, the function I
highlight in my research is the metapolitical/metaphysical frame for a responsible
subjectivity. This has direct political consequences, which I will try to draw out shortly.
But there is an ocean of possibility predicated on this (im)possibility, and much more
could be said moving forward. Suffice to say, the metaphysical movement of responsible
subjectivity in the body of a martyr announces a beginning, not an end. In fact, it is the
announcement of recurrent beginnings over ends, chastened through the cry of the victim
that announces, “Do not kill me!” In the phenomenological impossibility of martyrdom
lies the possibility for an other-than-sacrificial economy.
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Responsibility as a departure from the sacrificial economy presents in a variety of
ways throughout Levinas’s oeuvre. Goodhart offers the following synopsis, which I quote
here in full.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)

Saying as “thou shalt not kill”
Proximity as ‘alongsideness’ or accompaniment
Obsession as ceaseless answerability
Passivity as radical abiding or suffering
An-archy as non-indifference
Substitution as one-for-the-other
Persecution as hostage26

While not exhaustive, this list clearly shows that Levinas is after something that can be
‘said’ in more than one way. In fact, in fidelity to the (il)logic of martyrdom,
responsibility would necessarily show up in myriad ways relative to the concrete
situation. The aspects of responsibility are all ways of claiming the priority of asymmetric
relation in the formation of human subjectivity. Witness is fundamentally asymmetric,
though it is not simply another case of the outsider-insider dilemma particularly germane
to theoretical conversations in various social sciences. Hanoch Ben-Pazi stresses the
responsibility of witness in his analysis of testimony. According to him, the act of bearing
witness is often treated as secondary to the observation of another act. However, BenPazi suggests that this position does not hold up against philosophical criticism, which
wants to “reverse the order of discussion by asserting that the moment at which a person
witnesses an event is the moment at which he or she assumes responsibility, and that the
presentation of legal or historical testimony is only one possible manner of fulfilling this
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responsibility.”27 Ben-Pazi goes on to describe the fear that can accompany bearing
witness insofar as the one who bears witness finally discovers “himself involved, against
his will, in the creation and articulation of evil….”28 According to Levinas, the risk
involved is necessary to the goodness of infinite desire. Quite simply, it is impossible to
‘know’ whether one’s act of witness will impact the situation in an ultimately favorable
way. Because one does not choose to witness but is rather chosen by the cry of the
victim, the obligation to bear witness burdens me before I can even consciously decide to
do something. So, whether I act or not, I am burdened and carry within me the recurring
demand.
As I have presented it, interposition/martyrdom lives into the obligation instead of
turning away. Of course, even this life navigates the fear—similar to the navigation of the
uncertain element by appropriative desire—that accompanies witness. It is certainly easy
to become paralyzed by one’s role in the very evil (violence) that is being refused in the
act of bearing witness. As persons who live in what is undoubtedly the most photodocumented period in human history, the temptation to be a witness cuts two ways.
Photographs and posts ‘shine light’ on an event in order to shield the laborer from risk
and to allow for some modicum of control in the dissemination of witness. Appropriative
desire returns, through labor, into the confines of an interiority that is safe, protected from
the risk beyond the walls. Expropriative desire, in contrast, is tempted towards what is
beyond a person, toward the infinitely other, which is “also the source of responsibility
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imposed upon the subject toward the good that is beyond being.”29 Desire again names
the movement towards another, through the transformation of appropriation into
dispossession, which creates the responsible subject. Why should this subject-asresponsible not live under the name martyr, albeit with the added qualification of
singularity? Similarly, does a martyr refer once, multiple times, or does it instead
function as an existential quantifier?
I will not claim to answer these questions definitively, apart from a pithy
response, “Yes!” Not because the questions are necessarily rhetorical, but rather that
responsibility manifests in a variety of ways—as indicated in Goodhart’s synoptic list.
Instead, what I want to focus on for the remainder of this paper is the way in which my
metaphysical/metapolitical re-conception of the martyr opens up political possibilities
that operate outside of conventional pitfalls and yet, take up the challenges to which
many previous ventures had attempted to respond.
1) My proposal accounts for the failure of a libidinally-charged subject to be
anything other than an estranged mystic. Specifically, the subjectivity for which I
have argued remains responsible despite the torsion created by antagonistic
movements. Under my reading of Levinas’s martyr, one does not collapse into a
pleromatic abyss of hedonic emancipation but remains responsive to the needs of
the destitute up to and beyond death. In On Escape, Levinas writes of the ultimate
failure of pleasure to provide a way out of being—which I have argued is the
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arena of sacrificial violence.30 And in “Reflections on the Philosophy of
Hitlerism,” he makes it clear that a return to being, or elementary feelings, results
in a creation/discovery of Nietzsche’s ‘will to power.’ The subject grounded in
pleasure knows only ‘war and conquest.’31
2) The unbearable witness that I have described allows for conversion, or turning,
without which the conative self remains closed off to relationship. Levinas frames
this in terms of a diachronic intervention that an-archically grounds time itself.
Time is fundamentally a relation with the Other, and only secondarily does it
unfold in something of a patterned trajectory. If force, and force alone, counts for
the subject, then what remains is simply an arbitrary constellation of power in the
ocean of existence. No existent, no relation.
3) The interposed “me” does not fall victim to substantial critiques of free-will and
choice, nor does this subject slavishly serve the interests of a bio-cultural
program. As Levinas makes clear in Totality and Infinity, the interiority of
dwelling accomplishes a separation (atheism) that is never encompassed in some
kind of union or schema (53-60). This distance is central to the relationship,
which opens the possibility for both refusal and acceptance. How “I” witness
depends on the opening of “me” by the desire that originates elsewhere. In
privileging the role of the Other in constituting the subject, Levinas manages to
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steer clear of robust voluntarism but also refuses to vacate the possibilities of
relationship, which are never wholly determined.
E. Politics of Recurrence, or Interstitial Hyperpolitics
Briefly mentioned earlier, the term, “hyperpolitics,” as it relates to the
possibilities of Levinas’s philosophy, comes from the work of Asher Horowitz. Alone, it
refers to the superlative, the ‘beyond’ being as an intensification of expression. For
Levinas, the relation between transcendence (infinity) and concrete recurrences is not that
of the One and its parts.32 In other words, I cannot state this relation in terms of being,
which does not admit its wholly other, transcendence. Already, this task appears to strain
the least credulity, but I would argue that so also does the situation in which the
responsible subject finds him/herself.
Hyperpolitics invokes a politics of recurrence, not a static position or closed
discourse. As recurrent, it is constantly interrogated by the ethical relation. Rupture rather
than continuity, hyperpolitics is a movement restless in its pursuit of justice. To employ a
preferred Levinasian idiom here, hyperpolitics is the “saying saying saying itself, without
thematizing it, but exposing [the said] again” (OTB, 143). It suggests a radical passivity,
which affords a troubled ‘meanwhile,’ the attempt to return to a dwelling. A
hyperpolitical practice indexes sincerity as the “[undoing of] the alienation which saying
undergoes in the said, where, under the cover of words, in verbal indifference,
information is exchanged, pious wishes are put out, and responsibilities are fled” (OTB,
143). Instead of erecting yet another structure in an effort to patch the gaping holes of a
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particular apparatus, hyperpolitics pulls apart national dissimulations that impose
identities grounded in “blood and soil,” or perhaps a vague sentiment like that of many
liberal democracies.
Throughout this text, I have argued for a subject that is constrained by an infinite
demand coming from elsewhere. This dividual is borne by and in the response of
sincerity, which recurrently moves in the direction of justice. As a human singularized by
witness-bearing, I have decided to name this subject “martyr,” evoking historical
portrayals which sometimes serve to mislead more than offer a precise delineation of
witness. Levinas’s phenomenology of ‘unexplored horizons’ has aided me in my attempt
to respond to Girard’s concerns about the ‘sacred violence’ endemic to our species. Not
an erasure but a necessary pause in the development of mimetic theory, the witness is
necessary for the formation of alternative networks of relations, asymmetric distributions
of desire that create space for the refusal of violence.33 These spaces, which Levinas
names the “interval of difference,” articulate the possibility for a relational economy
working against the displacement of responsibility central to sacrifice (OTB, 141). As
such, the martyr is the expression of hope in multiplicity.
When combined with Horowitz’s “hyperpolitics,” Levinas’s martyr
communicates the interstices of praxis. This in-between movement occurs not necessarily
outside of the state—which assumes dominion at a certain level—but instead within the
aforementioned emancipatory spaces created by the ethical relation. To borrow a phrase
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from the Zapatista National Liberation Army, this space “opens a crack in history,”
through which the “rain taps her impatience.”34 These spaces establish an impermanent
otherwise; not a stasis but rather a non-presence that haunts the assemblies of struggle.
They name the obligation to the Other in different ways and continue to name the
obligation as the demand recurs in the voice of the voiceless. Because the recurrence
opens up a crack in the persistence of being, wherein emancipatory praxis sets forth, I
decided on “interstitial hyperpolitics” to name the relation between the martyr/witness
and a communal nexus of response.
Though Levinas uses the term distance to reference the interval between the Same
(Self) and the Other, Simon Critchley extends this discussion to include a radical
response to statist oppression: Politics should be conceived at a distance from the state,
taking up a distance in a specific situation.35 In creating/naming a distance from the state,
within the territory of the state, the state’s power—which largely proceeds from the
myths of omnipotence and omniscience—is announced as limited. Far from the god it
seeks to replace, the state operates arbitrarily and sporadically in its impossible efforts to
forestall the event—the name for what is impossible to comprehend and outside of
closure; in other words, the Other. The martyr’s embodiment as localized emancipatory
praxis not only undoes the alienation which Marx already decried, but also names a zone
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of opacity impenetrable by the panoptical apparatuses of surveillance.36 Quite simply, all
of this says “interstitial hyperpolitics.”
However, it is essential at this juncture to avoid hasty departures into strategy
sessions. As Levinas makes abundantly clear throughout his writings, the ethical relation
interrogates all political formations, even those that could possibly be understood as both
interstitial and hyperpolitical. In fact, as indicated above, my reasoning behind both this
name and the term, “martyr,” stems from the recurrence of an otherwise. Just when I
become convinced that I am on the “right” path, the demand of the Other threatens to
undo my ‘movemental’ assumptions. Called to give account for my activity, I speak in
guilt for a certain neglect that is constitutive of my life in the world. It bears repeating
that this ‘guilt’ is not moral. I have not transgressed a written law, nor have I violated a
commandment from ‘God on high.’ Instead, I have forgotten the relation that births,
bears, and troubles all gestures. And I forget precisely because only the trace presents in
the face of the Other. I am created—seemingly—ex nihilo, as there is no observable sign
of a creator. Responsible subjectivity testifies to what is not seen but rather ‘felt’ in a
place impossible to excavate.
Though it bears a certain resemblance to paradox, Horowitz suggests that readers
avoid too quickly assigning this term to the political import of Levinas’s thought. “Only
if politics and justice are to be identified strictly with rational peace” does there
necessarily exist a paradox, whereby ethics and politics nullify each other.37 Since the
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Saying is not strictly correlative with the Said, and in fact calls it into question
diachronically, politics is not simply a translation—no matter the sophistication—of
ethics. Recall that ethics is the “saying saying saying,” which is a difficult way of putting
forth the argument that ethics exposes politics. The ethical subject becomes a sign, rather
than using signs to communicate some positive thought or well-wish. Responsibility is
just this expressiveness, a becoming-sign, or a becoming-witness to the demand and need
of the Other.
When I write of a movement, or assembling, I am hinting at another potential
issue for readers of Levinas. As Enrique Dussel makes clear in his analysis of Levinas’s
philosophy, the subject in Levinas all-too-often has the sense of bourgeois individualism.
Dussel seeks to correct this by historicizing the subject, but in doing so, quite possibly
avoids the topic central to the ethical-political relation in Levinas. In other words,
Dussel’s extension runs the risk of ‘fixing’ the relationship, erring on the side of a
structuralist appropriation rather than an aporetic disengagement and obsession. Dussel
accuses Levinas of an epistemological individualism, but it is quite possible, then, that he
consequently mutes the social relation/fraternity to such an extent that the multiplicity is
prefigured, and thus dead-on-arrival.38 In contrast, Levinas would have a network of
relations invisible from the outside, a multiplicity proceeding from one to the other (TI,
120). Dussel is right in cautioning the reader against reification, domination, and
exploitation, which are all utilized by national regimes to prevent revolution. However,
Levinas’s main point concerns ethical motivation, not historical analysis. It is my
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contention that a liberationist approach, like that of Dussel, can easily be developed from
Levinas’s investigation of the subject-as-responsible, though it is never prescribed.
A stronger candidate for clarifying Levinas’s subject-analysis is the philosophical
category of labor; specifically, the way in which labor opens up a further discussion of
the will, which is “exposed to the other by its work” (TI, 226).39 Marx earlier noted the
alienation of labor under capital, which refuses the inherently social bond evidenced in
labor. In Levinas, the forgetting of sociality occurs in the supremacy of the Said, which
conceals and mystifies. Like alienated works, the sublimation of the Said participates in
the fetishism of commodities and resigns human community to a rational peace. Since the
injunction in Levinas’s work is to go beyond a rational peace, the subject must be
discovered not only in the “expression secured in language, but [in] the language of
expression buried in works.”40 What initially appears to Dussel and others as a rigid and
bourgeois individualism suggests instead an inherent sociality in the formation of the
subject, not only as a human fraternity in language but also through the works by which
the Other is nurtured. Fecundity is this unity—of labor and language—that engenders
multiplicity. Not a unity united under a schema but rather a unity that stands with
multiplicity. Since the market threatens to overdetermine the ethical relation Levinas
works to highlight, the subject-as-witness responds not only to the demand of the Other
but to the violability of the will.
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As violable, the will provides a glimpse into the possibility of servitude. The
subject is involved but not expressed in the work, and consequently, the work requires
interpretation (TI, 176-178). As a symbol, the work “takes on the anonymity of
merchandise” (TI, 226-227). It can be appropriated and put to work against me, reducing
me to the role of servant. The will, therefore, is somewhat at odds with itself, or at the
very least, is “not entirely what it wants to do.”41 This leads to conflict, since a will
sensitized to the possibility of servitude and cognizant of its violability prepares for war.
Having been violated at some point, and thus made painfully aware of the frightening
possibilities, the Same/Will approaches the Other as an enemy, a threat. The best it can
hope for is a calculated peace.
Levinas’s push beyond a rational peace is also his contention that buried beneath
work is the expression of a subject, an expression that is fundamentally related to
responsibility for the Other. In the depths of both language and work (as evidence of
primordial vulnerability) is the gift/burden of witness. The martyr is the name I have
chosen for this ‘bearing that is birthing.’ And as I have argued throughout this text, the
burden is impossible, incapable of being voluntarily assumed and or fully/completely
lived-into. Therefore, all subjectivation, all politics, is ever only a becoming, but not for
the sake of a becoming as in Nietzsche and Deleuze (or maybe just Deleuze’s Nietzsche).
Instead, Levinas will situate the becoming-subject in relation to the infinite demand that
does not orient—properly speaking—but rather disorients and questions the assumptions
of conative being. My direction, be it political or social in outlook, is recurrently affected
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by the witness I bear, and in bearing witness, I am evincing martyrdom as the first
expression of a subject, if not the last.
F. A Final Reply
I began this work with a brief discussion of mimetic theory, originating in René
Girard’s work but continuing to be developed today. I acknowledged my own debt to this
scholarship, and I offered my reading of Levinasian subjectivity—named martyrdom—as
a critical supplement to future research. From there, I devoted some time to examining
the origins of phenomenology in order to better contextualize both Levinas and my belief
in the need for a vision of the subject, however tentative it may be. Deposed, burdened,
accused, the subject that has emerged is unrecognizable to much of Western philosophy,
particularly the Anglophone tradition. In contrast to a virile rationality, I have argued for
a fundamentally vulnerable and relational subject that is not predicated on either the
metaphysics of substance or transcendental apperception. To my mind, this allows for
new possibilities in discussions of the human and post-human, or at least it serves to
reframe the conversation.
I do maintain, along with mimetic theorists, that hominids are especially violent,
and that this violence is related to mimetic desire. I have simply suggested that mimetic
desire is not the only desire but is actually founded on a deeper desire for the infinite, an
“aspiration for exteriority,” which at the very least grants an ‘otherwise’ to the tragic
forecast for human beings. I have named the subject possessed by this infinite desire,
martyr, and the witness borne by the martyr is precisely what is required for a peace that
is not simply rational, not simply a postponement of the war that is inevitable. With
Levinas, I would suggest similarly that war itself is founded on something other, an
174

interval of difference that makes room for a relationship of expropriation, not
appropriation. When I have written of the martyr, I have had in mind a dispossessed onemultiple (unity and multiplicity), a donation, a first gift that is “not the gift of anything I
have ever owned, but the destruction of the ownership I never had.42
Violence remains a reality for the entire world. Not just the potential violence of
life without which we would not exist, but a hyperviolence that threatens to further
alienate persons from one another through the vehicles of market and state—fully
acknowledging the symbiotic relationship between the two. What I have presented does
not disparage the ingenious work of Girard and others but rather enters into relationship
with them through the lens of the martyr, the singularized witness that stands alongside
others, and other others, through the gift of responsibility. My hope is that by casting a
different vision of subjectivity, Levinas (and those who have taken up his work) will call
into question problematic assumptions that endanger all life and conceal the underlying
recurrence of an-Other’s call, thereby gifting all persons with an unbearable burden that
confers meaning in an impossible situation.
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